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Preface
The project EuTRACE (European Transdisciplinary Assessment of Climate Engineering) was funded from June 
2012 through September 2014 by the EU as a Coordination and Support Action (CSA) in the 7th Framework 
Programme (FP7). EuTRACE brought together a consortium of 14 partner institutions that worked together to 
compile this assessment report. Consortium members represented various disciplines with expertise on the 
topic of climate engineering. This assessment report is the main result of the project.
The EuTRACE assessment report is provided in three parts (all available via www.eutrace.org):
 the full report, which provides extensive details and references for any readers who are interested in an in-depth 
insight into the range of main issues associated with the topic of climate engineering;
 an extended summary, aimed at a broad range of readers, providing an overview of the main results of the 
report, but leaving out most details; the extended summary follows the overall structure of the assessment 
report but does not include literature references in order to enhance readability;
 an executive summary, aimed especially at policy makers and other readers interested in an overview of the 
main actionable results of the assessment.  
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Executive Summary  
of the EuTRACE Report
Background and General 
Considerations 
There is a broad scientific consensus that humans are 
changing the composition of the atmosphere and that 
this, in turn, is modifying the climate and other global 
systems. The likely harmful impacts on societies and 
ecosystems, along with possibilities for mitigation and 
adaptation, have been documented in the assessment 
reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). 
In this context, various researchers, policy makers, 
and other stakeholders have also begun to consider 
“climate engineering” (also known as “geoengineer-
ing” or “climate intervention”) as a further response 
to climate change. Most climate engineering tech-
niques can be grouped into two broad categories:
 “greenhouse gas removal”: proposals for reducing 
the rate of global warming by removing large amounts 
of CO2 or other greenhouse gases from the atmos-
phere and sequestering them over long periods;
 “albedo modification”: proposals for cooling the 
Earth’s surface by increasing the amount of solar radi-
ation that is reflected back to space (“albedo” is the 
fraction of incoming light reflected away from a sur-
face).
The EuTRACE assessment report provides an over-
view of a broad range of techniques that have been 
proposed for climate engineering. Research on cli-
mate engineering has thus far been limited, mostly 
based on climate models and small-scale field trials. 
To illustrate the range of complex environmental and 
societal issues that climate engineering raises, the 
EuTRACE assessment focuses on three example tech-
niques: bio-energy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS), ocean iron fertilisation (OIF), and strat-
ospheric aerosol injection (SAI).
In general, it is not yet clear whether it would be pos-
sible to develop and scale up any proposed climate 
engineering technique to the extent that it could be 
implemented to significantly reduce climate change. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the costs and 
impacts on societies and the environment associated 
with individual techniques would be considered 
acceptable in exchange for a reduction of 
global warming and its impacts, and how such accept-
ability or unacceptability could be established demo- 
cratically.
Against this background, a broad and robust under-
standing of the topic of climate engineering would be 
valuable, were national and international policies, 
regulation, and governance to be developed. This 
could be supported by coordinated, interdisciplinary 
research combined with stakeholder dialogue, taking 
into account a range of issues, including the potential 
opportunities, the scientific and technical challenges, 
and the societal context within which wide-ranging 
concerns are being raised in discussions about climate 
engineering.
Opportunities and Scientific and 
Technical Challenges
Greenhouse gas removal techniques could possibly be 
used someday to significantly reduce the amount of 
anthropogenic CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the 
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atmosphere. This could present an important long-
term opportunity to limit or partly reverse climate 
change, given that anthropogenic CO2, once emitted, 
remains within the climate system for more than a 
hundred years on average. However, such techniques 
face numerous scientific and technical challenges, 
including:
 determining whether the techniques could be 
scaled up from current prototypes, and what the costs 
of this might be;
 determining the constraints imposed by various 
technique-dependent factors, such as available bio-
mass;
 developing the very large-scale infrastructures and 
energy inputs, along with the accompanying financial 
and legal structures, that most of the proposed tech-
niques would require; based on existing knowledge 
and experience, this could take many decades before 
it could have a significant impact on global CO2 con-
centrations. 
For albedo modification, initial model simulations 
have shown that several proposed techniques could 
potentially be used to cool the climate significantly 
and rapidly (within a year or less, and possibly at rela-
tively low operational costs). This would be the only 
known method that could potentially be implemented 
to reduce the near-term impacts of unmitigated global 
warming. However, in addition to the societal con-
cerns outlined in the next section, it is unclear 
whether any of the proposed albedo modification 
techniques would ever be technically feasible. There 
are numerous scientific and technical challenges that 
would first need to be addressed to determine this, 
including:
 very large and costly infrastructures that land-based 
techniques would require; 
 delivery mechanisms for techniques based on injec-
tion of aerosol particles into the atmosphere, includ-
ing delivery vessels (e.g., high-flying aircraft or teth-
ered balloons) and associated nozzle technologies;
 a much deeper understanding of the underlying 
physical processes, such as the microphysics of parti-
cles and clouds, as well as how modification of these 
would affect the climate on a global and regional basis.
A further challenge that generally applies to both 
greenhouse gas removal and albedo modification is 
that their application could result in numerous tech-
nique-specific harmful impacts on ecosystems and 
the environment, many of which are presently uncer-
tain or unknown. 
Societal Context 
The development and implementation of any of these 
proposed climate engineering techniques would 
occur within a complex societal context where 
numerous concerns arise, including: 
 public awareness and perception;
 the “moral hazard” argument (the concern that 
research on climate engineering would discourage the 
overall efforts to reduce or avoid emissions of green-
house gases);
 the sense of environmental responsibility in the 
Anthropocene;
 possible effects of various climate engineering tech-
niques on human security, conflict risks, and societal 
stability;
 expected economic impacts;
 justice considerations, including the distribution of 
benefits and costs, procedural justice for democratic 
decision making, and compensation for harms 
imposed on some regions by measures that benefit 
others.
It can be expected that these concerns, as well as the 
scientific and technical challenges discussed above, 
would take considerable time to resolve, if this is at all 
possible. Thus, it appears imprudent to expect either 
greenhouse gas removal or albedo modification to 
play a significant role in climate policy developments 
in the next decade, or even within the next several 
decades, although it is possible that one or more of the 
climate engineering techniques that are currently 
being discussed will become an option for climate 
policy in the latter half of this century.
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Development of Policies, Regulation, 
and Governance 
Developing effective regulation and governance for 
the range of proposed climate engineering techniques 
would require researchers, policy makers, and  other 
stakeholders to work together to address the uncer-
tainties and risks involved. At present, no existing 
international treaty body is in a position to broadly 
regulate greenhouse gas removal, albedo modifica-
tion, or climate engineering in its entirety. The devel-
opment of such a dedicated, overarching treaty (or 
treaties) for this purpose would presently be a pro-
hibitively large undertaking, if at all realisable. 
Thus far, two treaty bodies, the London Convention/
London Protocol (LC/LP) and the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity (CBD), have taken up discussions and 
passed the first resolutions and decisions on climate 
engineering. Furthermore, it has often been suggested 
that the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) could contribute to reg-
ulating various individual techniques or aspects of 
climate engineering. 
In light of this, one option that the EU could follow if 
it were to decide to try to promote a more coordi-
nated approach to the regulation of climate engineer-
ing would be to bring together the LC/LP, CBD, and 
UNFCCC at the operational level. This could be done, 
for example, through parallel action, common assess-
ment frameworks, and Memoranda of Understanding. 
A further option for EU member states (which are all 
parties to both the UNFCCC and the CBD) could be 
to pursue an agreement on a common position on 
various techniques or general aspects of climate engi-
neering. In particular, such an agreement could be 
made consistent with the high degree of importance 
that EU primary law places on environmental protec-
tion. 
For the more general development of climate engi-
neering governance (in addition to formal regulation), 
the EuTRACE assessment highlights five overarching 
principles for guiding the academic research commu-
nity and policy makers: 
 minimisation of harm; 
 the precautionary principle; 
 the principle of transparency; 
 the principle of international cooperation;
 research as a public good.  
Based on these principles, the EuTRACE assessment 
proposes several strategies that could broadly be 
applied across all climate engineering approaches in 
support of developing effective governance:
 early public engagement, including targeted public 
communication platforms;
 independent assessment;
 operationalising transparency through adoption of 
research disclosure mechanisms;
 coordinating international legal efforts through 
activities like those discussed above, e.g., common 
assessment frameworks, as well as through develop-
ment and joint adoption of a code of conduct for 
research;
 applying frameworks of responsible innovation and 
anticipatory governance to natural sciences and engi-
neering research.
Should the EU decide to develop clear and explicit 
policies for research on climate engineering, or its 
potential future deployment, then a conscientious 
application of the principles and strategies discussed 
in the EuTRACE assessment may help ensure coher-
ence and consistency with the basic principles upon 
which broader European research and environmental 
policy are built.
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1. Introduction
There is a broad scientific consensus that humans are 
changing the composition of the atmosphere, and that 
this is leading to global climate change (IPCC, 2013a). 
The implications of climate change have been recog-
nised internationally, reflected for example in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). However, the national and inter-
national mitigation efforts encouraged by this recog-
nition have not yet been sufficient to stop the global 
increase in greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2013a, 
pp. 486). In light of this, numerous studies have been 
conducted and plans developed, from the local to the 
international level, for adapting to climate change, 
with the general recognition that while adaptation can 
reduce the vulnerability to some impacts, it can be dif-
ficult and often costly, and in some cases might not 
even be possible (Klein et al., 2014). 
 
1.1 The context: climate change 
The threats posed by global climate change are widely 
acknowledged and have recently been extensively 
described in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 2013a), the key results of which are briefly 
summarised here. One of the most important global 
environmental changes caused by humans is the 
increase in the carbon dioxide (CO2) content of the 
atmosphere from about 0.028 % to about 0.04 % over 
the last two centuries. This increase in CO2 concen-
tration has arisen mainly from the combustion of fos-
sil fuels and is responsible for approximately half of 
the current anthropogenic global warming. The com-
bined warming influence of other anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases, together with sunlight-absorbing 
soot particles, is of a similar magnitude to that of CO2 
(IPCC, 2013a). At the same time, other anthropogenic 
aerosol particles containing sulphate and nitrate 
reflect sunlight, and also cause clouds to be more 
reflective, partially masking the warming trend. How-
ever, the strength of this aerosol effect on the climate 
is uncertain, shows significant regional variations, and 
does not simply reduce temperatures, but also affects 
other aspects of the climate such as precipitation pat-
terns, so that it cannot merely be seen as cancelling 
out a fraction of the global warming. Taken together, 
these changes have resulted in a net increase in the 
average surface temperature of the Earth, as depicted 
in Figure 1.1. The IPCC indicates that the “best esti-
mate of the human-induced contribution to warming 
is similar to the observed warming” (IPCC, 2013b, p. 
15), which is about 0.8°C over the last two centuries, 
and that “it is extremely likely that more than half of 
the observed increase in global average surface tem-
perature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthro-
pogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations 
and other anthropogenic forcings together” (IPCC, 
2013b, p. 15). 
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Figure 1.1:   
(a) Observed global 
mean combined land and 
ocean surface tem-
perature anomalies, from 
1850 to 2012 from three 
data sets. Top panel: 
annual mean values; 
Bottom panel: decadal 
mean values including 
estimated uncertainty 
for one dataset (for both 
panels, the colours rep-
resent different datasets: 
black – HADCRUT4 (ver-
sion 4.1.1.0); blue – NASA 
GISS; orange – NCDC 
MLOST (version 3.5.2); 
the shaded area in the 
bottom panel shows 
the uncertainty in the 
HADCRUT4 dataset). 
Anomalies are relative to 
the mean of the period 
1961 − 1990.   
(b) Map of observed  
surface temperature 
change from 1901 to 2012 
derived from tempera-
ture trends determined 
by linear regression from 
one dataset (orange line 
in panel a).  
 
Source:  
IPCC AR5 Working 
Group 1 Summary for 
Policymakers; see report 
for further details.  
Observed change in surface temperature 1901 – 2012(b)
Observed globally averaged combined land and 
ocean surface temperature anomaly 1850 – 2012
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1. Introduction
As part of the IPCC report, projections of the evolu-
tion of global mean temperatures for a range of future 
scenarios have been made using climate models. 
Compared to the contemporary climate (1986 – 2005 
average), the projected warming for the end of the 21st 
century (2081 – 2100 average) ranges from 0.3 to 1.7°C 
under a scenario of stringent mitigation, and from 2.6 
to 4.8°C under a fossil-fuel-intensive scenario (IPCC, 
2013b). The large range of temperatures for each sce-
nario is due to uncertainties in the magnitude of the 
climate feedbacks that both amplify and dampen the 
warming response, as well as to uncertainties in the 
treatment of many climate-relevant atmospheric 
processes, such as the formation of clouds and pre-
cipitation and how these are influenced by anthropo-
genic aerosol particles. Discussion of these scenarios 
often focuses on the change in the global mean tem-
perature; however, within each scenario there are also 
considerable regional differences, with greater warm-
ing expected over land than over oceans, and the 
greatest warming occurring in the Arctic region 
(IPCC, 2013b). 
The accumulation of CO2 and other greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere will have a profound effect on 
human societies and ecosystems, as will the broader 
changes in the climate and Earth system that will 
accompany the rise in global temperatures (IPCC, 
2014c). Higher temperatures are likely to increase the 
frequency and intensity of heat waves  (Meehl and 
Tebaldi, 2004), and lengthen the melting and growing 
seasons (Bitz et al., 2012; Tagesson et al., 2012) with 
far-reaching ecological consequences in cold regions 
(Post et al., 2009). The distribution of precipitation is 
expected to change, with dry regions frequently 
becoming drier and wet regions becoming wetter 
(Held and Soden, 2006), although uncertainties 
remain in both this and the differences between con-
tinental and marine responses. In general, the inten-
sity of precipitation is expected to increase, with rain 
occurring in more intense downpours between longer 
periods of low precipitation (Liu et al., 2009), which 
could lead to more floods and more intense droughts 
(Held and Soden, 2006). Higher temperatures will 
also continue to cause rising sea levels as the warming 
ocean expands and glaciers and ice sheets melt 
(Schaeffer et al., 2012). Elevated CO2 concentrations 
will also have a direct fertilising effect on vegetation, 
generally increasing net primary productivity (photo-
synthesis minus autotrophic respiration) and water-
use efficiency (Franks et al., 2013). However, climate 
changes will also stress plants, potentially reducing 
net primary productivity in some regions (Lobell et 
al., 2011), with substantial consequences for terrestrial 
ecosystems and hydrology (Heyder et al., 2011). Rising 
CO2 concentrations are also causing ocean acidifica-
tion, affecting many marine organisms, particularly 
shell-forming organisms such as coral reefs and mol-
luscs (Kroeker et al., 2010). These changes to the 
physical environment and the biosphere will affect 
human societies, for example through changes to nat-
ural hazards and effects on agricultural productivity 
and infrastructure (IPCC, 2014c).
1.2 Engineering the climate as a  
proposed response to climate change
Against this background, various researchers, policy 
makers, and other stakeholders have begun to con-
sider responses to climate change via methods that 
cannot easily be subsumed under the categories of 
mitigation and adaptation. The first question that is 
often raised is: are there viable ways to remove large 
amounts of CO2 and other greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere? Many ideas have been proposed for this, 
which vary considerably in their approach, and 
include combining biomass use for energy generation 
with carbon capture and storage (Biomass Energy 
with Carbon Capture and Storage, BECCS), large-
scale afforestation, and fertilising the oceans in order 
to induce growth of phytoplankton and thus increase 
the uptake of CO2 from the atmosphere.
Going beyond ideas for removing greenhouse gases, 
the question has also been raised: are there also pos-
sibilities for directly cooling the Earth? Several ideas 
have been proposed that could potentially do so, 
most aiming to increase the planetary albedo, i.e., the 
amount of solar radiation that is reflected (mostly by 
clouds or at the Earth’s surface) and therefore not 
absorbed by the Earth. Techniques have been pro-
posed that would act at a range of altitudes, including 
whitening surfaces, making clouds brighter, injecting 
aerosol particles into the stratosphere, and placing 
mirrors in space. Another proposed technique would 
involve modifying cirrus clouds to increase the 
amount of terrestrial radiation leaving the Earth. In 
this report, all of these approaches are subsumed 
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under the term “albedo modification and related 
techniques”.
Taken together, ideas for greenhouse gas removal and 
for albedo modification are often referred to by the 
umbrella term, climate engineering. Both of these 
concepts would act on the global surface–atmos-
phere radiation budget, but in very distinct ways, as 
depicted in Figure 1.2. Greenhouse gas removal 
would decrease the amount of outgoing radiation 
that is trapped by greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere, thus decreasing the downward flux of infrared 
radiation at the Earth’s surface. Planetary albedo 
modification, on the other hand, would increase the 
Earth’s natural reflection of solar radiation at various 
possible altitudes, as noted above.
Figure 1.2:   
Global surface–atmos-
phere solar and terrestri-
al radiation budget; solar 
radiation (largely visible) 
components are shown 
on the left, terrestrial ra-
diation (largely infrared) 
components are on the 
right, and sensible and  
latent surface–atmos-
phere energy transfer are 
in the middle. Red-circled 
labels indicate the main 
foci of proposed climate 
engineering: removal of 
greenhouse gases, and 
increasing the planetary 
albedo, either at the 
surface, or via clouds or 
aerosol particles (space 
mirrors are not discussed 
in detail in this report and 
thus are not shown).  
 
Source:  
Adapted from Kiehl and 
Trenberth (1997).  
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 Although this assessment focuses on the range of 
ideas being discussed under climate engineering, it is 
important to keep in mind that they are generally 
being considered within the broader context of miti-
gation and adaptation as the primary responses to 
climate change. Mitigation and adaptation are dis-
cussed extensively in the assessment reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Mitigation is defined by the IPCC as “technological 
change and substitution that reduce resource inputs 
and emissions per unit of output”, further specifying 
that “although several social, economic and techno-
logical policies would produce an emission reduction, 
with respect to climate change, mitigation means 
implementing policies to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions and enhance sinks” (IPCC, 2007a). This defini-
tion implies that methods aiming at reducing natural 
sources or enhancing natural sinks of CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases can be considered to qualify as mit-
igation policies, and is consistent with the usage of 
this terminology by the UNFCCC. Therefore, tech-
niques such as reforestation, afforestation, improved 
soil carbon sequestration, and enhanced weathering 
can, in principle, be classified as both mitigation and 
as climate engineering via greenhouse gas removal, 
depending on the definition of climate engineering 
that is being employed and, where appropriate, the 
scale of the intervention. Carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) usually refers to proposed mitigation technolo-
gies that would reduce CO2 emissions directly at vari-
ous sources, e.g., capturing CO2 from flue gases of 
power plants, so is generally classified as mitigation 
(IPCC, 2005). However, in the sense that CCS would 
cause substantial modification of geological reservoirs 
if implemented at a scale that had a significant impact 
on the global atmospheric CO2 burden, it is some-
times also classified as geoengineering (although usu-
ally not as climate engineering). CCS combined with 
bio-energy generation (BECCS) would remove CO2 at 
the emission source, but can also be considered an 
enhancement of a natural sink (through vegetation). It 
accordingly sits at the boundary between mitigation 
and greenhouse gas removal. Removing CO2 directly 
from the atmosphere is commonly referred to as 
“direct air capture” or “free air capture”, which is nor-
mally considered to be a type of climate engineering 
by greenhouse gas removal, distinct from mitigation 
efforts. 
The fifth IPCC assessment report defines adaptation 
as the “process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation 
seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial 
opportunities. In some natural systems, human inter-
vention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate 
and its effects” (IPCC, 2014c). In its fourth assessment 
report, the IPCC (2007b) specified that “various 
types of adaptation exist”, and defined various axes 
such as “anticipatory and reactive”, “private and pub-
lic”, and “autonomous and planned”. Key examples 
include raising and reinforcing dykes on rivers or 
coasts, and the substitution of plants sensitive to tem-
perature shocks with more resilient species. Central 
to the concept of adaptation is the idea of reducing the 
vulnerability of natural and human systems to climate 
change through modification of these systems. Here, 
approaches such as whitening the facades and roofs of 
buildings are generally considered to be forms of 
adaption (to moderate the urban heat island effect), 
but if conducted on a sufficiently large scale they 
could also be classified as climate engineering by 
modifying the planetary albedo (Oleson et al., 2010; 
Akbari et al., 2009). 
Whether an intervention into the Earth system quali-
fies as climate engineering is often considered to be a 
matter of intent and scale. Whilst some techniques 
can be considered either mitigation or climate engi-
neering (or both), usually depending on their scale, it 
has been argued that the classification is not a purely 
technical matter, rather that the umbrella term cli-
mate engineering signifies that proposals for large-
scale deliberate interventions into the Earth system 
deserve special scrutiny and attention (Jamieson, 
2013). In this context, a general definition of climate 
engineering is proposed here, along with other terms 
used in this report, in Box 1.1. In the literature, the 
terms geoengineering and climate engineering are 
often used interchangeably with only subtle differ-
ences (as noted in the example above); the term cli-
mate engineering is adopted here, as it is more specific 
and the intent is more immediately apparent (Caldeira 
and Wood, 2008, Feichter and Leisner, 2009, GAO, 
2011; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011; Rickels et al., 2011).
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The broad definition of climate engineering has been 
widely adopted and there is general agreement on 
many of the techniques that it should encompass. 
However, it is important to realise that the application 
of the blanket term can sometimes be misleading, and 
that there are limits to the applicability of general 
statements on climate engineering, since the effects, 
side effects,  associated risks, ethical dimensions, and 
the economic, social, and political contexts differ 
greatly for each of the various climate engineering 
techniques (Heyward, 2013; Boucher et al., 2014). As a 
result, many arguments only apply to a sub-set of the 
techniques or to single techniques, and the research 
community faces the challenge of carefully differenti-
ating between the various climate engineering tech-
niques and their implications in their analyses, as well 
as elucidating commonalities that justify the judicious 
use of the blanket term. The individual techniques are 
distinguished carefully in the report, and are general-
ised to either classes of climate engineering (i.e., 
greenhouse gas removal or albedo modification and 
related techniques) or to climate engineering as a 
whole only where appropriate. In some contexts the 
term climate engineering is applied, but only refers to 
one particular type or technique, in which case an 
appropriate modifier is applied (e.g., “climate engi-
neering by greenhouse gas removal”, or “climate engi-
neering by stratospheric aerosol injection”).
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Box 1.1   EuTRACE term Definition
Initiatives and measures to reduce or 
prevent anthropogenic emissions of 
climate-forcing agents into the 
atmosphere. 
The process of adjustment to actual 
or expected climate; seeks to moder-
ate or avoid harm or to exploit benefi-
cial opportunities.
A collective term for a wide range 
of proposed techniques that could 
potentially be used to deliberately 
counteract climate change by either 
directly modifying the climate itself 
or by making targeted changes to 
the composition of the atmosphere, 
without seeking to reduce anthropo-
genic emissions of greenhouse gases 
or other warming agents.
Removal of atmospheric CO2 and 
other long-lived greenhouse gases.
Deliberate modification of incoming 
solar or outgoing terrestrial radiation 
on a regional to global scale.
Mitigation
Adaptation
Climate Engineering 
(or Geoengineering) 
Greenhouse Gas Removal
Albedo Modification
Definition of terms for responses to climate change 
In order to help elucidate several of the physical and 
societal considerations associated with climate engi-
neering more clearly and concretely, three selected 
techniques are discussed in greater detail. Two of 
these are techniques for greenhouse gas removal –
bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) 
and ocean iron fertilisation (OIF) – and the other is a 
technique for modifying the Earth’s albedo – strat-
ospheric aerosol injection (SAI). These techniques 
were chosen for several reasons. They are among the 
most discussed techniques in the literature and in the 
broader socio-political context, including some of the 
most advanced governance discussions and – espe-
cially for OIF – the most advanced actual governance 
developments, as well as the most extensive field 
experimentation. They include one land-based, one 
ocean-based, and one atmosphere-based technique. 
They encompass techniques that could potentially be 
confined to small areas (BECCS), and thus are not 
always considered to be a climate engineering tech-
nique, and others that are transboundary in nature 
(OIF and SAI). They are currently at very different 
stages of research, as well as technological and gov-
ernance development, and their presumed levels of 
effectiveness and potential risks also differ widely.
BECCS is a technique that fits the definitions given 
above for both mitigation and climate engineering. It 
was also included in the future climate change sce-
narios of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Moss et 
al., 2008). Of particular importance, the only IPCC 
scenario with more than 50 % probability of meeting 
the internationally agreed target of limiting mean glo-
bal temperature rise to less than 2°C includes wide-
spread use of BECCS in the second half of the 21st 
century.
OIF is a greenhouse gas removal technique that has 
received attention since natural variations in oceanic 
iron supply were first postulated to have played a role 
in glacial – interglacial changes in atmospheric CO2 
(Martin et al., 1990). More than a dozen field tests 
since the 1990s have consistently shown that, under 
specific circumstances, a small input of iron can have 
a large effect on iron-limited ocean ecosystems, pro-
ducing large plankton blooms that might carry carbon 
to depth, although a large and long-term iron input 
would also perturb these ecosystems in ways that are 
difficult to foresee. Research over the past two dec-
ades has generally shown that OIF may have only a 
limited effect on atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
(Boyd et al., 2007; Buesseler et al., 2008). However, 
OIF is still being considered and pursued by some as 
a possible means to remove excess CO2 from the 
atmosphere, and is an interesting case study. This is 
especially relevant from the perspective of govern-
ance, since examination of past developments on OIF 
may yield insights into more general governance 
aspects of climate engineering (in both its main 
forms), since OIF has received the most regulatory 
attention, especially through the London Convention 
and London Protocol (LC/LP), as described in Section 
4.1.2.
SAI is the albedo modification technique that is cur-
rently receiving the most attention. The goal of this 
technique is to create an effect roughly analogous to 
that of a large volcanic eruption, i.e., a cooling of the 
planet through the reflection of sunlight by aerosols in 
the stratosphere (Crutzen, 2006, Budyko, 1974), 
although with different timing and geographical dis-
tribution. If delivery and dispersal of particles were to 
prove technically feasible and politically implementa-
ble, SAI could induce a rapid cooling effect on the cli-
mate. It is thus often referred to as a “high-leverage” 
technique (Keith et al., 2010), which could have a large 
effect over a short period of time, potentially at a rela-
tively low cost (Robock et al., 2010; McClellan et al., 
2012). However, SAI and all other albedo modification 
techniques could not reverse the effects of elevated 
GHG concentrations, but would instead change the 
climate in ways that might reduce some climate 
impacts, not affect others, and potentially introduce 
new risks (Rasch et al., 2008; Robock et al., 2008; 
Tilmes et al., 2009).
1.3 Understanding climate  
engineering: the role of scenarios  
and numerical climate modelling
 
Our understanding of most of the physical effects of 
climate engineering primarily comes from theoretical 
and modelling studies. For most techniques, dedi-
cated field tests have not been carried out. In addition, 
many details of the effects of full-scale deployment 
cannot be scaled up or anticipated from small-scale 
field tests. This section describes some of the model-
ling tools used to understand the potential effects of 
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greenhouse gas removal and albedo modification 
techniques on the Earth system.
 
Coupled Atmosphere–Ocean General Circulation 
Models (AOGCMs), often simply called “climate mod-
els”, have been the standard tool for studying climate 
variability and climate change since the 1990s. In the 
last decade, Earth System Models (ESMs) have also 
become common; these add the treatment of the car-
bon cycle and other large-scale processes to the 
AOGCMs. These global models are used to make pro-
jections of how the climate system will evolve in the 
coming century and beyond. The projections of these 
models are supported by a range of other modelling 
tools, from process models such as cloud-resolving 
models that help to improve the understanding of 
cloud feedbacks, to impact models such as crop mod-
els that evaluate the effects of climate change on crop 
yield. The communities working on modelling climate 
change are well developed and coordinated, and 
through projects such as the Coupled Model Inter-
comparison Project (CMIP), where many AOGCMs 
are compared systematically, they work together to 
better understand the model projections and their 
uncertainties, forming the basis for the assessments 
that are carried out in the WG1 contributions to the 
IPCC reports.
The evaluation of the potential climate effects of 
greenhouse gas removal and albedo modification 
techniques is not as mature as the evaluation of 
anthropogenic climate change, but draws on the same 
tools and knowledge base. Greenhouse gas removal 
and albedo modification are fundamentally different 
in terms of their effects on the Earth system. Remov-
ing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere would 
reduce their concentration, or at least their rate of 
increase, indirectly reducing the amount of global 
warming, whereas modifying the planetary albedo 
would alter the climate directly. There has been little 
work on the detailed climate and Earth system conse-
quences of greenhouse gas removal in general and 
only a few studies focused on specific techniques, e.g., 
afforestation (Ornstein et al., 2009; Swann et al., 
2010). This is in part because the effects of green-
house gas removal do not differ much from the effects 
of mitigation, as both approaches would alter the con-
centrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
However, greenhouse gas removal enables scenarios 
that include negative net global emissions of CO2. 
This would allow concentrations of CO2 to decline 
much faster than by means of natural processes. Some 
studies have investigated the climate consequences of 
such peak-and-decline scenarios (Boucher et al., 2012). 
Since implementing an albedo modification technique 
would constitute a direct modification of the climate 
with the intention of reducing the impacts of climate 
change, evaluating of the consequences for the climate 
and the Earth system is critical to understanding the 
potential utility and risks. This understanding and the 
related decision-making process will eventually rely 
on effective detection and attribution of the impacts 
of any albedo modification technique, which presents 
challenges such as those discussed in Box 1.2. The 
observational component of detection and attribution 
will also depend on a complementary contribution 
from model analyses.  
Thus far, most modelling studies have not yet focused 
on the specific issue of detection and attribution, but 
rather on the range of consequences of various albedo 
modification techniques for the climate and Earth sys-
tem. These comprise both idealised model simulations 
that improve our understanding of the basic response 
to albedo modification (Lunt et al., 2008; Irvine et al., 
2011; Kravitz et al., 2013a) as well as more realistic 
deployment scenarios to understand potential 
impacts in context. This can be achieved, for example, 
by using the scenarios employed in the IPCC assess-
ments as a baseline and then applying albedo modifi-
cation to achieve a specific temperature or radiative 
forcing target (Kravitz et al., 2011; Niemeier et al., 
2013). The Geoengineering Model Intercomparison 
Project (GeoMIP) (Kravitz et al., 2013a; Kravitz et al., 
2011), and prior to that the EU FP7 Project IMPLICC 
(Implications  and  Risks  of Engineering Solar Radia-
tion to Limit Climate Change (Schmidt et al., 2012b), 
attempted to  systematise this investigation, where a 
number of albedo modification experiments were 
conducted in the same way by many modelling groups 
in order to develop a better understanding of the pro-
jections and their uncertainties. 
These modelling efforts have also been supported by 
detailed process studies investigating smaller-scale 
processes, for example with detailed cloud-resolving 
models and aerosol models (Cirisan et al., 2013; 
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Jenkins et al., 2013). The understanding of the poten-
tial climate consequences of SAI and a number of 
other albedo modification techniques is currently lim-
ited by various uncertainties, such as how the small-
scale aerosol microphysical processes, upon which 
SAI depends, scale up to the global scale, especially 
since many global models involve relatively simplistic 
treatments of these processes. Additionally, to date, 
there has been no detailed and systematic evaluation 
of the range of impacts of various forms of albedo 
modification on other components of the Earth sys-
tem besides climate. This makes the evaluation of 
these techniques incomplete, although there are a 
number of notable studies on the impacts of albedo 
modification on crop yields and sea level rise (Moore 
et al., 2010; Irvine et al., 2012; Pongratz et al., 2012). 
The results of these modelling efforts are assessed in 
Chapter 2.
The consequences of greenhouse gas removal and 
albedo modification techniques will depend on the 
manner and the context in which they might eventu-
ally be deployed. To determine possible evolution 
pathways of population, energy demand, and the 
other aspects of the social and economic spheres as 
they relate to climate, future scenarios are often used, 
such as the Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs) used in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report 
(AR5) (Meinshausen et al., 2011; van Vuuren et al., 
2011a). The RCP scenarios were developed via broad, 
interdisciplinary collaboration and represent coherent 
scenarios for policy and technology development, 
constrained by an understanding of available 
resources that outline possible futures. For the sce-
nario with the lowest projected temperature increase 
by 2100, RCP2.6, large-scale afforestation and BECCS 
is assumed for the second half of the 21st century. 
These are a necessary part of the scenarios to achieve 
negative net global emissions of CO2 , making it pos-
sible to reduce the atmospheric concentration of CO2 
much more quickly than through natural processes.
Box 1.2  
Detection and attribution of albedo modification consequences 
One of the greatest challenges for climate science has been to robustly detect 
and attribute the consequences of human actions on the climate system  
(Barnett et al., 1999; Stone et al., 2009; Bindoff et al., 2013). The role of an-
thropogenic influences on the observed changes in surface air temperature at 
the global and continental scales can now be clearly attributed (Bindoff et al., 
2013). However, explicitly detecting and then attributing changes at smaller 
spatial scales and for other climate variables has proven challenging, due to 
uncertainties in climate models as well as uncertainties in the magnitude of an-
thropogenic influences (e.g., emissions of various greenhouse gases and aero-
sol particles), and most importantly due to the large internal variability of the 
climate system (Stott et al., 2010; Bindoff et al., 2013).
These same difficulties would be faced when attempting to detect and attribute 
the consequences of an albedo modification intervention. This means that it 
could take years or even decades to detect and attribute the effect of albedo 
modification on global mean temperatures, and longer still for changes at small-
er spatial scales and for more variable climate parameters such as precipitation 
patterns and extreme weather events (MacMynowski et al., 2011; Bindoff et al., 
2013). The difficulty of attribution poses many challenges for governance, espe-
cially in the context of compensation and liability (Svoboda and Irvine, 2014).
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1.4 Historical context and overview of 
this report
 
This report presents the results of EuTRACE (the 
European Transdisciplinary Assessment of Climate 
Engineering), a project funded by the European 
Union’s 7th Framework Programme, assessing from a 
European perspective the current state of knowledge 
about the techniques subsumed under the umbrella 
term climate engineering. It brings together scientists 
from 14 partner institutions across Europe, with 
expertise in disciplines ranging from Earth sciences 
to economics, political science, law, and philosophy.
This assessment follows several other assessments, 
starting with the 2009 assessment report by the 
Royal Society (Shepherd et al., 2009). While some of 
the techniques presently being discussed have 
received some limited attention over several decades, 
the current wave of interest was sparked by a few 
developments, including a series of open ocean exper-
iments to examine the potential of ocean iron fertili-
sation for reducing atmospheric CO2 , along with the 
2006 publication of a special section of the journal 
Climatic Change, in which Nobel laureate Paul Crut-
zen contributed the lead essay (Crutzen, 2006). In the 
essay, Crutzen asked whether introducing reflective 
particles into the stratosphere to cool the planet could 
contribute to resolving the policy dilemma that states 
face when reducing certain types of pollution, espe-
cially sulphate aerosol particles, which mask warming. 
While the ocean iron fertilisation experiments and 
the essays in Climatic Change clearly focused on par-
ticular techniques, the discussion quickly broadened 
to cover other possible means to achieve “deliberate 
large-scale manipulation of the planetary environ-
ment to counteract anthropogenic climate change” 
(Shepherd et al., 2009). 
This assessment report moves the discussion forward 
in several respects. For one, in a field with such a rap-
idly-evolving literature base and global discussions, 
regular assessments are important for tying in the dif-
ferent strands of literature and debate, and providing 
accessible compilations of the state of the art. A 
number of recent activities have moved the field for-
ward, including progress in the Geoengineering 
Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP), building 
partly on the EU FP7 project IMPLICC; the advances 
made by the LC/LP in the regulation of marine cli-
mate engineering activities; planning of the first field 
campaigns for atmospheric albedo modification tech-
niques; publication of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report; and a host of workshops, mostly in Europe 
and North America, but also a few in other parts of 
the world, e.g., those organised by the Solar Radiation 
Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI). 
Through the large and interdisciplinary composition 
of the EuTRACE project consortium, this report is 
able to capture a broad range of perspectives across 
disciplines and reflect on the field’s development 
through all of them. The report is also the first to 
reflect on the field from a particularly European per-
spective, especially in its analysis of existing govern-
ance and possible policy options. Based on a strong 
focus on ethical considerations, the report analyses 
research needs and policy options at an important 
point in the development of individual climate engi-
neering techniques and their governance.
Within this broader context, the EuTRACE assess-
ment is intended to provide valuable support to the 
European Commission and the broader policy and 
research community in the assessment of climate 
engineering, including the development of govern-
ance for research and the potential deployment of 
various techniques. This first chapter of the assess-
ment report has provided an overview of climate 
engineering, particularly placing it in the context of 
climate change. Chapter 2 describes the individual 
techniques that have been proposed for greenhouse 
gas removal and albedo modification. The state of sci-
entific understanding and technology development is 
outlined, including a brief discussion of what is known 
about the potential operational costs of individual 
techniques, with consideration of the uncertainties 
around all of these factors. 
Beyond the challenges of understanding and control-
ling the impacts on the Earth system, the different 
techniques present great challenges in the social, ethi-
cal, legal, and political domains. Chapter 3 considers 
several of these issues that have informed this debate, 
such as: the possible influence of climate engineering 
techniques on mitigation and adaptation efforts; how 
these techniques are perceived by the public; their 
conflict potential, economic aspects, distributional 
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effects, and compensation issues; as well as implica-
tions for governance. Chapter 4 then considers the 
current regulatory and governance landscape with a 
particular focus on EU law, while taking into account 
and discussing the wider developments at the interna-
tional level. Chapter 5 outlines major knowledge gaps 
and provides options for future research, as a guide 
for how the European Commission might approach 
funding decisions for future research on climate engi-
neering. Finally, Chapter 6 illustrates how policy 
options can be developed and justified, based on the 
principles that underlie EU law in its application to 
climate engineering (as identified in Chapter 4), the 
extensive basic knowledge of the science and tech-
nologies that are fundamental to the various climate 
engineering approaches (as described in Chapter 2), 
and the multiple concerns that climate engineering 
raises (as discussed in Chapter 3). Conscientious appli-
cation of such an approach, based on the principles 
embodied in existing legal and regulatory structures, 
the scientific state of the art, and the concerns raised 
in connection with climate engineering, may help lead 
to the development of European policies, on research 
and the potential future implementation of climate 
engineering techniques, that are coherent and consist-
ent with the basic principles upon which broader 
European research and environmental policy are 
built. 
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2. Characteristics of 
techniques to remove 
greenhouse gases or to 
modify planetary albedo 
This chapter provides an overview of the currently 
most discussed options to remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere or to increase the planetary albedo to 
reflect more sunlight back into space. The chapter 
assesses the technical feasibility, potential environ-
mental consequences, current knowledge of the oper-
ational costs, and the various uncertainties associated 
with the main proposals for greenhouse gas removal 
(Section 2.2) and albedo modification (Section 2.3). 
With regard to costs, it is worth noting that only the 
operational costs (installation and maintenance) will 
be discussed here; this is only one of three basic types 
of costs, along with price effects and social costs, 
which are discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.2.1. 
For each greenhouse gas removal and albedo modifi-
cation technique discussed, the current state of 
knowledge of the effectiveness and impacts specific to 
that technique is summarised, while some impacts 
that are common to all of these techniques are dis-
cussed in sections 2.1.9 (for greenhouse gas removal) 
and 2.2.7 (for albedo modification).
 
2.1 Greenhouse gas removal 
Proposed methods for the removal and long-term 
sequestration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases 
from the atmosphere range from those with primarily 
domestic influence that have minor consequences 
outside a given domain (except for the small global 
reduction in the atmospheric greenhouse gas concen-
trations), to those with transboundary influences on 
the environment and on global economics, and thus 
on global societies. 
In this section, the full range of techniques that are 
primarily being discussed for greenhouse gas removal 
are considered, both terrestrial and marine, as well as 
biotic and chemical. Among the primarily terrestrial 
biotic techniques are afforestation, BECCS, biochar, 
and additional biomass techniques; the main terres-
trial chemical technique is direct air capture, while 
enhanced weathering is both terrestrial and marine; 
finally, two techniques are considered that would aim 
to increase the rate of carbon transfer to the deep 
ocean, with ocean fertilization involving the “biologi-
cal pump”, and artificial upwelling involving the 
“physical pump”. The remaining chapters focus 
mainly on BECCS and OIF as two example tech-
niques that have very different implications. In the 
case of BECCS, scale plays an important role. For 
example, small-scale application of BECCS utilising 
waste biomass that is obtained from the same national 
jurisdiction likely has few transboundary conse-
quences, whereas larger-scale applications using bio-
mass grown specifically for the purpose and pur-
chased on the global market will have transboundary 
consequences for the global economy, even if the 
actual application remains domestically confined. In 
contrast, ocean fertilisation purposely modifies sys-
tems in the global commons, and thus qualifies as 
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transboundary regardless of the scale of application. 
Overall, the processes involved in many techniques 
are by nature transboundary, or become transbound-
ary if they involve global markets, and it is very likely 
that all methods of greenhouse gas removal will have 
at least some transboundary impacts (beyond the cli-
mate and other impacts of reduced concentrations of 
greenhouse gases such as CO2) if applied at a suffi-
ciently large scale to have noticeable effects on global 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. For CO2, 
this would require a removal rate comparable to that 
of current global emissions, which now exceeds 
30 Gt CO2/yr (IPCC, 2013a).
2.1.1 Afforestation
Description: Removing CO2 by afforestation would 
enhance the terrestrial carbon sink by increasing for-
est cover and/or density in unforested or deforested 
areas. 
Effectiveness: Estimates of both the annual and the 
overall carbon uptake potential of afforestation vary 
widely. An estimate based on the physical potential 
might consider regrowth of all deforested regions 
(around 660±290  Gt  C) (IPCC, 2014c).  However, 
such deployment is incompatible with current and 
projected land-use demand (Powell and Lenton, 
2012), which reduces the estimates for global deploy-
ment of afforestation to around 1.5 – 3  Gt  CO2/yr 
(Shepherd et al., 2009) including a reduction in the 
rates of deforestation. Consideration of the “payback 
period” from any biomass or soil carbon loss during 
planting is also required (Jandl et al., 2007). Cost esti-
mates in the literature vary widely as a consequence 
of differing and largely incomparable assessment cri-
teria and methods. Afforestation is, technically, the 
simplest method of greenhouse gas removal to 
undertake, if carried out in regions with favourable 
conditions;  however,  the  resulting  carbon  storage 
would be temporary, lasting only as long as the affor-
ested regions are continually protected or managed, 
and would therefore be vulnerable to changes in the 
environment (e.g., fire, disease), climate (e.g., 
drought), and society (e.g., demands for wood or 
land). Afforestation potential is principally limited by 
the availability of land that is fertile, irrigated, and 
socially acceptable for afforestation. 
Impacts: The impacts of afforestation include land-use 
competition, environmental impacts (e.g., water con-
sumption), possible ecosystem degradation where 
commercial forestry approaches are applied (e.g., 
non-native species, pest-control), societal impacts of 
landscape and usage change (e.g., access to fuel), and 
climatic impacts such as reduced albedo (depending 
on geographic location), which could even lead to a 
net warming despite the additional sequestering of 
CO2, along with evaporative effects on the hydrologi-
cal cycle including cloud formation (Bonan, 2008).
2.1.2 Biomass energy with carbon  
capture and storage (BECCS)
Description: BECCS is a proposed greenhouse gas 
removal technique that would combine carbon cap-
ture and storage (CCS) technology with biomass 
burning. The biomass, produced using energy from 
sunlight for photosynthesis, would draw its carbon 
source from CO2 in the air. Any carbon that is then 
captured in the high-CO2-concentration stream of 
the biomass burning exhaust gas, and subsequently 
sequestered, would thus effectively remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere. 
BECCS already figures prominently in the work on 
future emissions scenarios, as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
However, as can be seen in the figure, various sce-
narios currently differ substantially in their assump-
tions about the role of BECCs, which is in turn partly 
influenced by differing assumptions about the role of 
CCS combined with conventional technologies such 
as coal, oil, and natural gas burning.
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Figure 2.1:   
Contributions of various 
technologies and chang-
es in end-use to two miti-
gation scenarios.A signif-
icant role is assumed for 
BECCS in both scenarios 
(bright green in the top 
panel, turquoise in the 
bottom panel), especially 
in enabling net emissions 
to potentially go below 
zero in the second half 
of the century, but with 
notable differences in the 
relative role of BECCS in 
each scenario.   
 
Top panel: for the RCP2.6 
scenario from the IPCC 
Fifth Assessment Report.  
Source: 
 
Van Vuuren et al. (2011b); 
 
Bottom panel: from a 
scenario for limiting 
long-term global mean 
CO2 mixing ratios to 450 
ppm.   
Source:  
Luderer et al. (2012). 
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Nevertheless, despite these differences, many scenar-
ios share the common feature of assuming some form 
of greenhouse gas removal. A study by Fuss et al. 
(2014) found that 87 % (101 out of 116) of the scenarios 
that result in “…concentration levels of 430 – 480 ppm 
CO2 equivalent (CO2eq), consistent with limiting 
warming below 2°C, require global net negative emis-
sions in the second half of this century, as do many 
scenarios (235 of 653) that reach between 480 and 720 
ppm CO2eq in 2100”. Accordingly, in these scenarios, 
limiting global mean warming to less than 2°C would 
generally require some form of what is currently 
thought of as climate engineering by greenhouse gas 
removal. 
Within this context, as can be seen in Figure 2.1, con-
siderable hopes are being placed in BECCS as a sub-
stantial component of many scenarios for keeping 
global mean warming below 2°C. However, there are 
also strong doubts about BECCS; for instance, Fuss et 
al. (2014) prominently conclude that “…its credibility 
as a climate change mitigation option is unproven and 
its widespread deployment in climate stabilization 
scenarios might become a dangerous distraction”. 
Thus, due to these contrasting perspectives and the 
prominence it already has in current scenarios of 
future emission pathways, BECCs warrants particular 
attention among the techniques being considered for 
climate engineering by greenhouse gas removal, and 
as noted in Section 1.2 it will be a particular focus of 
the following chapters. This section provides a basis 
for that later discussion by summarizing the basic cur-
rent understanding of the potentials and limitations of 
BECCs. 
In BECCS, the burning of biomass would be used 
either for electricity generation or in bio-ethanol pro-
duction. Bio-ethanol production for transportation is 
well developed, with an annual global production of 
85 billion litres (International Energy Agency, 2011). 
Bio-ethanol production by fermentation produces a 
relatively pure CO2 waste stream that can be captured 
and compressed for geological storage. The first large-
scale project combining bio-ethanol production with 
CCS is underway at the ADM Decatur ethanol plant 
in Illinois, USA (see Box 3.4). Electricity generation by 
co-firing a small proportion of biomass (typically 
around 3 % of energy input) mixed into coal feedstock 
is widespread in large coal power plants where sup-
port incentives exist – biomass accounted for 1.5 % of 
global electricity generation in power plants in 2010 
(International Energy Agency, 2012). Biomass has a 
lower energy density than coal (30 – 80 % less for wood 
pellets compared to steam coal) (International Energy 
Agency, 2012), although power plants using 100 % bio-
mass have been operated, such as RWE Tilbury (UK) 
(RWE, 2012). Appropriately processed bio-methane 
can be added to the natural gas pipeline network for 
co-firing in gas power plants (Weiland, 2010). 
CO2capture from biomass burning (including co-fir-
ing) can be adapted to existing CO2 capture technolo-
gies but introduces additional considerations such as 
impurity variation and greater flue gas volume for 
post-combustion capture, managing tars released dur-
ing gasification, and more variable combustion prop-
erties in oxyfiring (International Energy Agency 
GHG R&D Programme, 2009).
Effectiveness: Possible scales of deployment of both 
bio-ethanol and biomass power generation with CCS 
are limited by three main factors: 
 
 biomass availability and the sustainability of inten-
sive, large-scale agricultural practices; 
 
 the amount of infrastructure available and/or that 
could be built for CCS (Luckow et al., 2010), along 
with the energy requirements for running the infra-
structure; and 
 long-term CO2 storage availability, noting that geo-
logical storage of captured CO2 offers possible CO2 
removal on an “effectively permanent” timescale. 
The availability of biomass for BECCS (as well as for 
other biomass-based techniques) is subject to many 
technical, climatic, and societal factors. Estimates of 
sustainable biomass supply differ by orders of magni-
tude, resulting  from  differing  assumptions  around 
biomass types, bio-technology development, future 
climatic conditions and food demand, and the availa-
bility of land, water, and nutrients, future climatic con-
ditions, and food demand (Bauen et al., 2009; Berndes 
et al., 2003; Dornburg et al., 2010). Higher estimates of 
potential removal of atmospheric CO2 by terrestrial 
biomass-based techniques likely require conversion of 
agricultural land or carbon-rich ecosystems for bio-
mass crops, and/or massive application of fertiliser. 
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In addition to considerations of the payback period 
and soil carbon availability, the purposeful increase in 
biomass for greenhouse gas removal will likely have 
both environmental (for example, ecosystem change) 
and climatic effects (due to changes in regional albedo 
and in the hydrological cycle), which may constrain 
deployment and limit the cooling effect on the cli-
mate. However, in the immediate future, the primary 
limitations on terrestrial biomass availability will 
likely result from dietary choices and the efficiency of 
food production (Powell and Lenton, 2012). Upper 
limit estimates of the potential of terrestrial biomass-
based methods generally presume that all biomass 
that is potentially available for CO2 removal will be 
used specifically for that purpose. Therefore, upper 
limit estimates of the amount of CO2 that can be 
removed by methods that use biomass are not addi-
tive, although there is likely some potential for over-
lap, for example turning waste from biomass for bio-
fuel production into biochar. The most feasible and 
effective method will likely vary according to regional 
considerations.
Regarding CCS infrastructure, CO2 capture tech-
niques are diverse (Fennell et al., 2014). Some tech-
niques, such as amine solvent capture, have been 
understood well industrially since the 1920s, but 
require up to 25 % of the energy output from a power 
plant.  Such approaches can still achieve an overall 
carbon capture efficiency of 90 – 95 %, including the 
CO2 emitted from the additional fuel required to 
maintain the same total power output. Newer tech-
niques, such as IGCC (integrated gasification com-
bined cycle) have an energy penalty of only 1 %, and 
are now starting to be built at commercial scale. 
Research techniques such as oxycombustion, chemi-
cal looping, and cryogenic cycles are under active 
development and hold the promise of capture penal-
ties of only a few percent, along with possible 
improvements in the efficiency of CO2 capture. 
Issues around the long-term storage of CO2 are dis-
cussed below, in Section 2.1.9.2. 
Finally, cost estimates range widely due to differing 
methodologies, assumptions around the value of the 
product (electricity, transport fuel), and the potential 
for cost reduction via improved CO2 capture tech-
nologies. CCS deployment presently lags considerably 
behind that envisaged in CO2 emission reduction 
strategies (Scott et al., 2013). Estimates vary widely for 
the deployment timescale of BECCS and the potential 
for greenhouse gas removal (2.5 – 10 Gt CO2/yr), with 
higher values requiring considerable conversion of 
land to grow feedstock (McGlashan et al., 2012).
Impacts: The impacts include land-use and water sup-
ply competition, local environmental degradation 
associated with industrial agriculture and biofuel pro-
duction facilities, and prolonged use of coal if the 
power plants are co-fired.
 
2.1.3 Biochar
 
Description: Greenhouse gas removal through biochar 
aims to increase the longevity of biomass carbon 
through conversion to a more stable form (char) com-
bined with burial or ploughing into agricultural soils. 
Char is produced by medium-temperature pyrolysis 
(>350°C) or high-temperature gasification (~900°C) of 
biomass in a low-oxygen environment. There are 
many varieties of biomass feedstock (defined by the 
US Department of Energy as “any renewable, biologi-
cal material that can be used directly as a fuel, or con-
verted to another form of fuel or energy product”; see 
www.energy.gov). Biomass feedstocks range from pel-
leted or chipped wood to agricultural residues and 
wastes, producing char with differing char yields and 
stable carbon fractions. Flammable syngas and bio-oil 
are co-produced with the char and might in turn be 
used for input energy to the production process 
(Lenton and Vaughan, 2013).
Effectiveness: Under current conditions, the potential 
for sustainable removal of CO2 by biochar is estimated 
at a maximum of 3.5 Gt CO2/yr, equivalent to seques-
tration of up to 350 Gt CO2 over a century (Woolf et 
al., 2010). Application to all agricultural and grassland 
areas gives a technical long-term global potential of 
storing 1500  Gt  CO2 (Lehmann et al., 2006). The 
greenhouse gas removal potential of biochar is influ-
enced by many factors, including feedstock produc-
tion, handling losses, energy input, char yield, labile 
carbon fraction, and mean residence time of carbon 
(Hammond et al., 2011). Under conservative estimates 
for biochar yield (25 % dry feedstock mass) and stable 
carbon fraction (50% over 100 years), sequestration of 
0.46 t CO2 (or 0.17 t C) per tonne of dry feedstock is 
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attainable, with higher values possible using better-
optimised feedstock. Additional CO2 uptake may also 
occur from increased vegetation productivity – bio-
char can increase soil retention of moisture and plant-
available nitrogen. Quantification of enhanced pro-
ductivity, char-type specific inf luences, and 
accounting remain uncertain but are an active area of 
research. Cost estimates in the literature are within 
the range $30 – 100 per tonne of CO2 (Shackley and 
Sohi, 2011; McGlashan et al., 2012). Biochar potential is 
primarily limited by feedstock availability and logisti-
cal constraints on application. With a carbon resi-
dence time of decades to centuries, maintenance (re-
application) is required. Char prior to burial could also 
be appropriated for use as fuel.
Impacts: The impacts include land-use competition, 
possible health risks from associated dust production, 
and the potential to reduce albedo by up to 80 % on 
application and 20 – 26 % post-harvest (Genesio et al., 
2011), reducing the climate change mitigation effect by 
13 – 22 % (Meyer et al., 2012).
2.1.4 Additional biomass-based  
processes: non-forest, burial, use in 
construction, and algal CO2 capture
Description and effectiveness: While forests have the 
greatest above-ground carbon density, several other 
techniques have significant potential for using terres-
trial biomass for greenhouse gas removal, including 
modified agricultural practices and peatland carbon 
sink enhancement (Worrall et al., 2010; Freeman et 
al., 2012). Introduction of organic material (crop 
wastes, compost, manure) to agricultural land is 
widely practiced and might be increased to enhance 
soil carbon, but would only achieve a limited uptake, 
not exceeding 2 Gt CO2/yr and the residence time of 
the carbon would be short (years to decades). The 
natural formation of peatland is slow (vertical accu-
mulation of approximately 1 mm/yr). This sink might 
be enhanced by burying timber biomass in anoxic 
wetlands, but such approaches are logistically com-
plex and the plausible scale is unknown (Freeman et 
al., 2012). A related possibility, with similar lack of 
knowledge about the plausible scale, is waste biomass 
burial in the deep ocean (Strand and Benford, 2009). 
A further sink for terrestrial biomass involves wide-
spread use in construction, with a carbon residence of 
decades to centuries, including both structural use 
(timber) and for insulation (e.g., straw); this has the 
additional benefit of displacing some CO2 emissions 
from cement production (Gustavsson et al., 2006). 
The potential overall contribution, limited primarily 
by demand, is likely to be small (<1 Gt CO2/yr). Finally, 
CO2 could be captured from concentrated flue 
streams and directly from free air by using algae in 
bioreactors, or using organic enzymes as catalysts; 
these are areas of active research, although the costs 
and potential for deployment are presently ill-defined 
(Bao and Trachtenberg, 2006; Rahaman et al., 2011; 
Savile and Lalonde, 2011; Pires et al., 2012).
 
Other impacts: As with other processes that employ 
biomass, the impacts include land-use, water supply 
competition, and potential ecosystem alteration. 
2.1.5 Direct air capture
Description: Greenhouse gas removal by direct air cap-
ture is currently being investigated in the context of 
scrubbing CO2 from the atmosphere for subsequent 
long-term storage. Techniques that use biomass were 
mentioned in the previous section; non-biomass tech-
niques are considered here. Two basic concepts are 
regularly proposed (Goeppert et al., 2012; McGlashan 
et al., 2012): adsorption onto solids and absorption 
into high-alkalinity solutions. In all cases, the three 
main challenges are: 1) overcoming the high thermo-
dynamic barrier resulting from the low (0.04 %) con-
centration of CO2 in air, with a theoretical minimum 
of 500 MJ per tonne CO2 (Socolow et al., 2011), which 
would be equivalent to approximately 500 GW (i.e., 
500 large power plants) of continuous power supply 
to compensate current global CO2 emissions; 2) sus-
taining sufficient airflow through the system; and 3) 
supplying additional energy for the compression of 
CO2 for storage. Different proposals include using 
amine-based resins that adsorb CO2 when ambient air 
moves across them, followed by release of concen-
trated CO2 by hydration in a vacuum (Lackner, 2009), 
or mechanically driving air across sodium hydroxide 
produced via calcination of limestone, and subse-
quently heating the solvent to release the absorbed 
CO2 (http://carbonengineering.com/, last accessed on 
28 May 2015). 
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Effectiveness: The potential deployment scale is 
unknown. Should direct air capture processes reliably 
and economically work at scale, extraction of a few 
Gt CO2/yr would be possible. However, since the cap-
ture of CO2 from higher-concentration sources will 
generally be cheaper (Brandani, 2012), it is possible 
that direct air-capture, even if it becomes technologi-
cally feasible, may remain a niche technology (Bala 
and Nag, 2012). Cost estimates are contested and 
range widely. Proponents suggest around $200 per 
tonne CO2  for initial facilities and that the subsequent 
costs will drop by an order of magnitude (Lackner, 
2009; Lackner et al., 2012). Other estimates are much 
higher: $600 or more per tonne CO2 (Socolow et al., 
2011), or possibly of the order of $1000 per tonne CO2 
(House et al., 2011). Resource requirement is 
unknown, but includes land-area, energy input, and 
geological CO2 storage capacity. Other approaches 
include accelerated thermal degradation of CO2 
through catalysis using, for example, nickel (Bhaduri 
and Šiller, 2013), synthesised enzymes (Bao and Tra-
chtenberg, 2006), or exothermic reaction with lithium 
nitride (Hu and Huo, 2011). All of these proposals are 
in the very earliest stages of research. While activity is 
focused on CO2, air-capture concepts might also be 
applied to other greenhouse gases, especially methane 
(Boucher and Folberth, 2010).
Other impacts: The impacts are unknown but likely 
include land-use conflicts, water supply, industrial 
development, and societal acceptance of large-scale 
CO2 storage.
2.1.6 Enhanced weathering and 
increased ocean alkalinity 
Description: In the pre-industrial carbon cycle, natural 
CO2 emissions from volcanic sources were removed 
from the atmosphere, primarily by CO2 reacting with 
minerals in rocks, a process known as chemical 
weathering. Erosive processes eventually bury these 
weathering products or transport them via rivers to 
the oceans, sequestering the carbon for geological 
timescales. The natural rate of weathering is less than 
one hundredth of the current rate of anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions. Chemical methods for increasing the 
uptake and storage of carbon are based on artificially 
accelerating these weathering processes. These meth-
ods include dispersing mined, crushed, and ground 
silicate rocks (e.g., olivine) on land, preferably in 
warm, humid tropical areas (Hartmann et al., 2013), or 
onto the sea surface (Köhler et al., 2013). Alternatively, 
silicates could be used to neutralise hydrochloric acid 
produced from seawater, thereby enabling additional 
CO2 uptake by the ocean (House et al., 2007). The use 
of limestone has also been suggested, either by disper-
sion into upwelling regions (Harvey, 2008), or by 
heating it to produce lime (calcination), which would 
then be dispersed in the ocean to increase ocean alka-
linity and promote additional CO2 uptake (Kheshgi, 
1995). Alternatively, silicate materials might be devel-
oped to make cements that absorb CO2 during setting 
(Shao et al., 2006).
Effectiveness: Due to an abundance of raw material, the 
physical potential of enhanced weathering is high. 
However, as the chemical reaction that captures one 
tonne of CO2 requires one tonne of olivine, the scale 
of operations required to remove a substantial frac-
tion of annual emissions would be huge – comparable 
to existing mining and distribution industries. Esti-
mates for the technical potential of CO2 uptake by 
dispersal of silicates range widely, from the Mt CO2/yr 
range (Hartmann and Kempe, 2008) to a few 
Gt CO2/yr (Köhler et al., 2010). Costs are very uncer-
tain, with only one study estimating $25 – 50 per tonne 
CO2 (Köhler et al., 2010), but the potential range of 
costs is likely much larger, given the present lack of 
infrastructure developments and the potential limita-
tions at full-scale operation. In particular, production 
of hydrochloric acid on an industrial scale requires 
large amounts of electricity, and similarly, lime pro-
duction requires a heat source, along with capture and 
storage of the CO2 released during the calcination 
process. The logistical limitations, similar to those for 
silicates, suggest that an uptake of at best a few 
Gt  CO2/yr might be achievable with large-scale 
deployment. 
Other impacts: All methods would have impacts asso-
ciated with the major mining, processing, and distri-
bution operations. Silicate dispersal on land might 
result in alkalisation of water resources. Methods that 
increase global ocean alkalinity would nominally 
work favourably to counteract ocean acidification but 
other effects that have not yet been investigated might 
also be expected, resulting from the optical, chemical, 
and potentially harmful characteristics associated 
with the quantities of material involved and the min-
eral impurities they contain.
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2.1.7 Ocean fertilisation, including 
ocean iron fertilisation (OIF)
Description: While the oceans only contain a small 
portion of the global biomass (1 – 2%), marine phyto-
plankton in the surface layers are responsible for 
about half of the planet’s net primary productivity, the 
biological conversion of CO2 into organic carbon 
(Groombridge and Jenkins, 2002). A small fraction of 
this biomass sinks to great depths or to the bottom of 
the ocean before remineralisation processes break 
down the organic material into CO2, nutrients, and 
other chemicals. This transport of biomass carbon 
from the surface to the deep ocean is known as the 
“biological carbon pump” (Volk and Hoffert, 1985). 
Photosynthesis can only occur when there are suffi-
cient macro- and micro-nutrients and sunlight. The 
distribution of the nutrients in the surface ocean 
depends on input from rivers, the atmosphere, and 
deeper waters. There are large areas of the surface 
ocean where phytoplankton growth is limited by a 
lack of nutrients such as nitrate and iron. In these 
regions, biological processes could theoretically be 
enhanced to increase oceanic carbon storage in the 
deep ocean by fertilising the water to stimulate phyto-
plankton growth and intensify the biological carbon 
pump. The removal of CO2 from the surface waters 
then increases the net uptake of CO2 into the ocean 
from the atmosphere through air–sea gas exchanges.
Effectiveness: In determining the effectiveness of ocean 
fertilisation, it is important to distinguish between the 
use of macronutrients (e.g., nitrate, phosphate) and 
the use of micronutrients (e.g., iron). For macronutri-
ents, the same order of magnitude of mass is needed 
as the amount of exported CO2 (i.e., of the order of 
one tonne of macronutrient per tonne of carbon), 
while for micronutrients, many orders of magnitude 
less mass would be needed, making them generally 
more attractive in terms of logistical considerations. 
Fertilisation with macronutrients obtained on land 
would thus necessitate enormous logistical and ener-
getic investments and would compete with agricul-
ture for the necessary nutrient supply. Consequently, 
most proposals for ocean fertilisation have focused on 
micronutrients.
The main micronutrient that has been proposed for 
fertilisation is iron. Ocean iron fertilisation is one of 
the three exemplary techniques that are primarily dis-
cussed throughout the rest of the report. OIF has par-
ticularly been proposed for large regions of the North 
Pacific, the Equatorial Pacific, and the Southern 
Ocean, where macronutrients are sufficient and the 
growth of phytoplankton is mainly limited by a lack of 
soluble iron. Natural evidence for this limitation is 
seen when blooms form, coinciding with large deposi-
tion episodes of iron-rich desert dust or volcanic ash 
(Olgun et al., 2013), as well as in regions of the South-
ern Ocean where natural fertilisation by iron-contain-
ing rock that dissolves in the wake of islands also 
causes phytoplankton blooms (Blain et al., 2007; 
Pollard, 2009). 
Thirteen scientific experiments have been carried out 
since the early 1990s in the open ocean, with widely 
varying results. The experiments have shown that it is 
possible to induce plankton blooms in all three of the 
target regions, but that the connection between addi-
tional blooms on a small-to-medium scale and actual 
increases in CO2 uptake and drawdown is very uncer-
tain (Boyd et al., 2007; Buesseler et al., 2008; William-
son et al., 2012). For instance, in the LOHAFEX 
experiment in the Southern Ocean, phytoplankton 
were quickly consumed by grazers, which was attrib-
uted to the low silicate levels of the fertilised waters, 
leading to the formation of mostly soft-shelled plank-
ton that limited the export of the sequestered carbon 
to relatively shallow depths where storage times are 
believed to be short (Martin et al., 2013). Fertilised 
blooms can also be rapidly diluted or fragmented by 
oceanic mixing. Model simulations suggest that the 
best location to achieve a sustained drawdown of CO2 
by iron fertilisation is the Southern Ocean, since ferti-
lisation elsewhere would frequently lead to the deple-
tion of macronutrients, thereby limiting phytoplank-
ton growth (Sarmiento et al., 2010). The only study to 
demonstrate a substantial increase of CO2 uptake and 
export to the deep waters was EISENEX (Smetacek 
et al., 2012), in which fertilisation was carried out in a 
closed gyre that remained intact for a few weeks fol-
lowing initial fertilisation, giving time to observe the 
sedimentation of biomass through the ocean mixed 
layer. Model computations of large-scale iron fertilisa-
tion in the Southern Ocean indicate that the addi-
tional carbon export to the deep ocean could offset 
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CO2 emissions of about 70 Gt(C) during a 100-year 
period of continuous fertilisation (Oschlies et al., 
2010a). Total carbon uptake is strongly dependent on 
the duration of fertilization, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
Based on early indications of its potential effective-
ness, patents have been filed for various methods of 
iron fertilisation (Howard Jr. et al., 1999; Maruzama et 
al., 2000; Lee, 2008) and for a monitoring method 
(Suzuki, 2005).
Figure 2.2:   
(a) Simulated fertilisa-
tion-induced annual 
air–sea CO2 flux south 
of 30°S (dashed lines) 
and integrated over the 
global ocean (solid lines). 
Units are Gt C/yr.   
(b) Simulated cumula-
tive temporal integral of 
the fertilisation-induced 
change in air–sea flux 
of CO2 south of 30°S 
(dashed lines) and for the 
global ocean (solid lines); 
units are Gt C. Coloured 
lines refer to the different 
fertilisation experiments: 
stopping fertilisation 
after 1 year (red), 7 years 
(green), 10 years (blue), 
50 years (cyan), and not 
at all within the first 100 
years (magenta).  
 
Source:  
Oschlies et al. (2010a).  
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In addition to fertilisation by dissolution of micronu-
trients such as iron, it has also been proposed to use 
macronutrients that are already dissolved in the deep 
ocean, via enhancing the upwelling of nutrient-rich 
water from a depth of several hundred meters, 
employing methods such as wave-driven pump sys-
tems (Lovelock and Rapley, 2007). This is distinct in 
purpose from the artificial upwelling discussed in the 
next section, since the focus here is on enhancing 
nutrients for biological uptake, whereas in the next 
section the focus is on enhancing physical uptake of 
CO2. Model calculations show that pumping deep 
water upwards would be expected to result in phyto-
plankton blooms, thus leading to increased oceanic 
drawdown of CO2. However, even assuming an opti-
mum distribution of perfectly functioning pump sys-
tems, the sequestration potential is low, estimated at 
about 0.5 Gt CO2/yr (Yool et al., 2009). A complica-
tion arises because nutrient-rich deep water is gener-
ally also enriched in CO2 compared to less nutrient-
rich water, since both nutrients and CO2 arise from 
the re-mineralisation of organic material. However, 
since the older, deeper waters have not been in recent 
contact with rapidly rising atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations, they still may be undersaturated with respect 
to today’s elevated atmospheric CO2 levels, and thus 
take up some anthropogenic CO2 in addition to the 
CO2 sequestered via enhanced phytoplankton pro-
ductivity (Oschlies et al., 2010b). The potential use of 
artificial upwelling to increase CO2 uptake is dis-
cussed further in Section 2.1.8. 
Other impacts: The effects of manipulating ocean eco-
systems on large scales are not restricted to carbon 
export, and several side effects and difficulties of 
potential implementation have been pointed out 
(Chisholm et al., 2001; Lawrence, 2002; Strong et al., 
2009b). Most significantly, ocean fertilisation would 
alter the productivity of large regions of the ocean 
(Gnanadesikan et al., 2003) and since plankton form 
the base of the marine food chain (Denman, 2008), 
significant side effects on marine ecosystems could be 
expected. In addition to the marine biological effects, 
ocean fertilisation would also be expected to lead to 
enhanced oxygen consumption at depth and to 
increases in marine emissions of various trace gases 
(Jin and Gruber, 2003, Lawrence, 2002). Most impor-
tant among these is nitrous oxide (N2O), which is 
formed as a by-product of increased remineralisation, 
especially by bacteria in sub-surface waters that 
become depleted of oxygen due to the increased 
through-flux of biological material. N2O has high glo-
bal warming potential (GWP), approximately 300 on 
a 100-year time horizon, which could partly counter-
act the cooling from the removal of CO2, depending 
on the region, timing, and intensity of fertilisation (Jin 
and Gruber, 2003; Oschlies et al., 2010a). Further 
impacts include possible increases in toxic phyto-
plankton blooms (Trick et al., 2010). Given the current 
level of scientific understanding, it is not yet possible 
to confidently predict the long-term effects of large-
scale ocean fertilisation (Wallace et al., 2010).
2.1.8 Enhancing physical oceanic  
carbon uptake through artificial 
upwelling
 
Description: Physical methods that could theoretically 
increase oceanic CO2 uptake involve increasing the 
natural rate (due to ocean circulation) at which ocean 
water has contact with the atmosphere, either by 
increasing circulation or by directly transporting CO2 
into the deep sea. Any CO2 introduced to deep waters 
will ultimately dissolve in the surrounding seawater, 
return to the surface with ocean circulation over 
longer timescales (centuries), and re-equilibrate with 
the atmosphere via air–sea gas exchange. Thus, these 
methods do not result in permanent CO2 storage. 
Effectiveness: Models suggest that for a CO2 discharge 
depth of 3,000 m, slightly less than half of the CO2 
will return to the atmosphere within 500 years (Orr, 
2004). Zhou and Flynn (2005) analysed the possibility 
of accelerating oceanic CO2 uptake via intensifying 
downwelling ocean currents, brought about by cool-
ing CO2-rich surface waters at high latitudes so that 
they sink and transport CO2; this is, however, very 
likely to be energetically infeasible. Alternative meth-
ods are based on artificially forcing cold water from 
the deep ocean up to the surface, for example by using 
wave-driven pumps for which prototypes and con-
cepts have been developed (Bailey and Bailey, 2008). 
Water brought to the surface by this method is typi-
cally colder and “older”, has greater CO2 solubility due 
to the lower temperature, but was equilibrated to a 
lower historical atmospheric CO2 level, so that when 
brought to the ocean surface layer it more effectively 
takes up CO2 compared to contemporary surface 
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waters. Upwelling cold water also cools the atmos-
phere. This in turn results in changes in terrestrial 
ecosystems, especially reduced respiration in soils, 
and thereby increased uptake of CO2 by the soils and 
vegetation. However, the potential for CO2 removal 
via this mechanism is low, estimated at less than 
1 Gt CO2/year. Model simulations indicate that consid-
erably less than half of this uptake would occur in the 
oceans, while most would occur in terrestrial ecosys-
tems, although this is difficult to quantify (Oschlies et 
al., 2010b; Oschlies et al., 2010a; Keller et al., 2014). 
Other impacts: Modelling suggests that the redistribu-
tion of warm and cold waters associated with 
enhanced upwelling from the deep ocean would lead 
to significant changes in the global ocean, atmos-
phere, and land energy balance, in turn modifying ter-
restrial ecosystem respiration, resulting in a small 
carbon uptake that is difficult to attribute. Turning off 
the pumping would lead to rapid warming, resulting 
in average global surface temperatures that would be 
even higher than they would have been if no upwelling 
had been applied (Oschlies et al., 2010b). There would 
also likely be unanticipated and unknown ecosystem 
impacts similar to those discussed in Section 2.2.1 for 
stratospheric aerosol injections. 
2.1.9 Cross-cutting issues and  
uncertainties
There are several key cross-cutting issues and associ-
ated uncertainties that apply to a range of greenhouse 
gas removal techniques, which depend on the scale of 
application, and are associated with both domestic 
and transboundary impacts. One of the largest uncer-
tainties concerns operational costs, both for installa-
tion and maintenance. In the previous sections, cost 
estimates were given where available in the literature. 
Due to the extensive uncertainties, these are not dis-
cussed in further detail here, although it is noted that 
this is one of the most important issues to resolve 
before serious consideration is given to scaled-up 
implementation of any of the greenhouse gas removal 
techniques. This section focuses on two further, 
important cross-cutting issues: the application of life-
cycle assessments to the various techniques, and the 
overall limitations on CO2 storage capacity.
  
2.1.9.1 Lifecycle assessment of  
greenhouse gas removal processes
Most techniques for removing greenhouse gases, if 
applied at scales sufficient to significantly impact the 
global atmospheric CO2 burden, would involve sizea-
ble industrial development with direct and indirect 
effects. Full life cycle assessments would be required 
to assess their potential, accounting for both the CO2 
lifecycle and other impacts on the climate and envi-
ronment, for example, biogeochemical cycle changes, 
albedo, other greenhouse gas emissions or hydrologi-
cal cycle changes, as well as changes in ecosystems. In 
addition to considering emissions from energy 
sources, a CO2 lifecycle assessment would include sev-
eral processes such as the supply chain, construction, 
direct and indirect land-use changes, fugitive emis-
sions, transportation, by-product end use, and waste 
disposal (e.g., Davis et al., 2009; Weisser, 2007). For 
biomass-intensive techniques such as BECCS, a 
proper assessment of the effects on the carbon cycle 
would take into account the carbon costs of land con-
version, planting, maintaining, harvesting, and 
processing of the biomass, and must account for the 
fact that woody vegetation takes many years to 
regrow. Whether, and how, the indirect land-use 
change associated with biomass cultivation should be 
included is currently being debated. It is possible that 
biomass overuse without equal rates of biomass 
regrowth — or with unintended impacts on land con-
version to replace “lost” agricultural land — coould 
ultimately increase the global atmospheric CO2 burden.
There is little consensus on the system boundaries 
applied to lifecycle assessments of current climate 
change mitigation technologies, e.g., whether or not to 
include indirect land use change impacts due to bio-
fuel crops,  which are subject to order-of-magnitude 
uncertainty (Plevin et al., 2010; Mathews and Tan, 
2009). Biomass-based or biomass-impacting green-
house gas removal systems represent what might be 
the greatest complexity and uncertainty  in lifecycle 
assessments of climate impacts, involving the possibil-
ity of positive local impacts such as enhanced growth, 
in combination with negative impacts such as soil car-
bon release (Anderson-Teixeira  et al., 2009), as well as 
wider environmental, social, and climatic effects. 
Many of these impacts are temporal, involving a “pay-
back period” to replace losses of CO2. Generally, 
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lifecycle assessments need to consider that any appli-
cation of a technique that removes CO2 from the 
atmosphere may result in a “rebound effect”, in which 
the removed CO2 is counterbalanced by reduced 
uptake of CO2, or by the release of CO2 from other 
components of the global carbon cycle (Ciais et al., 
2014). Development of frameworks for lifecycle 
assessments of greenhouse gas removal methods 
focusing on the impacts on the climate  and the 
broader environment should be considered, in order 
to develop an informed assessment of their applicabil-
ity (building on, for example, Sathre et al., 2011).
2.1.9.2 CO2 storage availability and 
timescale
Options for long-term storage (>10,000 years) — pri-
marily geological or geochemical storage — have the 
potential to mitigate climate change on a “permanent” 
basis (Scott et al., 2013). Shorter-term CO2 removal or 
fixation options eventually release the stored carbon 
back into the atmosphere as CO2, so that the removal 
process would need to be continually maintained in 
order to have the effect of long-term storage. Shorter-
term storage is also potentially vulnerable to climatic 
and societal changes, e.g., subsequent clearance of 
afforested regions. As such, these shorter-term oppor-
tunities have been posed as “buying time” while 
longer-term alternatives are being developed (Dorn-
burg and Marland, 2008). These considerations would 
apply similarly to the removal of other greenhouse 
gases.
Captured CO2 can potentially be used as a feedstock 
for chemical manufacturing processes, e.g., liquid 
fuels, carbonate, methane, methanol, and formic acid. 
However, net CO2 removal is not achieved if it is used 
to form a product that is subsequently combusted 
(e.g., liquid fuels) or subjected to reactions that pro-
duce CO2, either in deliberate processing or in the 
natural environment. Demand for long-term, chemi-
cally stable CO2-based products is very likely to 
remain extremely small compared to current anthro-
pogenic emissions of CO2 (Kember et al., 2011). Con-
sequently, carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) 
projects may be important as a step towards develop-
ing closed-cycle perspectives in the private sector and 
general public, and towards adding value to some of 
the CO2 that is captured by various processes, but are 
not likely to have a large impact on global atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations. Using CO2 to increase recovery 
from oil and gas reservoirs (enhanced oil recovery), 
which is sometimes considered as a form of CCU plus 
storage, does result in geological CO2 storage but the 
full lifecycle of the process, particularly the net effect 
on the atmospheric carbon budget once the oil and 
gas are combusted, needs to be considered in more 
detail (Jaramillo et al., 2009). 
The cumulative capacities of the various proposed 
CO2 storage options are uncertain, with most esti-
mates based on limited data and desk-based studies. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in Scott et al. (2015), useful 
insights can be gained by comparing these estimates 
with the estimated availability of fossil carbon reserves 
(very high confidence in quantity and extractability) 
and the much larger total available resources (identi-
fied, but without cost estimates for extraction). These 
are depicted, along with storage capacities, in Figure 
2.3. The total storage capacity on the global land sur-
face (in biomass and soils) is at least an order of mag-
nitude smaller than available fossil carbon reserves. 
The ocean has much greater storage capacity, theo-
retically in excess of all known fossil carbon resources, 
but methods to access this storage and the timescales 
of such storage have not yet been established, and it is 
unclear if it will ever be possible to establish appropri-
ate long-term storage methods for the oceans.
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Among the possible storage reservoirs, depleted 
hydrocarbon fields and saline aquifers are the best 
understood, proven, and quantified, providing secure 
CO2 storage on geological timescales (Scott et al., 
2013; Sathaye et al., 2014). Estimates suggest that they 
have sufficient global capacity to contain the CO2 
resulting from the use of all current fossil carbon 
reserves, with plausible engineering interventions, 
such as pumping out formation waters to reduce pres-
sures, being able to further increase individual reser-
voir capacities. At the continental scale, sedimentary 
basins with potential as geological CO2 storage sites 
are relatively well distributed. 
However, storage sites are not necessarily co-located 
with major emissions sites, so that CCS source–sink 
matching would require the development of signifi-
cant CO2 transportation infrastructures (Metz et al., 
2005; Stewart et al., 2013), and factors such as social 
acceptability (see example cases in Section 3.1.4) can 
limit the practical availability of storage sites. Reloca-
tion of CO2-emitting facilities or implementation of 
direct air capture might offer improved co-location to 
storage, but would require appropriate above-ground 
conditions (e.g., labour and markets for products, or 
suitable meteorological conditions for CO2 air cap-
ture).
Figure 2.3:   
Sizes of fossil carbon 
supply (reserves and 
resources) and potential 
carbon stores divided 
between temporary 
(≤1,000 yr) and per-
manent (geological 
timescales ≥ 100,000 
yr) in Gt CO2. Oil and 
gas reservoirs are both a 
fossil carbon supply and 
potential CO2 storage 
resource. Question marks 
indicate undeveloped 
and/or unestablished (at 
the scale of MtCO2  or 
more) CO2 storage mech-
anisms. Global mean 
temperature increases 
associated with various 
amounts of cumula-
tive CO2 emissions are 
indicated. 
 
Source:  
Scott et al. (2015).  
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While secure storage capacity in geological reservoirs 
is estimated to be sufficient to match known fossil car-
bon reserves, it is not established whether it would be 
sufficient to accommodate all estimated fossil carbon 
resources (Scott et al., 2015). Very large theoretical 
storage CO2 potentials have been identified in basalts 
(McGrail et al., 2006; Matter and Kelemen, 2009), 
seabed sediments (House et al., 2006; Levine et al., 
2007), and through acceleration of mineral weather-
ing (Hartmann et al., 2013), but their feasibility at scale 
is effectively unknown at the present time. 
2.2 Albedo modification and related 
techniques
The Earth’s climate depends upon the balance 
between absorbed solar radiation and emitted terres-
trial radiation (see Figure 1.2 for reference). Albedo 
modification refers to deliberate, large-scale changes 
of the Earth’s energy balance, with the aim of reduc-
ing global mean temperatures. The proposed methods 
are designed to increase the reflection of solar (short-
wave) radiation from Earth. Suggestions for increas-
ing the Earth’s reflectivity include: enhancing the 
reflectivity of the Earth’s surface; injecting particles 
into the atmosphere, either at high altitudes in the 
stratosphere to directly reflect sunlight or at low alti-
tudes over the ocean to increase cloud reflectivity; 
and placing reflective mirrors in space.
Albedo modification techniques are distinct from 
mitigation and from most greenhouse gas removal 
techniques, in three key ways:
 
 their operational costs are potentially low; 
 their effects are potentially rapid and large; 
 their evaluation is better characterised as a 
risk-risk trade-off (Goes et al., 2011). 
In light of this distinction, various potential roles for 
albedo modification have been proposed: 
 employing albedo modification on a large scale with 
the goal of reducing climate risks as much as possible, 
potentially substituting for some degree of mitigation 
(Teller et al., 2003; Carlin, 2007; Bickel and Lane, 
2009); 
 employing albedo modification as a “stopgap” meas-
ure to allow time for reducing emissions (Wigley, 
2006); 
 reserving albedo modification for use in a potential 
“climate emergency”, such as the large-scale release of 
methane from permafrost and ocean deposits (Black-
stock et al.; 2009, see also Box 3.7). 
Of course, it is also possible that albedo modification 
techniques will have no role in future responses to 
climate change, if it is decided not to employ any of 
them at all, given that they do not address the funda-
mental cause of global warming, namely emissions, 
and thus the increasing atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases (Matthews and Turner, 2009). 
Discussions on the potential role of albedo modifica-
tion frequently focus on three key drawbacks. Firstly, 
since albedo modification impacts the climate in a 
manner that is physically different from the impact of 
greenhouse gases, it would not be possible to simply 
reverse the effects of global warming. Thus, whilst 
albedo modification may reduce some risks associated 
with climate change, it may in turn increase others. 
The way in which an albedo modification technique is 
deployed would affect the distribution of benefits and 
harms (Irvine et al., 2010; Ricke et al., 2010a; Mac 
Martin et al., 2013). Secondly, albedo modification car-
ries the risk of a “termination shock”: if it were 
deployed for some decades at large scale and thereaf-
ter terminated, there would be a rapid warming glo-
bally, back towards the temperatures that the Earth 
would have already reached in the absence of a 
deployment of albedo modification (Matthews and 
Caldeira, 2007; Irvine et al., 2012). Such an event 
would likely be particularly damaging, given that 
there are indications that the impact of climate change 
on human populations and ecosystems depends 
strongly on not only the amount but also especially on 
the rate of climate change (Goes et al., 2011). Thirdly, 
albedo modification does not address the direct 
effects of CO2 on the environment, such as ocean 
acidification and impacts on terrestrial vegetation 
(Matthews and Caldeira, 2007). 
Finally, beyond these physical risks, it is also impor-
tant to note that the potential future role of albedo 
modification, if any, will also depend on how the ini-
tial scientific results are interpreted, framed, and com-
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municated, as well as on how the socio-technical con-
text, into which discussions of climate engineering are 
emerging, shapes these techniques and their usage. 
This is discussed further in Chapter 3.
The Sections below (2.2.1 – 2.2.5) assess several of the 
key methods that are currently being discussed, which 
mostly involve increasing the planetary albedo, either 
at the Earth’s surface, or in the atmosphere via modi-
fying low-level clouds or stratospheric aerosol parti-
cles. Using space mirrors for climate engineering is 
not discussed in detail, since the technological devel-
opment, material and energetic requirements, and 
associated operational costs would at present be so 
prohibitive that this technique is not realistically 
being considered for implementation in the mid-term 
future, although it is used as a form of “thought exper-
iment” for idealised climate model simulations, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.6. While the majority of studies 
have concentrated on albedo modification, a few other 
related techniques have been proposed that would 
alter the Earth’s energy balance by increasing the 
amount of terrestrial radiation emitted from the 
planet (see Section 2.2.5). Numerous additional meth-
ods beyond those discussed below have also been pro-
posed. An overarching description of the research 
findings on the responses of the climate to the various 
methods is presented at the end of this section.
2.2.1 Stratospheric aerosol injection 
(SAI)
Description: Stratospheric aerosol injection involves 
increasing the amount of aerosol particles in the lower 
stratosphere (at altitudes above about 20 km) as a 
means to increase the reflection of sunlight beyond 
what is reflected by the naturally-occurring strat-
ospheric aerosol layer (Niemeier et al., 2011; Rasch et 
al., 2008). Particles could either be injected directly or 
formed via injection of precursor gases such as sul-
phur dioxide (SO2), which are then converted into 
particles. SAI is currently the most discussed albedo 
modification technique. It was first proposed by Bud-
yko (1974), but was not widely discussed until the idea 
was reiterated by Crutzen (2006); since then it has 
been heavily investigated, including numerous model-
based studies and first proposals and plans for field 
experiments, as well as studies on societal aspects 
such as perception, ethical concerns, and governance. 
Effectiveness: Analyses of the global temperature 
record subsequent to large volcanic eruptions that 
inject millions of tonnes of SO2 into the stratosphere 
leave little doubt that the introduction of aerosols into 
the stratosphere cools the climate (Robock, 2000). It 
has been suggested that the technical feasibility, effec-
tiveness, affordability, and timeliness of stratospheric 
climate engineering techniques could make them a 
possible option for counteracting global warming 
(Robock et al., 2009), but many concerns have also 
been raised, including geographically inhomogeneous 
climate effects and potential side effects (Robock, 
2008). 
Candidate gases for injection into the stratosphere 
include SO2 or hydrogen sulphide (H2S) (Robock et 
al., 2008; Shepherd et al., 2009; Rasch et al., 2008), 
which are oxidised to form small sulphuric acid aero-
sol particles (Robock et al., 2009). H2S has a lower 
molecular mass and is around twice as effective as 
SO2 in creating molecules of stratospheric sulphuric 
acid per kg of gas, but is highly toxic and thus may be 
problematic for transport to the stratosphere in large 
masses. Detailed aerosol microphysical modelling 
studies reveal a very complex picture of the interplay 
between injection rate, location, particle growth, and 
microphysical and optical properties; based on these, 
it appears likely that continuous injection of SO2 or 
H2S would lead to the formation of larger particles 
than observed subsequent to volcanic eruptions, if the 
total annual injection rates are comparable (Heckend-
orn et al., 2009; Timmreck et al., 2010; Niemeier et al., 
2011). Direct injection of sulphuric acid, H2SO4, has 
also been proposed as a way to potentially gain more 
control over aerosol size, but given the higher molecu-
lar mass, a greater weight of material would then need 
to be lifted to the stratosphere (English et al., 2012; 
Pierce et al., 2010). Larger particles are less effective at 
scattering sunlight back to space and have a shorter 
atmospheric residence time because they sediment 
more rapidly, which means that one would expect 
diminishing returns in terms of the cooling impact for 
increased rates of injection (Niemeier and Timmreck, 
2015). Such diminishing returns are demonstrated in 
Figure 2.4, which also shows that there are large dif-
ferences between models in terms of the estimated 
injection rate needed to achieve a certain amount of 
radiative forcing. Particles of various chemical compo-
sitions have been proposed, including titanium diox-
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ide (Pope et al., 2012), soot (Kravitz et al., 2012), and 
limestone (Ferraro et al., 2011), and nanoparticles that 
would photophoretically levitate, i.e., would be self-
lofting into the upper stratosphere (Keith, 2010). Cus-
tomised particles could theoretically be designed to 
maximise the cooling impact while minimising side 
effects, for example on  stratospheric ozone. Soot 
would dramatically heat the stratosphere, and would 
also decrease ozone levels and thus increase the UV 
flux at the Earth’s surface, and thus it has been sug- 
gested that it is not a suitable particle type or SAI 
(Kravitz et al., 2012).
Figure 2.4:   
Surface shortwave radia-
tive flux anomaly induced 
by a given annual rate of 
injection of stratospheric 
sulphate particles, for 
three different studies; 
the concave upward 
shape of the curves 
indicates the diminishing 
returns that are simu-
lated at higher injection 
rates. 
 
Source:  
(Niemeier et al., 2011).  
Particles with a smaller radius and higher refractive 
index (for example titanium dioxide, TiO2) could be 
around three times more effective than the same mass 
of sulphuric acid particles (Pope et al., 2012). However, 
coagulation of candidate solid particles in the strato-
sphere still needs to be comprehensively investigated. 
If the customised particles were to coagulate, particu-
larly when mixed with the naturally occurring sul-
phate aerosol layer, then this would lead to much 
larger particles than those initially injected. This 
would in turn reduce their optical efficiency, increase 
absorption of terrestrial radiation, and increase their 
sedimentation rates. This may be of particular rele-
vance should future large volcanic eruptions coat the 
candidate particles with a layer of sulphate. 
 
Delivery mechanisms have received considerable 
attention. Estimates of the operational costs of vari-
ous potential delivery mechanisms have been pro-
vided by Robock et al. (2009); Davidson et al. (2012); 
and McClellan et al. (2012). Those studies considered 
injection via: aircraft payloads, artillery shells, rockets, 
stratospheric balloons, and other possibilities. The 
main conclusion was that the most economically fea-
sible injection mechanisms are likely to be injection 
via high-flying (higher than 15 km) aircraft, or by teth-
ered balloons in the tropics. For aircraft delivery, 
installation cost estimates range from about $1 – 30 bil-
lion, plus annual maintenance costs in the range of 
$0.2 – 20 billion, depending on the injection strategy. 
Artillery shells and missiles were estimated to have 
maintenance costs in the range of 10 – 100 times more 
than those associated with aircraft delivery. Estimates 
for stratospheric balloon delivery are comparable to 
aircraft injections, in the range of $1 – 60 billion for 
installation costs with annual maintenance costs of 
$1 – 10 billion. The results of the initial studies vary 
widely, with some having nearly opposing trends. For 
example, Davidson et al. (2012) indicate maintenance 
costs for aircraft injections that are ten times those of 
10
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balloon injections, whereas McClellan et al. (2012) 
suggest that balloon injections would instead be about 
ten times the maintenance costs of aircraft injections. 
These disparities are due to different underlying 
assumptions about the amount of material that is to 
be injected, with airplanes being more efficient at 
injecting smaller amounts and balloons becoming 
more cost-effective when larger amounts are injected 
(because they can continuously inject material, while 
airplanes can only inject a limited amount of material 
and would then have to pick up a new payload and 
refuel). There is, nevertheless, a broad consensus that 
dispersing megatons of particles into the stratosphere 
could be feasible and achievable at total operational 
cost that might be within the reach of individual 
nations, if the various practical constraints surround-
ing SAI delivery mechanisms were to be overcome 
(see Box 2.1).
The operational costs will depend on many factors, 
such as the altitude of deployment and the total 
amount of aerosol particle mass or precursor that is 
injected. The amount of sulphur that would need to 
be injected into the stratosphere to offset a warming 
corresponding to a doubling of atmospheric carbon 
concentration was estimated in Shepherd et al. 
(2009) to be between 1 and 5 Mt sulphur, while more 
recent estimates suggest that up to several tens of Mt 
could be required (Pierce et al., 2010; Niemeier et al., 
2011). An important general consideration is that the 
forcing would not increase linearly with the injected 
mass, since greater injection rates will normally lead 
to larger particles that have shorter residence times 
and less favourable radiative properties, thus giving 
diminishing returns. As shown by Niemeier and 
Timmreck (2015), there may be an upper limit of the 
order of 10 – 15 W/m2 for the cooling that can be achie-
ved by stratospheric aerosol particle injection.
Other impacts: Stratospheric ozone is affected by strat-
ospheric aerosols. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo 
reduced the total global amount of stratospheric 
ozone by approximately 2 % (Harris, 1997), since strat-
ospheric particles offer heterogeneous surfaces for 
chemical reactions that deplete stratospheric ozone 
(Tilmes et al., 2008). However, this effect is small rela-
tive to the existing ozone reduction caused by chlo-
rofluorocarbons (CFCs), and will also decrease pro- 
 
 
portionally as the amount of available chlorine 
decreases (as CFC concentrations decrease in the 
future). Candidate particles could theoretically be 
chemically engineered (Pope et al., 2012) by coating 
them to have less impact on stratospheric ozone than 
sulphuric acid particles. Scattering by the injected 
particles would serve to reduce the amounts of harm-
ful UV radiation reaching the surface of the Earth, but 
this would only partially compensate the increases in 
Box 2.1  
Practical constraints surrounding SAI delivery mechanisms 
Tethered balloons are subject to constraints on the intrinsic mechanical prop-
erties of tethers, as well as to meteorological phenomena such as horizontal 
and vertical wind shear, clear air turbulence, cumulus convection, icing, and 
lightning, which would influence the possible locations of year-round operating 
bases (Davidson et al., 2012). Delivery from aircraft by increasing the sulphur 
content in aviation fuel and using the current distribution of civil aircraft flight 
paths would be ineffective, since the injection altitude is too low and most of 
the injection would be too far north to result in significant global cooling (Anton 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, under this scenario, stratospheric aerosol particles 
would be confined to the Northern Hemisphere, with impacts on the patterns 
of tropical rainfall (Haywood et al., 2013). Thus, if aircraft were used to deploy 
stratospheric aerosols, a new fleet of high-flying aircraft dedicated to the task 
would likely be the preferable option (McClellan et al., 2012).
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UV radiation resulting from ozone loss (Tilmes et al., 
2012). Reductions in ozone and the absorption of ter-
restrial radiation by the stratospheric aerosols could 
change the heating rates in the stratosphere, with con-
sequent impacts on the dynamics of the stratosphere 
(Ferraro et al., 2014). Post-Pinatubo modelling shows 
that the absorption of terrestrial radiation by sulphate 
aerosols altered the stratospheric dynamics so that 
the aerosol was transported more strongly into the 
Southern Hemisphere rather than remaining prima-
rily isolated in the Northern Hemisphere (Young et 
al., 1994). 
In addition to stratospheric ozone, tropospheric cir-
rus clouds may also be impacted by stratospheric 
aerosols injections when the particles sediment from 
the stratosphere into the troposphere. Global GCM 
simulations (Kuebbeler et al., 2012) suggest that strat-
ospheric aerosol injections would reduce ice crystal 
number concentrations in cirrus clouds by  between 5 
and 50 %, which would lead to enhanced global cool-
ing, highlighting a potentially important feedback 
mechanism. However, this effect is highly uncertain 
and not supported by observations, which have 
shown abnormally high ice crystal number concentra-
tions in cirrus clouds due to aerosol particles that 
originated from the Mt. Pinatubo eruption sediment-
ing from the stratosphere into the upper troposphere 
(Sassen et al., 1995).
SAI may also influence vegetation growth by reducing 
solar radiation at the surface, which will reduce pho-
tosynthesis. This might be partly counteracted by the 
increased fraction of diffuse- to direct-radiation 
(Vaughan and Lenton, 2011) which would result in 
higher photosynthesis rates (Mercado et al., 2009; Gu 
et al., 2002). The aforementioned ozone depletion 
might harm plants by letting more harmful UV radia-
tion reach them, rather than being absorbed at high 
altitudes (Stapleton, 1992), although the aerosol itself 
will reduce levels of harmful UV radiation. Tempera-
ture changes on the regional scale will also influence 
vegetation, which also depends on how SAI is imple-
mented: warming in polar regions might lead to 
enhanced vegetation growth, whereas in other regions 
it might have a different effect. Due to its effects on 
the global atmospheric circulation, SAI will change 
water availability. This may be especially important in 
water-limited regions, potentially increasing water 
availability and hence vegetation growth despite a glo-
bally weaker hydrological cycle. However, model sim-
ulations suggest that, due to elevated atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations, vegetation growth would 
increase significantly and that SAI would not change 
this by much (Bala et al., 2002; Naik et al., 2003; Jones 
et al., 2011).
Taken together, the various feedback mechanisms 
mentioned here make it challenging to anticipate the 
distribution of stratospheric aerosols, their impacts on 
other components of the climate and Earth system 
(such as ozone and cirrus clouds), and hence the over-
all resultant environmental consequences of an injec-
tion of stratospheric aerosol particles or their precur-
sors.
2.2.2 Marine cloud brightening (MCB)/ 
marine sky brightening (MSB)
Description: First proposed by Latham (1990), this 
method involves using water-soluble particles to seed 
low-level warm clouds over the oceans. These clouds 
tend to have a net cooling effect on the climate 
because of their strong reflection of solar radiation. 
The aim of this technique would be to increase their 
albedo, as well as to possibly also increase their life-
times. This could be achieved by injecting suitable 
particles into the cloud updrafts, whereupon the par-
ticles act as cloud condensation nuclei, around which 
water vapour can condense. Increasing the number of 
cloud condensation nuclei increases the number of 
droplets in the clouds, meaning that the available 
water forms into more and smaller droplets than in 
non-seeded clouds. Since the ratio of surface area to 
volume increases for smaller droplets, the smaller 
droplets have a greater surface area and thus reflect 
more sunlight than fewer, larger droplets, as depicted 
in Figure 2.5. In addition to this impact on reflection 
by cloud droplets, the increased concentration of aer-
osol particles also directly causes an increase in the 
reflection of sunlight; however, the indirect effect via 
cloud droplets is usually larger than the direct effect 
via the much smaller aerosol particles themselves.  
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For seeding clouds, the type of aerosol particle most 
commonly suggested is naturally occurring sea salt. 
Since aerosol particle residence times are much 
shorter (days) in the lower troposphere near the 
Earth’s surface than in the stratosphere (order of 1 – 2 
years), the particles would need to be continuously 
replenished and large masses would need to be 
injected in order to be effective. Recent model studies 
have shown that injection of sea salt could also be 
effective over cloud-free, low-latitude oceans, since 
the sea salt particles themselves also reflect solar radi-
ation. The relative effectiveness of marine cloud 
brightening and this “clear-sky sea-salt effect” is cur-
rently not well known, but they appear to be of the 
same order of magnitude (Partanen et al., 2012; Jones 
and Haywood; 2012, Alterskjær et al., 2013). Through-
out the report, the combined method is referred to as 
“marine sky brightening (MSB)”. 
Effectiveness: Published estimates indicate that marine 
cloud brightening could potentially exert a radiative 
forcing of -1.7 to -5.1 Wm-2 (Jones et al., 2011; Partanen 
et al., 2012; Alterskjær et al., 2012; Latham et al.2008; 
Lenton and Vaughan, 2009; Rasch et al., 2009; Alter-
skjær and Kristjánsson, 2013). This high potential 
effectiveness is due to the extensive regions over 
which the technique could be applied: about 17.5 % 
(89.3 × 106 km2) of the Earth’s surface area is covered 
by marine stratiform clouds (Latham et al., 2008) and 
cloud-free areas over the subtropical oceans represent 
another 5 – 10 % of the Earth’s surface area. The 
method would be most effective when there are no or 
few higher-level clouds overlying the targeted low 
clouds and the air is unpolluted (Alterskjær et al., 2012; 
Bower et al., 2006). The effectiveness would be 
dependent on meteorological conditions such as hori-
zontal and vertical wind speeds, as well as the forma-
tion of precipitation (Wang et al., 2011). The meteoro-
logical conditions could also influence the efficiency 
of the spraying process (Jenkins et al., 2013). The 
resulting size of the sea salt aerosol particles is crucial. 
For particles that are too large, cloud seeding might 
even lead to a reduction in cloud droplet number con-
centration, opposing the desired effect (Alterskjær 
and Kristjánsson, 2013; Pringle et al., 2012). Clouds are 
among the most complex and least understood com-
ponents of the climate system, and there are large 
uncertainties associated with aerosol–cloud interac-
tions (Korhonen et al., 2010; Stevens and Boucher, 
2012) and aerosol–radiation interactions (Partanen et 
al., 2012). 
 
Figure 2.5:   
Depiction of cloud 
brightening by aerosol 
particle injection. On the 
left is an unperturbed 
cloud in which the 
available liquid water is 
spread over fewer, larger 
droplets; on the right  
is a cloud in which cloud 
condensation nuclei 
particles have been 
injected, creating more 
particles over which the 
available liquid water is 
spread. The particles in 
the perturbed cloud have 
a larger total surface area 
and thus let less sunlight 
through the cloud than in 
the unperturbed case.   
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The most commonly discussed delivery strategy 
involves wind-driven vessels that would pump sea 
spray into the overlying air, whereupon evaporation 
would form sea salt aerosols that would then be trans-
ported up to the base of overlying low-level clouds by 
below-cloud updrafts and turbulent motion in the 
marine boundary layer (Salter et al., 2008). Chal-
lenges associated with this method include coagula-
tion of the injected sea salt particles into fewer and 
larger particles (that sediment more quickly), and 
reduced updraft speeds or formation of downdrafts 
due to cooling by the sea spray as it evaporates. One 
study showed that the former effect can reduce the 
cloud droplet number concentration by 46  % over 
emission regions, thereby reducing the effectiveness 
of the technique by almost a factor of 2 (Stuart et al., 
2013), while the latter effect appears to be less signifi-
cant (Jenkins and Forster, 2013). Despite these limita-
tions, other delivery methods, for example using air-
craft, are likely infeasible given the very large mass of 
cloud seeding particles required. The costs of research 
and development for unmanned floating vessels are 
estimated at about $100 million, whilst each ship is 
estimated to cost $1.5 – 3 million (Salter et al., 2008). 
Estimates of the number of vessels needed to achieve 
a 3.7 Wm-2 radiative cooling (equivalent to the forcing 
from a doubling of pre-industrial CO2) vary from 
~1500 (Salter et al., 2008) to ~25000 (Alterskjær et al., 
2013). The method is deemed to have a low technical 
feasibility, largely because of the difficulty of develop-
ing a reliable spray-generation technology that could 
efficiently produce particles of an appropriate size in 
sufficiently large quantities. More fundamentally, the 
level of understanding of the effects of such aerosol 
spraying is currently very low, as there are only a few 
numerical experiments available, of which the results 
are quantitatively quite divergent, for example due to 
differences in the treatment of sub-cloud updrafts 
(Jenkins et al., 2013). 
Other Impacts: As for other forms of albedo modifica-
tion, changes in the hydrological cycle are expected 
for MSB (Robock et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2011; Rasch 
et al., 2009; Rasch, 2010; Jones et al., 2009; Baughman 
et al., 2012; Bala et al., 2010; Bala and Nag, 2011; Alter-
skjær et al., 2013). Particularly for implementations in 
the Pacific Ocean, there is the potential for changes in 
the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) due to the 
strong localised cooling that would need to be 
induced in one of the key target regions, off the coast 
of Peru (Baughman et al., 2012). MSB is expected to 
enhance precipitation over low-latitude land regions; 
this may enhance agricultural productivity in some 
regions but could also lead to increased flood risk 
(Bala and Nag, 2011; Alterskjær et al., 2013). The emit-
ted sea salt could cause corrosive destruction of infra-
structure and have detrimental effects on plants if 
local deposition rates were sufficiently high (Paludan-
Müller et al., 2002; Muri et al., 2015).
2.2.3 Desert reflectivity modification
Description: Deserts are considered one of the most 
optimal areas for land-based reflectivity modification, 
due to low population density, a relatively stable 
surface, sparse vegetation, a large surface area 
(11.6 × 106 km2, 2.3 % of the Earth’s surface area, not 
including aeolian deserts), limited cloud cover, and 
low-latitude locations. A reflective material could be 
placed on desert surfaces, e.g., aluminium coated with 
polyethylene (plastic) (Gaskill, 2004), with the inten-
tion of increasing the albedo from the present value of 
0.2 – 0.5 to about 0.8 (Tsvetsinskaya et al., 2002). 
Effectiveness: Covering all deserts (i.e., 2.3% of the 
Earth’s surface) with material that would increase its 
albedo from 0.36 to 0.8 would give a maximum glo-
bally averaged radiative forcing of -1.9 to -2.1 Wm-2, 
assuming permanently clear skies in the desert 
regions (Lenton and Vaughan, 2009). The effective-
ness of the method is likely to be reduced with time, 
as sand and debris are windblown onto the sheets, 
reducing their reflectivity, thus adding maintenance 
costs; for near-complete coverage, the logistics of 
access to the surfaces for such maintenance would 
present an additional challenge (although near-com-
plete coverage would limit the amount of sand debris 
that might be mobilised by winds to coat the mate-
rial). Installation costs have been estimated at ca. $0.3 
per m2 of surface area (Shepherd et al., 2009), based 
on the simple assumption that costs would be compa-
rable to painting human structures, with possibly 
comparable maintenance costs if the surfaces needed 
to be renewed or recovered on a regular basis. Under 
this assumption, the total cost for achieving -2 Wm-2 
of forcing would thus be several trillion dollars, which 
is likely to be prohibitively costly for full-scale deploy-
ment. The technology to produce the plastic sheets 
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already exists, but nevertheless the feasibility is low, 
due to the high installation costs and the challenging 
maintenance issues. Reversal of deployment would in 
principle be straightforward, since the sheets would 
be readily removable, although plastic waste would 
likely be a major issue, as polyethylene is not readily 
biodegradable.
Other Impacts: The most significant impact expected 
from this technique would be a substantial perturba-
tion of desert ecosystems, due to the physical cover-
age by the sheets and the reduced energetic input due 
to the increased albedo. No studies of these implica-
tions are known. Furthermore, the increased desert 
reflectivity is expected to lead to considerable regional 
climatic changes. Irvine et al. (2011) found large reduc-
tions in regional precipitation adjacent to deserts and 
a severe reduction in monsoon intensity due to 
increasing albedo in desert regions. Another potential 
impact is a substantial reduction in the nutrient sup-
ply to the Amazon, for which the Sahara is an impor-
tant source (Koren et al., 2006; Swap et al., 1992). 
There has been very little research on this topic, and 
thus the present level of understanding is very low. 
2.2.4 Vegetation reflectivity  
modification 
Description: Another proposal for increasing Earth’s 
surface albedo involves growing or producing varie-
ties of plants with a higher albedo than current varie-
ties, for example in crops, grasslands, or pasture 
grasses. The impacts are expected to be mainly local 
or regional with likely minimal impact on the global 
commons and with minimal transboundary effects, 
except the large-scale climate cooling effects resulting 
from the albedo modification. The permanence of the 
effect will depend on the lifetime and the planting 
rotation cycles of the crops. To have a global impact, 
the modified crops would need to be planted over 
very large regions (see the estimations of necessary 
surface area in Section 2.2.3), particularly since the 
potential increase in albedo by modifying crops will 
generally be less than what could be achieved by cov-
ering deserts with reflective foil. The natural variabil-
ity of albedo within one crop variety is typically 
within the range 0.02 – 0.08 (Ridgwell et al., 2009), 
but for some crops, e.g., wheat, it can be as much as 
0.16 (Uddin and Marshall, 1988). The albedo depends 
on plant morphology, leaf spectral properties, and 
canopy structure (Doughty et al., 2010). Genetic mod-
ification and selective breeding of crops could be used 
to “design” plants with certain traits. This way, or by 
simply choosing naturally brighter varieties, a differ-
ent variety of the same type of crop could continue to 
be grown. The consequences for food production and 
processing would thus be minimised or avoided. 
Effectiveness: The impacts of modified plant albedo 
would be mainly regional and seasonal (summer) 
(Irvine et al., 2011; Ridgwell et al., 2009; Doughty et 
al., 2010; Singarayer et al., 2009). Grassland and crop 
albedo modifications are estimated to have a radiative 
forcing potential of -0.6 and -0.3 Wm-2 respectively, or 
-0.9 Wm-2 in combination (Lenton and Vaughan, 
2009, Ridgwell et al., 2009, Hamwey, 2007). Approxi-
mately 2.7 % of the Earth’s surface is covered by crops, 
whilst around 7.5 % is covered by grassland. No new 
infrastructure or technology would be needed, mak-
ing the technical feasibility of this method high. 
Other Impacts: As for other techniques that remove 
greenhouse gases through modifying vegetation, such 
changes in land use may conflict with other goals of 
land use management such as biodiversity preserva-
tion and carbon sequestration. Changing crop types 
on a large scale could affect market prices, biodiver-
sity, and local ecosystems. The background climate 
state is important for determining the impacts of 
increasing vegetation albedo. During post-harvest 
periods and regrowth, the albedo would vary, result-
ing in a seasonal variation of the additional radiative 
forcing effect (Zhang et al., 2012). The effects on soil 
moisture are uncertain, and changing crops could lead 
to changes in moisture advection and cloud cover, 
which could in turn either counteract or enhance the 
albedo cooling (Irvine et al., 2011; Ridgwell et al., 
2009; Doughty et al., 2010). Net primary productivity 
and crop yields could be influenced by changes in 
photosynthesis as a result of the higher albedo (Shep-
herd et al., 2009), and reduced leaf-heating due to 
increased plant albedo could also result in a reduction 
of water demand, again likely influencing net primary 
productivity (Singarayer et al., 2009; Moreshet et al., 
1979). There is presently limited understanding of 
such techniques, as few studies are available.
EuTRACE Report_47
2. Characteristics of techniques to remove greenhouse gases or to modify planetary albedo
Figure 2.6:   
Schematic of cirrus cloud 
thinning by seeding 
with ice nuclei, reducing 
reflection of shortwave 
solar radiation (blue ar-
rows) and absorption of 
longwave terrestrial ra-
diation (red arrows). The 
seeded cirrus clouds on 
average reflect slightly 
less shortwave radiation 
back to space, but also 
allow more longwave 
radiation to escape to 
space, with the latter ef-
fect dominating.  
 
Source:  
Storelvmo et al. (2013).   
2.2.5 Cirrus cloud thinning
Description: In addition to the various schemes dis-
cussed above for increasing the planetary albedo, 
other related ideas for directly cooling the Earth’s sur-
face have been proposed. Most discussed among 
these is the idea of cirrus cloud thinning. Cirrus 
clouds, like all other clouds, both reflect sunlight and 
absorb terrestrial radiation. However, cirrus clouds 
differ from other types of clouds in that, on average, 
absorption outweighs reflection, with the result that 
cirrus clouds have a net warming effect on the climate 
(Lee et al., 2009). It has been suggested that seeding 
the cirrus-forming regions in the upper troposphere 
with relatively few, highly effective ice nuclei could 
induce a fraction of the haze droplets in cirrus clouds 
to freeze by interacting with the ice nuclei, forming 
fewer and larger ice crystals (Mitchell and Finnegan, 
2009). These ice crystals would quickly grow large, at 
the expense of smaller, supercooled water droplets, 
thus more rapidly sedimenting out of the clouds and 
thereby reducing the optical thickness and lifetime of 
the seeded cirrus clouds (see Figure 2.6). Seeding 
material would need to be added regularly, because it 
too would fall out together with the large ice crystals. 
Reducing the optical thickness and lifetime of cirrus 
clouds would increase outgoing terrestrial radiation, 
causing a cooling effect. Bismuth tri-iodide, BiI3, has 
been suggested as a seeding material, as it is relatively 
cheap and non-toxic (Mitchell and Finnegan, 2009). 
Sea salt has also been suggested as another potential 
seeding candidate (Wise et al., 2012). The seeding 
aerosols can have an atmospheric residence time of up 
to 1 – 2 weeks, depending on their size and thus their 
sedimentation velocities. Commercial airliners and 
unmanned drone aircraft have been suggested as 
potential delivery mechanisms (Mitchell et al., 2011). 
The seeding substances could be dissolved into the jet 
fuel, or a flammable solution could be injected into the 
jet engine exhaust. Given that global cirrus cloud cov-
erage is 25 – 33 % (Wylie et al., 2005) (128 – 168 × 106 
km2), large areas of the Earth would, in principle, be 
susceptible to modification.
a) unseeded b) seeded
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Effectiveness: A net cloud forcing of up to -2.7 Wm-2 has 
been found in model studies (Storelvmo et al., 2013; 
Muri et al., 2014). The method would be most effective 
at high altitudes (~10 km), in air with low background 
aerosol particle concentrations, and at night-time. The 
method would also be most effective outside of the 
tropics, since ice crystals in tropical cirrus clouds 
(typically anvil clouds) are predominantly formed in 
strong updrafts in convective clouds, making seeding 
a challenge. Combined with recent findings of hetero-
geneous nucleation in tropical anvil cirrus (Cziczo et 
al., 2013), this effectively rules out tropical cirrus for 
seeding (Storelvmo and Herger, 2014). Very little is 
currently known about the feasibility or operational 
costs of this approach; there are very few theoretical 
studies, and to the extent of our knowledge, no exper-
imental field studies or implementations have been 
attempted to date. The maintenance cost of procuring 
the seeding material, BiI3, is likely negligible given the 
relatively small mass required (140 tonnes, Marshall, 
2013), although there are other, likely more expensive, 
components of the total operational costs, for exam-
ple aircraft deployment in susceptible regions, for 
which no estimates are yet available.
Other Impacts: In the context of cirrus cloud thinning, 
the cloud–aerosol–climate interactions are not well 
understood. Factors that control the heterogeneous 
freezing process are uncertain, as ice growth kinetics 
are not well documented. “Over-seeding” might lead 
to warming, as opposed to the desired cooling (Store-
lvmo et al., 2013). Vertical velocities are important for 
activation of ice nuclei, but current estimates are 
uncertain due to lack of observations. Heterogeneous 
freezing may already be common in cirrus (Cziczo et 
al., 2013), which would render the method less effec-
tive than expected. There could be a number of clima-
tological side effects. However, as cirrus cloud-thin-
ning targets terrestrial radiation — effectively directly 
countering the greenhouse effect by reducing the 
amount of terrestrial radiation that is re-radiated from 
the atmosphere towards the surface, albeit not with 
the same geographical distribution of radiative forcing 
by greenhouse gases — it may nevertheless reduce the 
degree of atmospheric circulation changes and 
regional changes to the hydrological cycle that would 
be expected with most of the albedo modification 
schemes (Muri et al., 2014). With few numerical 
experiments available, the current level of under-
standing is very low.
2.2.6 Results from idealised  
modelling studies
Prior to potential future field tests or implementation, 
an initial understanding of the climate response to 
modifying the planetary albedo can be gained from 
both highly idealised studies and more realistic sce-
narios of deployment. Idealised studies have proven 
very useful as they allow individual aspects of the 
response to be clearly identified. However, these ide-
alised experiments are inevitably oversimplifications 
and omit many of the subtleties that would be 
involved in the deployment of an albedo modification 
scheme. Realistic scenarios of deployment, in con-
trast, are important for discussions with stakeholders 
about the topic; however, since many factors generally 
influence the climate simultaneously in such simula-
tions, it can be difficult to isolate the causes of various 
responses. 
In many idealised numerical model studies to date, a 
reduction in the incoming solar radiation (solar irradi-
ance) has been used as a simple proxy for the various 
forms of albedo modification. While it might be pos-
sible to achieve such a uniform reduction by placing 
an array of mirrors in space, this technology is not 
considered a realistic option in the foreseeable future. 
However, since such simulations involving a uniform 
reduction in incoming solar radiation are straightfor-
ward to set up and compare with each other, this 
approach has been favoured to enable many climate 
modelling centres to conduct the same simulations, 
providing more confidence in the results. This has 
been done under the auspices of GeoMIP (see  Box 
2.2), providing a valuable background knowledge base 
for future, more realistic and more complicated exper-
iments that are being initiated in the next phase of 
GeoMIP.
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Box 2.2  
The Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP)
Since the first  assessment of climate engineering by the UK Royal Society 
(Shepherd et al., 2009), considerable further modelling work has analysed the 
climatic effects of albedo modification techniques. Following the protocol of 
the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5), which has been extensive-
ly utilised by the IPCC (IPCC, 2013a), the Geoengineering Model Intercompari-
son Project (GeoMIP) project (Kravitz et al., 2011) provides the most compre-
hensive multi-model assessment  to date of the impact of albedo modification 
on climate. The GeoMIP setup is designed to enable nominally identical simula-
tions to be carried out by the full range of coupled atmosphere–ocean models. 
GeoMIP originally included four experiments, each of which built on standard 
CMIP5 experiments, and added an additional forcing to simulate the implemen-
tation of various techniques for modifying the planetary albedo (see Figure 
2.7). Experiment G1 builds on the CMIP5 experiment of an instantaneous quad-
rupling of the atmospheric CO2 concentration, and employs a global reduction 
in the total solar irradiance to compensate for the radiative forcing due to the 
increased CO2 concentration, resulting in a net zero global radiative forcing. G2 
follows the same principle, but builds on the CMIP5 experiment of a 1% annual 
CO2 increase since pre-industrial times. The approach of reducing total solar 
irradiance (e.g., Bala and Caldeira, 2000) was favoured for these first experi-
ments because its simplicity allowed the participation by many models (for 
example, Kravitz et al., 2013a; Schmidt et al., 2012a). G1 and G2 may be thought 
of either as representing an implementation of space mirrors or as a useful but 
imperfect analogue of stratospheric aerosol injection (Niemeier et al., 2013,  
Ferraro et al., 2014; Kalidindi et al., 2014). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in 
mind that the simple GeoMIP G1 and G2 experiments fail to account for side ef-
fects that are germane to stratospheric sulphur injections, such as stratospheric 
ozone depletion (Tilmes et al., 2008), effects on cirrus clouds (Kuebbeler et al., 
2012), or changes in tropical convection (Ferraro et al., 2014). Therefore, Ge-
oMIP experiments G3 and G4 use the injection of sulphur dioxide into the strat-
osphere to compensate for a specified fraction of the radiative forcing after the 
year 2020 in the CMIP5 future scenario RCP4.5: G3 keeps the total net radiative 
forcing (GHG warming minus SAI cooling) constant at 2020 levels, while G4 has 
a constant SAI forcing while the GHG forcing continues to increase based on 
the RCP4.5 scenario (see Figure 2.7). An overview of the GeoMIP project and of 
recently published results is given by (Kravitz et al., 2013c). GeoMIP is continu-
ing and has defined a new set of modelling experiments, including a new focus 
on the cloud brightening approach (Kravitz et al., 2013b).
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Figure 2.7:   
Idealised radiative forc-
ing curves in each of the 
four original GeoMIP 
experiments (G1-G4), 
along with the radiative 
forcing for the pre-indus-
trial control simulation 
and the standard CMIP5 
simulation
 
Source:  
Kravitz et al., 2011  
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Numerous studies show that albedo modification can-
not reverse all aspects of greenhouse gas-driven cli-
mate change, and that a large-scale implementation of 
SAI sufficient to offset a significant fraction of current 
or future global warming would still result in a sig-
nificantly altered climate compared to the present-day 
climate. One fundamental difference between the 
response of climate to greenhouse gas forcing and the 
forcing from albedo modification is their effect on glo-
bal precipitation, so that either global mean tempera-
ture or global mean precipitation could be returned to 
earlier conditions, but not both at the same time 
(Kravitz et al., 2013a; Irvine et al., 2010; Ricke et al., 
2010b; Jones et al., 2010; Robock et al., 2008; Bala et 
al., 2010; Bala et al., 2008). Furthermore, the cooling 
effect of SAI, or any form of albedo modification, 
would have a different spatio-temporal pattern from 
the warming effect of greenhouse gases. Accordingly, 
even if global mean temperatures are returned to 
some earlier condition, there will be some warmer 
and some cooler regions (Kravitz et al., 2013a). The 
multi-model ensembles of the GeoMIP project (simu-
lation G1, Kravitz et al., 2011, see Box 2.2) indicate that 
if the sunlight reaching the top of the atmosphere is 
reduced enough to completely offset the global mean 
warming due to a large increase in greenhouse gases, 
then the Equator would end up becoming cooler than 
under the pre-industrial climate, whereas the poles 
would be warmer (Schmidt et al., 2012a; Kravitz et al., 
2013a). Albedo modification would also alter the 
regional distribution of precipitation and evaporation 
with consequences for regional hydrology (Tilmes et 
al., 2013). Figure 2.8 illustrates the temperature and 
precipitation differences between a pre-industrial 
simulation and the GeoMIP G1 simulation (see Box 
2.2) with elevated CO2 concentrations compensated 
by a reduction in solar irradiance (Schmidt et al., 
2012a). Whilst albedo modification could not reverse 
all the effects of greenhouse gas-driven climate 
change and would accordingly result in an altered cli-
mate, studies suggest that in most regions, the 
changes in climate would nevertheless be of a smaller 
magnitude than under scenarios that consider only 
the effects of greenhouse gases (Ricke et al., 2010b; 
Moreno-Cruz et al., 2011).
SAI differs from idealised solar irradiance reduction 
(for example, by space mirrors) in a number of ways 
that need to be considered in evaluating its potential 
climate response. Firstly, sulphate aerosols absorb ter-
restrial radiation, leading to heating within the strat-
ospheric aerosol layer, thereby reducing the top-of-
atmosphere net forcing. This will have impacts on the 
atmospheric circulation and hydrological cycle (Jones 
et al., 2010; Ferraro et al., 2014). Secondly, the spatial 
distribution of aerosols will not be homogeneous and 
thus will not produce as homogeneous a cooling effect 
as in the simple solar reduction experiments (Jones et 
al., 2010; Robock et al., 2008; Niemeier et al., 2011). 
Thirdly, the distribution of the stratospheric aerosol 
layer could be deliberately unbalanced, for example by 
restricting most of the aerosol layer to one hemi-
sphere or only to one pole. Model simulations indicate 
that SAI solely in the Northern or Southern Hemi-
sphere stratosphere would lead to shifts in the posi-
tion of the inter-tropical convergence zone (ITCZ), 
with particularly significant implications for the Sahel 
region, while injecting into both hemispheres would 
not shift the location of the ITCZ significantly (Hay-
wood et al., 2013). The impact of injection at different 
latitudes and altitudes has been more generally 
assessed by Volodin et al. (2011), showing that inject-
ing at extreme northern latitudes is less effective than 
equatorial injection in terms of producing a long-lived 
stratospheric aerosol layer, and thus in cooling the 
planet. Volodin et al. (2011) also emphasised that, to be 
effective, delivery needs to be within the stratosphere, 
noting that the altitude at which the stratosphere 
starts ranges from around 8 km at the poles to around 
20 km at the Equator. Schallock (2015) conducted a 
similar study, although varying a larger range of 
parameters, and similarly found that the most effec-
tive region for injection is around the Equator. Schal-
lock (2015) also determined that the simulated mass 
retention in the stratosphere is nearly twice as large 
for injections at 25 km compared to injections at 20 
km (and that this ratio is nearly the same for simulated 
particles of 100, 200, and 400 nm). Particle injection 
at tropical latitudes would pose a substantial technical 
challenge for many proposed delivery methods, given 
these indications of very high altitudes being required 
for SAI to be highly effective. Much remains to be 
understood, as current climate model simulations do 
not capture the full spatial patterns of response to 
stratospheric aerosol forcing, particularly the ob- 
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served warmer and wetter European winters that 
have historically occurred after large volcanic erup-
tions (Stenchikov et al., 2006; Driscoll et al., 2012). 
Some albedo modification techniques or combina-
tions of techniques could potentially offer considera-
ble control over the distribution of the induced radia-
tive forcing. In theory, this could allow optimisation 
G1 – piControl, precipitation (mm/day)
Figure 2.8:   
Difference between the 
GeoMIP G1 simulation 
and the pre-industrial 
control simulation for 
surface air temperature 
(top panel) and precipi-
tation (bottom panel), 
computed as the mean of 
the GeoMIP ensemble of 
12 models. Areas where 
at least nine models 
show a response with the 
same sign are colour-
shaded.  
 
Source: 
Figure updated from 
Schmidt et al. (2012a), 
using data from Kravitz 
et al. (2013a).  
of the forcing, although no albedo modification 
deployment could reverse all the climatic effects of 
greenhouse-gas-induced warming. Simulations using 
an idealised latitudinal distribution of aerosols to min-
imise regional temperature and precipitation changes 
(Ban-Weiss and Caldeira, 2010; MacMartin et al., 
2013) or to minimise loss of Arctic and Antarctic sea 
ice (Caldeira and Wood, 2008; MacCracken et al., 
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2012) show potential in addressing these specific con-
cerns but do not address how these latitudinal distri-
butions of aerosols can be achieved in practice. Thus, 
while it is clear that albedo modification could effec-
tively reduce global mean temperature, offering some 
degree of control over the amount and distribution of 
the reduction, it is unclear whether a sophisticated opti-
misation of albedo modification forcing is achievable.
Albedo modification, combined with various green-
house gas scenarios, would have numerous other 
impacts on the climate system beyond changes in pre-
cipitation and temperature. The response of the over-
all hydrological cycle to albedo modification is an area 
of active research. Whilst albedo modification would 
reduce precipitation, it would also reduce evaporative 
demand, and the water-use efficiency of plants is 
expected to increase under elevated CO2 concentra-
tions (Franks et al., 2013); Box 2.3 describes some of 
the broader vegetation results of albedo modification 
studies. A study by Pongratz et al. (2012) indicates that 
albedo modification would increase crop yield relative 
to a scenario with rising greenhouse gases, as the heat 
stress on plants would be reduced (see also Xia et al., 
2014). Sea level rise would also be reduced under sce-
narios of albedo modification, reducing the thermal 
expansion of the oceans and likely reducing the melt-
ing of ice sheets and glaciers, although these changes 
would mostly take effect over longer (multi-decadal) 
timescales (Irvine et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2010; 
Irvine et al., 2012). Evaluation of these various climate 
impacts predicted for various albedo modification sce-
narios is at a very early stage, and it is not yet possible 
to predict with confidence the extent to which differ-
ent regions would benefit from or be harmed by the 
deployment of a given albedo modification scheme.
Box 2.3  
SAI and vegetation productivity
Plants are sensitive to temperature, light conditions, and water availability. All 
these parameters will be influenced by albedo modification through the in-
duced cooling, changes in rainfall patterns, evaporation, and through impacts 
on available photosynthetically active radiation. Vegetation productivity is 
frequently characterised by the vegetative net primary productivity (gross 
primary productivity minus autotrophic respiration). Simulations suggest that  
under business-as-usual scenarios, as well as in a hypothetical future world in 
which global temperatures are held at present-day values via SAI,  net primary 
productivity would increase due to CO2 fertilisation (Jones et al., 2013; Glienke 
et al., 2015). GeoMIP simulations show that models with an interactive nitrogen 
cycle (Thornton et al., 2009) predict a far smaller CO2 fertilisation effect than 
without the nitrogen cycle, owing to carbon–nitrogen cycle interactions (Jones 
et al., 2013; Glienke et al., 2015). Considerable uncertainties remain in param-
eterisations of the CO2 fertilisation effect and in projected vegetation productiv-
ity changes. There is only limited observational evidence of these relationships; 
for instance, the rates of atmospheric CO2 increase slowed after the eruption of 
Pinatubo (Gu et al., 2003), which has been suggested to be due to increased 
photosynthesis under the more diffuse radiation conditions (Roderick et al., 
2001) or a decrease in microbial respiration associated with the global cool-
ing (Jones et al., 2003). Stratospheric climate engineering may further increase 
net primary productivity by increasing the diffuse component of solar radiation 
(Mercado et al., 2009),  although this would depend strongly on latitude and 
other factors; this might also result in further effects on the hydrological cycle 
via evapotranspiration (Oliveira et al., 2011).
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2.2.7 General effectiveness and  
constraints of modifying the planetary 
albedo
The effectiveness of albedo modification in prevent-
ing temperature rise is reliant on its continued opera-
tion. Accordingly, if greenhouse gas emissions con-
tinue, and it were desired to keep global mean 
temperatures below some threshold (e.g., the 2°C limit 
frequently discussed by policy makers), then the scale 
of deployment would need to be increased to counter-
act the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations. If 
albedo modification were then abruptly terminated, 
global mean temperatures would quickly return to 
approximately the same temperatures as would have 
been expected had albedo modification never been 
implemented (Jones et al., 2013; Alterskjær et al., 2013; 
Irvine et al., 2012). As can be seen in Figure 2.9, this 
rapid warming following the abrupt termination of 
intervention is a robust response that is seen in all 
models of the GeoMIP multi-model ensemble. A sim-
ilarly rapid response is found for precipitation and sea 
ice (Jones et al., 2013). These rapid rates of change 
would be expected to have significant impacts on eco-
systems, which might have even greater difficulty 
adapting than under a business-as-usual or modest 
mitigation scenarios with slower rates of temperature 
increase. Thus, if albedo modification ever were to be 
deployed at a scale that exerted a significant cooling 
effect, and were to then be terminated for some rea-
son, then the resulting rate of temperature increase 
(and associated impacts on ecosystems) could be 
made less severe by phasing out the implementation 
over the course of many years or decades, rather than 
abruptly (Irvine et al., 2012).
Figure 2.9:   
Multi-model ensemble 
simulations (GeoMIP G2) 
of the impact on temper-
ature due to albedo mod-
ification by reduction of 
the solar constant. The 
global mean temperature 
change compared to the 
pre-industrial control 
simulation is shown for 
each of the models, with 
the dotted lines repre-
senting simulations with 
no albedo modification 
and solid lines repre-
senting simulations with 
albedo modification up 
to year 50, after which 
the albedo modification 
is terminated. 
Source:   
Jones et al. (2013).  700
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2.2.8 Carbon cycle climate feedbacks 
between modifying the planetary 
albedo and removing greenhouse 
gases from the atmosphere
Feedbacks between the climate and the carbon cycle 
mean that intervention in one will influence the other. 
On the one hand, reducing global surface tempera-
tures via albedo modification would impact carbon 
cycle fluxes both by altering terrestrial and marine 
biological productivity and changing the solubility of 
CO2 in the ocean surface (due to temperature 
changes). On the other hand, greenhouse gas removal 
methods that modify the land or ocean surface will 
alter the radiation balance of the Earth–atmosphere 
system.
The influence of albedo modification on the carbon 
cycle has been explored in a limited number of model-
ling studies (Jones et al., 2013; Matthews and Caldeira, 
2007; Eliseev, 2012; Muri et al., 2015; Bala et al., 2002; 
Kalidindi et al., 2014; Jones and Haywood, 2012; Fyfe 
et al., 2013; Irvine et al., 2014a). Biological productivity 
is frequently characterised by the vegetative net pri-
mary productivity. As discussed in Box 2.3, under 
both business-as-usual scenarios and in a future cli-
mate-engineered world where global temperatures 
are held at present-day values, net primary productiv-
ity is projected to increase due to CO2 fertilisation 
(Jones et al., 2013; Glienke et al., 2015; see also Box 2.2). 
Changes to the climate would also affect other aspects 
of the carbon cycle. For example, the respiration rate 
of soil bacteria in a cooler climate is expected to be 
lower, resulting in more carbon being stored in soils. 
The response of the terrestrial residence time of car-
bon is uncertain under albedo modification. Further-
more, a cooler ocean can absorb more CO2. In one 
study, applying albedo modification to return global 
mean surface temperatures of a business-as-usual 
CO2 emission scenario (RCP8.5) back to pre-indus-
trial values was projected to draw down about 920 Gt 
CO2 from the atmosphere by the year 2100 (Keller et 
al., 2014), with the resulting decrease in the mean CO2 
mixing ratio shown in Figure 2.10. This predicted 
“unintended” drawdown of CO2 is actually larger than 
the maximum drawdown that can be expected from 
some greenhouse gas removal techniques.
In turn, greenhouse gas removal methods can modify 
the surface solar radiation balance via changes in sur-
face albedo. This is a largely unexplored topic, 
although initial indications are that the effects would 
likely not have a significant impact on the global cli-
mate system (Keller et al., 2014).
Overall, at present, there are very large uncertainties 
about the feedbacks in both directions, and consider-
able further work would be needed in order to 
develop a more robust understanding of the connec-
tions between greenhouse gas removal and albedo 
changes.
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Figure 2.10:   
Enhanced carbon uptake 
from a deployment of 
albedo modification that 
brings global average 
temperatures back to 
the pre-industrial level 
in an RCP8.5 scenario. 
Top panel: Simulated 
changes in globally aver-
aged annual atmospheric 
CO2 mixing ratio for 
the control and albedo 
modification simulation; 
bottom panel: Simulated 
year 2100 mean annual 
differences in the terres-
trial and oceanic carbon 
inventories for the albedo 
modification simulation 
minus the control simula-
tion. 
 
Source:   
Keller et al. (2014), 
adopted from original 
figures.
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3. Emerging 
societal issues
Beyond the technical challenges of understanding and 
possibly exerting some degree of control over the 
impacts of climate engineering on the Earth system as 
described in the previous chapter, techniques that 
have been proposed for removing greenhouse gases 
or for modifying the planetary albedo or cirrus clouds 
all raise complex questions in the social, ethical, legal, 
and political domains (Shepherd et al., 2009). This 
chapter assesses several of these societal issues, which 
to a considerable degree shape the debate around dif-
ferent climate engineering techniques. Even the mere 
ideas of greenhouse gas removal or albedo modifica-
tion raise important questions, for example about the 
possible influence that considering such techniques 
may have on efforts toward mitigation and adaptation 
(3.1.1), or about the responsibility that humans have 
toward the environment (3.1.2). This chapter also con-
siders public awareness of the different techniques, 
and how this has developed in recent years (3.1.3), 
drawing on a preliminary analysis of four field experi-
ments or trials to assess potential avenues for future 
research and attention. A second part of the chapter 
assesses aspects of potential climate engineering 
deployment, such as political conflicts that may ensue 
(3.2.1), along with economic considerations (3.2.2.). As 
will be shown, this also raises normative questions of 
fairness and justice, based on the distribution of ben-
efits and costs (3.2.3) and of compensation for harm 
(3.2.4). The different issues discussed in the first two 
parts make decisions on interventions in the climate 
system, as well as about research on such interven-
tions, extremely challenging. Building on this, the 
assessment presented in Chapter 6 addresses some of 
the difficulties for decision making and draws on vari-
ous principles to examine the possible directions that 
such decisions may take. Within the different subsec-
tions of the chapter, the issues are presented first in a 
general way and are then applied to the three tech-
niques detailed in the previous chapters (BECCS, OIF, 
and SAI).
 
3.1 Perception of potential effects of 
research and deployment
There are several issues related to the manner in 
which the discourse around climate engineering is 
perceived by policy makers and the broader public, 
including possible responses to the perception — jus-
tified or not — of a near-future “solution” to climate 
change. This section focuses particularly on the 
responses to research on climate engineering and on 
various aspects of carrying out the discourse, e.g., 
participation and consultation. 
3.1.1 Moral Hazard  
A prominent concern around climate engineering has 
been the fear that discussing, researching, and 
developing climate engineering techniques may have 
negative effects on efforts to reduce emissions. In gen-
eral, such concerns have been summarised under the 
term “moral hazard” (Keith, 2000), which originated 
in insurance theory (Arrow, 1963). These concerns 
prevented many researchers from engaging with the 
topic until an editorial by Paul Crutzen in the journal 
Climatic Change  (Crutzen, 2006) served to break the 
“taboo” (Lawrence, 2006) perceived by many in the 
atmospheric research community. It has been sug-
gested that the moral hazard effect may occur via sev-
eral mechanisms, which may also interact. These 
include: increasing risk-prone behaviour; diverting 
attention, efforts, and incentives from the challenge of 
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decreasing greenhouse gas emissions; encouraging 
political stagnation; supporting a cost/benefit-based 
delay of emission reductions; and worsening existing 
coordination problems in climate policy (see, for 
example, Hale, 2012, Lin, 2013, Preston, 2013).
Three background assumptions are often associated 
with the moral hazard argument. First among these is 
the danger that climate engineering techniques could 
be misused to protect the vested interests of involved 
actors. In particular, this involves the possibility that 
developing and applying climate engineering tech-
niques could be used to strengthen the position of 
those who oppose emission reductions, especially by 
those that profit from fossil-fuel-intensive production 
processes and fossil fuel extraction (Jamieson, 1996, 
Virgoe, 2009: 105, Ott, 2012). Secondly, many have 
associated the array of possible responses to climate 
change with hopes for more fundamental changes to 
the current systems of production and consumption. 
Proposals for climate engineering, however, generally 
focus on modifying the physical environmental 
aspects of global warming rather than on the underly-
ing societal causes. This would potentially decouple 
other societal issues such as consumerist lifestyles, 
mass agricultural practices, unsustainable processes 
of energy and consumer goods production, tropical 
deforestation, and population trends from the debate 
on global warming (Corner and Pidgeon, 2010; 
Schäfer et al., 2014). Finally, such concerns about 
maintaining the status quo can be linked to an under-
lying concern about the use of technological fixes, 
which are seen as being based on a deep-rooted habit 
of solving problems with technology by changing the 
external circumstances (for example, applying more 
technology) rather than by changing behavioural pat-
terns (Borgmann, 2012). Even though such fixes are 
used in many areas, their moral status is generally 
considered ambiguous and the techno-fix framing is 
often used negatively, to connote an inadequate and 
morally problematic solution to an underlying prob-
lem (Preston, 2013).
 
Views sceptical of the moral hazard argument have 
also been set forth. Firstly, the ethical implications of 
the suggested relationship between mitigation and 
climate engineering techniques are unclear. As Pres-
ton (2013) points out, warnings of a moral hazard are 
ambiguous and cannot provide clear guidance 
because it is unclear what action should follow from 
such warnings. Secondly, behavioural change due to 
reductions in the risks one faces can be seen as a 
rational response to the emergence of a new situation. 
Often, the negative evaluation of such a behavioural 
change is linked to the specific characteristics of the 
behaviour for which insurance is sought, rather than 
the measure taken to reduce the risk (Hale, 2009). 
Thus, safety technologies that create or could create 
an increase in risk-prone behaviour are not always 
abandoned, at least not as long as the benefits are 
believed to outweigh the possible costs (Bunzl, 2009). 
What seems to make individual climate engineering 
techniques problematic is the assumption that they 
will contribute to an underestimation or intentional 
downplaying of the risks and uncertainties associated 
with emitting greenhouse gases, and thus to the 
transfer of those risks to others, especially future gen-
erations. Thirdly, very little empirical evidence is cur-
rently available in this area, and claims about a moral 
hazard may only be testable, if at all, if the situation 
ever actually develops in a substantial and observable 
form (Lin, 2012, Preston, 2013). Fourthly, it is unclear 
whether mitigation efforts would be more successful 
in the absence of discussions on climate engineering, 
as many different factors contribute to the political 
inertia against reducing emissions (Davies, 2011). 
Finally, some argue that the prospect of specific cli-
mate engineering techniques (especially SAI) could 
have the reverse effect, as the mere thought that they 
might be deployed might be perceived by some as 
being so threatening that they strengthen the support 
for mitigation (Davies, 2010, Davies, 2011, Moreno-
Cruz and Smulders, 2010). Millard-Ball (2012) argues 
that it may be rational for other countries to respond 
to such a threat by reducing emissions to the level 
where a country that is threatening to deploy a tech-
nique such as SAI no longer perceives a necessity to 
do so.
The moral hazard arguments have been applied espe-
cially to SAI, which has been referred to as a fast and 
cheap “technological fix” (Corner and Pidgeon, 2010, 
ETC Group, 2010). Due to incomplete knowledge 
about potential side effects, high risks, and pervasive 
uncertainties, there is very little support in the litera-
ture for SAI as a replacement or substitute for mitiga-
tion (Rickels et al., 201; Shepherd, 2009). 
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Greenhouse gas removal techniques such as OIF and 
BECCS might also create a moral hazard, which 
would have both similarities and differences to the 
moral hazard potentially created by SAI. Here the 
focus is not on the possibility of rapidly counteracting 
specific effects of climate change, but rather on the 
potential for developing techniques, or for creating 
the perception that it will be possible at some point to 
develop such techniques, that might help address the 
physical causes of global warming at a later point in 
time. Given the prominent role that greenhouse gas 
removal techniques are given in the mitigation path-
ways underlying RCP 2.6 (and to some extent RCP 
4.5), this concern seems particularly noteworthy (see 
Section 2.1.2). Even though the effectiveness of many 
techniques that aim to remove greenhouse gases from 
the atmosphere seems questionable in light of the 
scale of current emissions and the concentrations of 
atmospheric greenhouse gases that might occur in the 
future, the mere perception that greenhouse gases 
might be removed from the atmosphere at a large 
scale may still lead to reduced efforts towards mitiga-
tion. Techniques for removing greenhouse gases may 
therefore also exacerbate carbon-based path depend-
ency in the near term (Unruh and Carrillo-Her-
mosilla, 2006).
3.1.2 Environmental responsibility 
The potential use of different climate engineering 
techniques that have large-scale influences on the cli-
mate system has been ascribed various negative char-
acter traits, including hubris, arrogance, and reckless-
ness (Kiehl, 2006, Hamilton, 2013). Some of these 
arguments are concerned with the potential negative 
influence of specific climate engineering techniques 
on humanity’s relationship to nature (Ralston, 2009). 
From this perspective, such techniques may not only 
have adverse effects on the environment, but could 
also exacerbate a perceived lack of environmental 
responsibility (Buck, 2012). In this sense, the inten-
tional manipulation of the climate has been described 
as a further instance of humans’ unwillingness to “live 
with nature” (Jamieson, 1996) and the “crossing of a 
new threshold on the spectrum of environmental 
recklessness” (Gardiner, 2011). This also hints at the 
potential hubris toward human capabilities in which 
domination or control over natural processes is 
sought (Ralston, 2009; Joronen et al., 2011). Concerns 
have been raised (Matthews and Turner, 2009) that, 
due to the potential for human error and unintended 
consequences of such interventions, the claim of con-
trollability created by overconfidence and “appraiser’s 
optimism” may turn out to be an illusion (Amelung 
and Funke, 2013). Nevertheless, the use of terms such 
as hubris may be misleading. Individual climate engi-
neering techniques differ greatly with regard to their 
novelty, scalability, and expected environmental 
impacts (Preston, 2013, Heyward, 2013), so at a mini-
mum an explicit differentiation between individual 
techniques is necessary. It is also debatable whether 
direct interventions in the climate system need to be 
understood as transcending a threshold in our rela-
tionship to the Earth (Ridgwell et al., 2012). Some 
argue that humanity is already engaged in a large-
scale experiment with the climate through the use of 
fossil fuels (Davies, 2011). Here, the key point concerns 
an ethical distinction between intentional and unin-
tentional interventions in natural systems and proc-
esses, and what this means for our responsibility. This 
is a discussion that has just started to emerge (Jamie-
son, 1996, Tuana, 2013).
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The literature on public awareness and public accept-
ance of climate engineering techniques is recent and 
diverse. Since awareness is typically assumed to be a 
precondition for the formation of beliefs and attitudes 
toward a novel technology, social science research has 
investigated both public awareness and acceptance of 
different climate engineering techniques and propos-
als. Empirical studies have used a variety of methods, 
including questionnaires and focus groups, with 
research designs including correlational analyses of 
surveys (e.g., Bellamy and Hulme, 2011), a quasi-exper-
imental study (Kahan et al., 2012), and deliberative 
focus groups (e.g., Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013). 
Given that awareness of climate engineering is par-
ticularly low (results of a UK-based study (Pidgeon et 
al., 2012) show that 75 % of the respondents in the 
national sample had either “not heard of” the term cli-
mate engineering or knew “almost nothing about it”), 
some research has employed methods of public dia-
logue as a means to both raise awareness and to solicit 
attitudes from participants (Bellamy et al., 2013; Mac-
naghten and Szerszynski, 2013). 
The literature has had varied foci, ranging from cli-
mate engineering in general to specific techniques or 
groups of techniques, particularly planetary albedo 
modification (e.g., Mercer et al., 2011). Typically, tech-
niques for greenhouse gas removal are not discussed 
in isolation, but within the context of contributions on 
climate engineering in general and as part of the lit-
erature on CCS, including BECCS. Additionally, some 
studies have primarily focused on perceptions of cli-
mate change, within which climate engineering has 
been incorporated as one element (e.g., Bostrom et al., 
2012); or on the perceptions of possible responses to 
climate change — one being climate engineering 
(Poumadère et al., 2011). 
Studies of public awareness suggest that wording is 
important. The use of the term “climate engineering” 
was associated with higher levels of public awareness 
than use of the term “geoengineering” (Mercer et al., 
2011). In this context, it is counterproductive to think 
of individuals as being similar to “empty vessels” that 
need to be filled with scientific/factual information 
about climate engineering. The findings of qualitative 
and deliberative research (e.g., Pidgeon et al., 2012) 
indicate that members of the public associate climate 
engineering with diverse, complex ideas, including 
“messing with nature”, science-fiction, “Star Wars” 
and environmental dystopia.
Box 3.1
 What are public awarenes, acceptance, and engagement? 
 Public awareness refers to what people think they know about climate engi-
neering, whether correct or not, and can therefore consist both of factual infor-
mation and beliefs about the topic.
 Public acceptance refers to a widely shared belief held by politicians, industry, 
and citizens that a given activity or the application of a particular technology 
is beneficial for society. It should be distinguished from community acceptance 
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2007), which refers to whether a specific group of citizens 
are prepared to accept the siting of a given technology near to where they live. 
 Public engagement is an umbrella term used to describe any activity that en-
gages in a public dialogue. These can have different levels of depth (Rowe and 
Frewer, 2005), from communicating information (one-way) to participation/ 
deliberation (two-way dialogue involving listening, reflection, and interaction). 
3.1.3 Public awareness and perception
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Two studies that applied deliberative methods suggest 
a position of “qualified” or conditional acceptance, in 
which support for research into climate engineering 
may not correlate with support for actual deployment 
( Park h i l l  and Pid geon, 2011,  Macna ghten and 
Szerszynski, 2013; Pidgeon et al., 2013). Mercer et al. 
(2011) found some acceptance of research on albedo 
modification techniques in a web-based survey in the 
UK, US, and Canada. Support was found to decrease 
when respondents were asked about using such tech-
niques immediately, or to stop a climate emergency, 
while respondents disagreed when asked whether 
such interventions should ever be undertaken. Pidg-
eon et al. (2012) found greater support in the UK for 
techniques to remove greenhouse gases than for 
albedo modification, which they suggest may be 
linked to concerns about “interference with nature” 
(see Section 3.1.2), as well as issues of reversibility and 
control.
A study by Macnaghten and Szerszynski (2013) found 
public concern regarding the potential for interna-
tional conflict following unilateral actions by nation-
states, together with scepticism concerning the ability 
of national governments and international institutions 
to effectively govern techniques such as SAI in light of 
the slow progress on coordinated climate change mit-
igation.
Public uncertainty regarding the value of field trials is 
a consistent finding, revealing doubts about avoiding 
unintended consequences to weather systems, as well 
as concerns about being fully able to predict the 
impacts of large-scale deployment following a rela-
tively small-scale field trial (Parkhill and Pidgeon, 
2011). Research on small-scale field trials suggest simi-
larities with previous research on the  “NIMBY” (Not 
In My Back Yard) concern of local communities, 
including issues of local governance regarding site 
selection and public consultation (Parkhill and Pidg-
eon, 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2013). Informing public audi-
ences about past geopolitical attempts to shape 
weather and climate, and allowing deliberative discus-
sions of the implications of this, appears to have the 
potential to lead to a hardening of participants’ atti-
tudes towards consenting to any research on albedo 
modification (Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013). 
This demonstrates the significance of “framing 
effects”: public acceptance of climate engineering will 
be influenced by how it is presented and by the issues 
or technologies with which it is associated. 
Although these studies begin to indicate the complex 
array of worldviews, values and beliefs that are likely 
to influence public perception of climate engineering, 
conclusions based on their findings are necessarily 
tentative. Previous studies employed differing meth-
odologies and independent variables; consequently, 
replication is required to corroborate their findings 
and to determine the dependence on regional and cul-
tural contexts. Low levels of public awareness would 
suggest that attitudes may not yet have formed for 
many people and even if they have, those opinions are 
likely to be weak and unstable. For this reason, some 
have suggested that the use of qualitative research and 
deliberative methods of public engagement may be 
the more suitable methodological approaches to adopt 
(Corner et al., 2012). 
By comparison, a more substantive literature exists on 
public acceptance of CCS, including several studies 
focusing on the case of BECCS (see section 3.1.4). 
Some of these studies have compared attitudes to 
CCS with those surrounding renewable energy (Oltra 
et al., 2010; Upham and Roberts, 2011a; Scheffran and 
Cannaday, 2013), indicating that public acceptance of 
the latter is higher than for the former. They also illus-
trate doubts about whether CCS could contribute to 
solving the climate change problem. Palmgren et al. 
(2004) report mixed results on attitudes to CCS, cor-
relating with views on anthropogenic climate change. 
Providing more information resulted in stronger 
opposition to CCS, especially against storage in the 
ocean. They conclude that public acceptance of CCS 
would require prior acceptance of the climate change 
problem. Huijts et al. (2007) find a slightly positive 
attitude toward carbon storage in general, whereas 
Oltra et al. (2010) find that the dominant public view 
of CCS is sceptical due to perceived risks. Terwel and 
Daamen (2012) point out that NIMBY effects do not 
necessarily dominate initial reactions to CCS. Several 
contributions on CCS emphasise the importance of 
trust in government and in the actors involved 
(Upham and Roberts, 2011b; Itaoka et al., 2012; Terwel 
and Daamen, 2012).
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The effect of information upon public acceptance is 
uncertain (Fischedick et al., 2009; Itaoka et al., 2012). 
Huijts et al. (2007) find that information is not always 
asked for and does not necessarily increase accept-
ance — people that strongly object to technologies 
are often highly informed about them. As mentioned 
above, Palmgren et al. (2004) found that information 
provision increased resistance to CCS. Beyond the 
quantity of information provided, research suggests 
the importance of information qualities. When atti-
tudes are weak or unstable, framing effects can play a 
significant role in shaping attitudes subsequently elic-
ited. This poses a challenge for deliberative public 
engagement, since the a priori choices made by the 
research team regarding what information to provide 
to participants about climate engineering are likely to 
have a strong effect upon the results. Given this, 
increased use of experimental designs in future stud-
ies would be useful to test the impacts on public 
acceptance of providing specific forms of knowledge 
on climate engineering. 
3.1.4 Participation and consultation: 
questions from example cases
This section examines four example cases (Box 3.2-
3.5) that were selected because of their potential rele-
vance to questions that arise in the context of discus-
sions of the three main techniques examined in this 
assessment: 
 one field experiment examining OIF;
 two projects aimed at developing prototype imple-
mentations of BECCS;
 one project that included a planned field test of a 
delivery technology for albedo modification by SAI. 
The exploratory assessment of these example cases 
brings to the fore questions about the role of risk 
assessment, the impact of private sector involvement 
on public perception, and the role of trust and public 
participation, as well as governance in climate engi-
neering field experimentation.
Box 3.2
 LOHAFEX Iron-Fertilisation Experiment 
Goal: The LOHAFEX project was designed to perform in-situ iron-fertilisation 
with ten tonnes of iron sulphate applied over 300 km2 to improve scientific un-
derstanding of the relationship between plankton ecology and the carbon cycle 
and the role that this may have in both historical and future climatic changes 
(AWI, 2009). 
Description: LOHAFEX has to be considered against the background of several 
previous experiments (Strong et al., 2009b), in response to which environmen-
tal non-government organisations (ENGOs) and the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) to the London Convention (LC) raised concern about violation of interna-
tional laws on marine dumping (see Section 4.1.2). In May 2009, the UN Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (CBD) passed a Decision that included a section on 
OIF (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009), requesting all member states to 
ensure that OIF activities do not take place, with the exception of small-scale 
scientific studies in coastal waters, until there is more scientific evidence to jus-
tify such activities. 
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Prior to the CBD Decision, the  LOHAFEX project started in 2005 as a collabo-
ration between the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, in 
Germany, and the National Institute of Oceanography, in India, funded by the 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Govern-
ment of India. The field experiment was to be carried out in the Southwest At-
lantic in early 2009. It received publicity after the ship had left harbour, when a 
protest was initiated by three ENGOs (the ETC Group, followed by Greenpeace 
and WWF). The protests questioned the legality of the experiment and lack of 
independent monitoring. The BMBF postponed the project start for two weeks 
and organised independent assessments by experts, evaluating the scientific 
value of the experiment and whether the recent CBD Decision was to be con-
sidered binding. The three separate legal opinions that were solicited were in 
agreement that the experiment was legal, as the CBD decisions are legally non-
binding; and that iron  fertilisation experiments do not constitute ‘dumping’ if 
the goal is to undertake scientific research (Proelss, 2009). 
The BMBF permitted continuation of the experiment, although calls for  greater 
clarity and for a clear distinction between experiments and commercial projects 
followed (Strong et al., 2009b). The LOHAFEX results uncovered unforeseen 
difficulties in the applicability of iron fertilisation as a technique to remove at-
mospheric CO2: iron addition stimulated phytoplankton production for a short 
time, but due to low silicic acid concentrations in the  fertilised waters, there 
was only limited formation of diatoms, a type of phytoplankton with a glassy 
(silica) shell that provides protection against grazing, and which were primarily 
formed in previous  fertilisation experiments. The softer phytoplankton that 
were formed were quickly consumed by a surge of zooplankton (copepods), 
and no significant increase in CO2 drawdown was observed (Martin et al., 2013).
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Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage in Greenville, Ohio
Goal: The Greenville, Ohio project described in this second example case aimed 
to demonstrate the feasibility of integrating bioenergy generation from corn 
ethanol with carbon capture and storage (CCS), with two main specific objec-
tives: 1) to capture one million tons of CO2 over four years from a corn ethanol 
plant and store it in a saline aquifer at 1,000 metres depth, and 2) to demon-
strate the technical and commercial potential of large-scale BECCS. 
Description: The project was led by Battelle Andersons Marathon ethanol plant 
and two local governments (Darke County and Greenville). It started in early 
2007 with preliminary briefings between the companies and local government 
officials, and was publicly announced in May 2007 (Hammond and Shackley, 
2010). 
The first public meeting was organised by the companies in August 2008. 
In March 2009, a public movement called Citizens Against CO2 Sequestra-
tion raised questions concerning: i) the possible risks, hazards and liabilities 
(e.g., groundwater contamination, use of explosives, increased risk of earth-
quakes, road closures, and decrease in property values); ii) a feeling of being 
experimented upon by the industry and government; and iii) a distrust of the 
companies involved and the science underpinning the technology, as well as 
scepticism concerning anthropogenic climate change. The group expressed 
their concerns about a perceived lack of transparency and consultation with 
the local community on the part of the developer, and was critical that plans 
did not include sufficient local development opportunities (Hammond and 
Shackley, 2010). Despite this opposition, the Ohio Environmental Protection 
Agency approved the project in June 2009, with a drilling test to be carried out 
in July 2009. Over the next three months, the opposition intensified, including 
a protest march and several protest meetings (attracting hundreds of people). 
Opposition to the project was also influenced by the circumstance that the 
company was new to the region and its motives for supporting a BECCS project 
were not fully trusted (with some residents believing that the motivation was to 
more broadly influence future planning permission processes). 
In August 2009, the County Commissioners formally requested that the project 
be terminated, by which point it seemed that local and state political support 
had waned. The project was ultimately cancelled by the developers that same 
month. Since then, there have been no further attempts to develop BECCS or 
CCS technologies in this region, and Citizens against CO2 Sequestration contin-
ues to support protests against CCS activities in other regions.
Box 3.3
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Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage in Decatur, Illinois
Goal: The BECCS activities in Decatur, Illinois have the same overall aim as was 
proposed for the Greenville, Ohio project: to demonstrate the feasibility of 
integrating bioenergy generation (corn ethanol) with CCS. The goal of the first 
project carried out in Decatur, of capturing and sequestering one million tonnes 
of CO2, was achieved in January 2015 (http://www.energy.gov, last accessed 
03 June 2015). In 2009, a second project was granted funding to build on and 
expand the first project. Its goal is to expand the first project to commercial-
scale CO2 storage capacity by integrating the original facilities with newly con-
structed facilities, and to sequester and store approximately one million tonnes 
of CO2 per year (Gollakota and McDonald, 2014).
Description: The first project to be conducted in Decatur, the Illinois Basin-
Decatur Project (IBDP), was carried out by the Midwest Geological Sequestra-
tion Consortium (MGSC, led by the Illinois State Geological Survey, ISGS), in 
partnership with Schlumberger Carbon Services and Archer Daniels Midland 
(ADM), a global food-processing and commodities trading company that oper-
ates a corn ethanol fermentation facility adjacent to the storage site. Injection 
is taking place on ADM’s property, with ADM holding the permit for injection 
and providing the CO2 (Streibel et al., 2014). The project is largely funded by the 
U.S. Department of Energy (Finley et al., 2013). Drilling of several wells started 
in 2009, and CO2 injection began in November 2011 (Finley, 2014). The second 
Decatur project, the Illinois Industrial CCS Project, is a follow-on project to the 
IBDP. It received approval for DOE funding in 2009, and includes a partnership 
with Richland Community College (RCC).
RCC has provided a platform for community engagement (consultation, train-
ing, education, and open forums since 2010, with typically 100 or so people 
attending), but has also arranged presentations and question-and-answer 
sessions between the local community, technical experts (e.g., ISGS), and the 
companies involved (ADM and Schlumberger). RCC has devised a number of 
specialised degree options on CCS in the last few years. Additionally, a National 
Sequestration Education Center (NSEC) was formed as part of the Illinois In-
dustrial CCS Project’s implementation. With various classrooms and laboratory 
facilities, it is intended to provide community and regional outreach through 
an interactive visitor-centre. The centre also aims to position BECCS within the 
wider context of sustainable energy options, including wind turbines, solar  
power, and geothermal energy. The centre is located at the injection point for 
the CO2 storage site, the long-term aim being that visitors can observe the 
injection process and witness how the project evolves. 
To date, there has been no organised opposition to the Decatur BECCS project. 
Box 3.4
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Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) 
Goal: The SPICE project was designed to investigate, via computer model-
ling, whether the intentional injection of large quantities of particles into the 
stratosphere could mimic the cooling effects of volcanic eruptions. In addition 
to computer modelling, SPICE set out to investigate a possible delivery mecha-
nism: a tethered balloon with an attached hose and pump device. The team 
proposed constructing a 1-km-long prototype of the 20-km hose and associat-
ed balloon and pump equipment as a first step toward evaluating the feasibility 
of such a system for possible future use in SAI deployment. 
Description: Although the “test bed” would not be a test of the physical im-
pacts of a climate engineering technique (the trial was designed to spray only 
a small volume of water, testing the delivery device but not the climatic or 
atmospheric response to climate engineering suggestions), SPICE was due 
to undertake the UK’s first field trial related to implementation aspects of an 
albedo modification technique (Fischedick et al., 2009; Macnaghten and Owen, 
2011). It was funded by three UK research councils (the Engineering and Physi-
cal Sciences Research Council, the Natural Environmental Research Council, and 
the Science and Technology Facilities Council), and was one of two projects on 
climate engineering, along with the Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering 
Proposals (IAGP) project, to emerge from a so-called “sandpit event”. Sensitivi-
ties over the potential “slippery slope” effect that such an experiment might 
produce, particularly given that the proposed test bed would move beyond 
laboratory tests, led to the establishment of a “stage-gate” approach to imple-
ment principles of “responsible innovation”. This was overseen by an expert 
panel (including scientists and a representative from an environmental NGO) 
that would advise on whether the experiment should go ahead based on the 
fulfilment of certain criteria: i) risks to be identified, managed, and deemed 
acceptable; ii) deployment to be compliant with relevant regulations; iii) clear 
communication of the nature and purpose of the project; iv) applications and 
impacts described and mechanisms put in place to review these; v) mechanisms 
identified to understand public and stakeholder views (Stilgoe et al., 2013).
Box 3.5
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 In September 2011, following the advice of the stage-gate panel, the test bed 
was postponed to allow the team behind it to undertake additional work to fulfil 
criteria iii–v. At the same time, a vocal debate was taking place in the media, 
and a petition organised by ETC Group and signed by 50 NGOs was sent to 
the UK Government demanding that the project be cancelled. In May 2012, the 
project team cancelled the experimental part of SPICE, although the rest of the 
project (lab- and desk-based) continued. Several factors converged to result 
in the decision for cancellation: i) the lack of a clear regulatory framework by 
which to govern climate engineering field research (Stilgoe et al., 2013); ii) a 
potential conflict of interest around a patent application related to the tethered 
balloon delivery mechanism, submitted by one of the mentors at the “sandpit” 
and including one of the SPICE project investigators as an inventor, which was 
not apparent during the sandpit event (Stilgoe et al., 2013); and iii) the diminish-
ing usefulness of the experiment as the project continued (see also the personal 
statement by the project’s principal investigator, Matthew Watson, on www.
thereluctantgeoengineer.blogspot.de/; post from 16 May 2012). 
The potential conflict of interest caused considerable consternation amongst 
the SPICE project partners, stage-gate panel members and within the broader 
research community (Stilgoe et al., 2013). 
The opposition of ENGOs, and a subsequent public outcry have been cited as 
additional reasons for the cancellation (Cressey, 2012), although these claims 
were vigorously rebutted in the media by the SPICE project’s principle investi-
gator (Watson, 2013).
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The following sections distil questions that arise from 
these exploratory assessments of the example cases. 
While the exploratory assessments described above 
do not allow for making generalisable claims, their 
value lies in pointing to areas that deserve further 
attention and inquiry. For all areas described below, 
further research would be necessary to better under-
stand the social dynamics involved. 
What is the role of risk assessment in designing 
climate engineering field experiments? 
Clearly distinguishing between what counts as exper-
iment, test bed, demonstration, research, develop-
ment, and deployment proves difficult. The experi-
ences of this issue in the example cases indicate that 
openness and transparency about the intent behind 
an experiment, its scale, and possible routes to scaling 
up experiments to the level of demonstration or 
implementation play important roles in shaping public 
perception of various types of studies. Given the tech-
nical uncertainties and complexities in the example 
cases, and the breadth of stakeholder standpoints and 
motives, it is unlikely that all stakeholders involved 
would ever be fully satisfied with any particular risk 
 assessment. This suggests it might be useful to 
develop principles for guiding decisions on whether or 
not to take forward a climate engineering experiment. 
Although different methodologies were used to frame, 
assess, and mitigate potential risks and impacts across 
the example cases (risk impact assessment and legal 
analysis in LOHAFEX; Underground Injection Con-
trol permit application for Decatur project, Illinois; 
use of the responsible innovation framework in 
SPICE), in all cases, novel assessment frameworks or 
modifications of existing frameworks were deemed 
necessary by those responsible for the projects.
What is the role of private sector interests 
in shaping public perceptions of climate 
engineering field experiments? 
Personal and private-sector interests in a project, and 
how such interests are portrayed and perceived, may 
influence whether and to what extent a particular 
project can be realised. The existence of private sector 
or personal interests, whether as intellectual property 
rights on the part of individuals or the commercial 
interests of private companies, can become a source 
of conflict in the context of growing ethical and polit-
ical debates around the commercialisation of and 
motivations for climate engineering research and 
technology development. The example cases suggest 
that, in order to prevent or resolve such conflicts, 
transparency and openness on intellectual property, 
and commercial or other vested interests may be ben-
eficial. Entrenched views and scepticism concerning 
the will of private sector actors to work for the collec-
tive good may undermine consensus-building. Based 
on the example cases described here, it appears that 
building trust in project developers, project managers, 
and mediating institutions can prove fundamental to 
the acceptance of climate engineering research 
projects. 
What is the role of trust and public participation 
in shaping public perceptions of climate 
engineering field experiments? 
Public participation and engagement can be crucial to 
a project’s success. Local communities intensively 
opposed one of the field tests described above (Green-
ville) and were supportive in two other cases (Decatur 
and SPICE), whereas LOHAFEX was more remote 
from local communities. In the LOHAFEX and 
SPICE cases, it was predominantly international envi-
ronmental NGOs and the media that played a pivotal 
role by drawing public attention to the activity, and in 
the case of LOHAFEX also questioning its legality. 
The example cases seem to suggest that early and 
ongoing public participation and engagement is an 
important consideration for experiments in this sensi-
tive area of research, but at the same time does not 
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guarantee acceptance. Effective public participation 
and engagement requires relationships of trust 
between the different actors and stakeholders 
involved, which in turn often requires a history of 
institutions working together effectively.
What is the role of governance for climate 
engineering field experiments?
The application of some form of governance did not 
guarantee the success of the projects (two of the four 
example projects were not completed). Lack of clarity 
regarding the applicability of an international resolu-
tion (the UN CBD) led to controversy and to the 
adoption of new assessment procedures by the rele-
vant scientific and research funding communities. 
Further detailed consideration of such regulatory 
aspects is provided in Chapter 4.
3.2 Societal issues around potential 
deployment 
While the preceding section has focused largely on 
climate engineering research, this section will con-
sider issues surrounding the potential deployment of 
climate engineering techniques. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
illustrate that the deployment of climate engineering 
techniques such as SAI and BECCS may result in 
various potential impacts (black arrows) on physical, 
ecological, and social systems, possibly involving com-
plex feedback processes (red arrows). 
Figure 3.1 shows primary and secondary effects of cli-
mate engineering through SAI. According to model 
computations, SAI is capable of reducing the global 
mean temperature, but would also reduce the global 
intensity of the hydrological cycle and change regional 
weather patterns (Kravitz et al., 2013a; Tilmes et al., 
2013). Although this could potentially reduce overall 
climate risk at a global scale, it would change the dis-
tribution of regional and local risks. Beyond the 
intended effects on climate, SAI would also change 
stratospheric temperature and chemistry, for instance 
influencing the ozone layer (Heckendorn et al., 2009; 
Tilmes et al., 2009), and would also affect the occur-
rence of acid rain, although it is unclear whether this 
impact would be significant in comparison to that 
attributed to surface-level pollution sources (Kravitz 
et al., 2009). In addition to side effects on natural sys-
tems, SAI has potential public health impacts, for 
example by decreasing the thickness of the ozone 
layer, in turn increasing UV radiation at the Earth’s 
surface. It has also been suggested that the potential 
for conflict and social inequality could increase, for 
example through reductions in agricultural produc-
tivity and forestry or through dual-use problems that 
might arise from potential military applications, 
aggression and power plays associated with SAI tech-
niques (Bodansky, 1996, Robock, 2008).
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Figure 3.1:   
Schematic overview of 
possible consequences 
of the deployment of SAI. 
The legend on the bot-
tom shows the colour-
coded argumentation 
spheres: environmental 
(olive); scientific (light 
blue); economic (yel-
low); political (orange); 
social (brown); individual 
(violet). The boxes in 
the figure show various 
possible consequences 
of SAI deployment, with 
the colour of each box 
corresponding to the ar-
gumentation sphere that 
is most relevant to the 
consequence, and the 
colour of the line around 
the respective box corre-
sponding to the second 
most relevant argu-
mentation sphere. Grey 
arrows indicate plausible 
consequences; red ar-
rows indicate feedbacks. 
The following sections 
of this chapter focus 
on three of the major 
argumentation spheres: 
economic, social, and 
political. 
 
Source:   
Jasmin S. A. Link and 
Jürgen Scheffran,  
University of Hamburg.
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scale, for instance if deliberate deforestation were to 
increase the albedo (Bonan, 2008; Peng et al., 2014). 
Deforestation can also lead to local increases in par-
ticulate matter, with implications for human health 
(Beckett et al., 1998), as well as for regional clouds and 
climate. Another effect might be accumulated health 
risks or even sudden deaths, if there were ever to be a 
substantial CO2 leakage from underground storage 
sites (Solomon et al., 2007, 9ff.).
Figure 3.2 shows primary and secondary effects of 
BECCS. The implementation of BECCS would com-
pete with land use for food production, and may 
therefore contribute to social inequality (Lovett et al., 
2009). Land use change also generally influences eco-
systems, biodiversity and soil structure, for example if 
non-native species are favoured to maximise biomass 
growth (Chapin III et al., 2000; Sala et al., 2000; Dup-
ouey et al., 2002). BECCS could even influence the 
regional weather and climate if applied on a large 
Figure 3.2:   
Schematic over-
view of possible 
consequences of 
the deployment of 
BECCS. The legend 
on the bottom shows 
the colour-coded ar-
gumentation spheres: 
environmental (olive); 
scientific (light blue); 
economic (yellow); 
political (orange); 
social (brown); indi-
vidual (violet). The 
boxes in the figure 
show various possible 
consequences of 
BECCS deployment, 
with the colour of 
each box correspond-
ing to the argumen-
tation sphere that is 
most relevant to the 
consequence, and 
the colour of the line 
around the respective 
box corresponding 
to the second most 
relevant argumenta-
tion sphere. Grey 
arrows indicate plau-
sible consequences; 
red arrows indicate 
feedbacks. The fol-
lowing sections of 
this chapter focus on 
three of the major ar-
gumentation spheres: 
economic, social, and 
political. 
 
Source:   
Jasmin S. A. Link 
and Jürgen Schef-
fran, University of 
Hamburg.
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1) Competition over scarce resources: While many 
albedo modification techniques could likely be imple-
mented with comparatively limited resources, most 
greenhouse gas removal techniques, such as BECCS 
or enhanced weathering, demand massive resource 
inputs to have a globally meaningful impact (see Sec-
tion 2.1). Large-scale deployment of most techniques 
for the removal of greenhouse gases would need 
extensive infrastructures, thereby requiring the 
extraction and conversion of major resources (energy, 
raw materials, water, and land) that have an impact 
on natural and social systems in the affected regions. 
Thus, competition over physical resources; financial 
resources like investments; and immaterial resources 
such as human, social, and political capital could 
increase, affecting the availability of resources for 
mitigation and adaptation. 
2) Resistance against impacts and risks: Anticipa-
tion of foreseeable or suspected impacts; detrimental 
side effects; and externalities such as pollution, modi-
fied rainfall patterns from SAI, or changes in ecosys-
tems, vegetation, and crop yields; as well as principled 
opposition, might provoke resistance on local, 
national, and international scales. Furthermore, differ-
ent techniques for the removal of greenhouse gases 
have specific local impacts (for example on water, bio-
diversity, forests, agriculture, or cities) that might 
encounter resistance from those who are affected and 
have inadequate coping mechanisms. Moreover, since 
technical, economic, and political limitations mean 
that some techniques are feasible only in certain 
regions, there may be particularly enhanced pressure 
on the resources and communities in these specific 
regions. This poses challenges for public acceptance 
and local coping mechanisms comparable to those 
associated with other forms of environmental modifi-
cation, such as large-scale forest clearance for agricul-
tural use, damming rivers, and the creation of artificial 
lakes (Conca, 2010, Balint, 2011). 
3) Conflicts over distribution of benefits, costs, 
and risks: With its high leverage potential for short-
term effects on the global climate system, as well as 
potentially unpredictable variations in regional 
impacts that might be adverse to local interests, SAI 
could provide ground for various conflicts. Given that, 
as discussed in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.6, temperatures 
would be decreased by different overall amounts 
depending on the amount of material that is injected, 
Finally, the deployment of BECCS can also trigger 
local and national responses, for example due to the 
NIMBY effect (see Section 3.1.3), but also due to land 
use conflicts, increased food prices, or demands for 
subsidies for crop production. 
3.2.1 Political dimensions of  
deployment 
Since each technique is situated in a specific socio-
political context, it is important to reflect on how this 
context might change through the emergence of that 
technique. Different political consequences would 
emerge along the lifecycles (concept development, 
research, deployment, and various possible side 
effects) of the various proposed techniques, if they 
were to be pursued. Critical issues include the use of 
resources during the deployment process, the direct 
impacts upon the environments in which the tech-
niques might be implemented, as well as unexpected 
consequences of the techniques on nature and society 
(e.g., Caldeira, 2012; Honegger et al., 2012; Klepper, 
2012; Lin, 2012; McLaren, 2012; NOAA, 2012; Mooney 
et al., 2012; Bellamy et al., 2012).
To date, there has been no integrated analysis of the 
linkages between climate change, the different climate 
engineering techniques, and their combined effects on 
human security, conflict risks, and societal stability. 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that various conflict 
types may emerge throughout the lifecycle of climate 
engineering activities (Maas and Scheffran, 2012; 
Scheffran and Cannaday, 2013; Brzoska et al., 2012; 
Link et al., 2013). The following discussion distin-
guishes between five conflict types: 
 competition over scarce resources; 
 resistance against impacts and risks;
  conflicts over distribution of benefits, 
cost and risks; 
 complex multi-level security dilemmas 
and conflict constellations;
 power games over climate control.
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The attention paid by economists to proposals for 
planetary albedo modification can be traced to a pro-
vocative article by Thomas Schelling (Schelling, 1996), 
who pointed out the difficulties in dealing with 
“something global, intentional, and unnatural” that at 
the same time has the potential to immensely simplify 
negotiations over how to address climate change. 
Schelling argued that albedo modification had the 
potential to reform climate policy, from an exceed-
ingly complex regulatory regime into a problem of 
international cost-sharing — a problem with which 
the world is familiar. Barrett (2008a) subsequently 
argued that the economics of albedo modification 
through SAI are “incredible”, representing an oppor-
tunity to offset the warming effect of rising green-
house gas concentrations at a very low cost. However, 
Barrett (2008a) also highlighted the challenges of gov-
ernance and regulation (see also Chapter 4). These 
points of departure may explain why the economic 
literature on climate engineering has focused mainly 
on modifying the albedo, especially through SAI, 
rather than on removing greenhouse gases, which is 
instead generally discussed within the context of the 
economics of mitigation. To date, however, economic 
analyses of albedo modification have been primarily 
concerned with the possibility of cooling the planet at 
very low operational cost, often neglecting other costs 
that this would entail, such as price effects and social 
costs (see Box 3.6).
The economic literature on climate engineering can 
be divided into two branches that are further dis-
cussed in the subsections below: 
 assessing costs and benefits;
 socio-economic insights from climate 
    engineering scenarios.
3.2.2.1 Assessing costs and benefits 
Different cost types need to be taken into account 
when considering the deployment of the various tech-
niques (see Box 3.6 for definitions).
and that the effects of this would differ regionally, 
there may be international disagreement over what 
form and scale of SAI deployment (if any) might be 
considered desirable, as well as over real or perceived 
injustices in the distribution of impacts from potential 
deployment. Distributional conflicts may also arise for 
greenhouse gas removal techniques, especially con-
cerning cost-sharing as well as the distribution of 
risks of environmental degradation and detrimental 
impacts on human health or ecosystems.
4) Complex multi-level security dilemmas and 
conflict constellations: In the absence of interna-
tional cooperation and broad consensus on high-lev-
erage albedo modification techniques, individual 
attempts to regulate global mean temperatures could 
provoke countermeasures by states and the resistance 
of citizens, leading to potential security dilemmas 
ranging from local to global levels. In a hypothetical 
future world in which albedo modification techniques 
are utilised, it is conceivable that those deploying such 
techniques might be blamed for weather-related disas-
ters and damage elsewhere, whether justified or not.  
5) Power games over climate control: Some have 
argued that countries may use high-leverage tech-
niques such as SAI as an instrument for power projec-
tion and hostile use (Dröge, 2012, Maas and Scheffran, 
2012). During the Cold War, the superpowers sup-
ported a small amount of research on weather control 
for offensive and defensive purposes (Fleming, 2010). 
However, direct military applications of SAI or most 
other albedo modification techniques appear unlikely 
for the time being, due to the difficulty of accurately 
controlling the effects (and even detecting and attrib-
uting them). Should it become technologically feasible 
for countries to attempt to “optimise” their own cli-
mate, transboundary effects might trigger diplomatic 
crises and international disputes that hinder interna-
tional cooperation.
3.2.2 Economic analysis
Economic analysis of climate engineering is in its 
infancy and has to be considered in the broader con-
text of climate economics. Most of the focus in cli-
mate economics has been on how to control green-
house gas emissions efficiently, and to explain under 
what circumstances the costs and benefits of emission 
control will support “early action” on mitigation.
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3) Social costs
Despite the uncertainties concerning operational 
costs and the role of price effects, the greatest uncer-
tainty about the costs of climate engineering, and in 
particular albedo modification through SAI, arises 
from its social costs, since present knowledge of such 
issues is basically non-existent (Klepper and Rickels, 
2012). Scientific studies of the various techniques have 
shown that their use may have unintentional side 
effects, which can take the form of external costs or 
external benefits (where “external” in this context 
implies that a third party not involved in the market 
transaction has to bear costs or receives benefits). 
These costs and benefits could be related to the mate-
rial in use, or to the deployment mechanism. They 
could also materialise as costs associated with impacts 
on specific ecosystems or with overall changes in the 
climate system. For a comprehensive analysis, poten-
tial side effects also need to be taken into account and 
incorporated in the social costs associated with each 
technique.
For BECCS, external costs are thought to be mainly 
related to competition for land use and water supply. 
External costs for OIF would predominantly involve 
impacts on marine ecosystems. Due to the dynamics 
of the ocean system, such effects could be distributed 
widely. Were SAI to successfully reduce global mean 
temperature, it would change the climate and climate 
impacts, for example impacting agricultural produc-
tivity and the occurrence of extreme weather events. 
There is limited research on the effect of SAI on vari-
ous climate impacts, and there is uncertainty over the 
1) Operational costs
The broad range of estimates for the operational costs 
of several climate engineering techniques were previ-
ously discussed in Chapter 2 and will not be discussed 
further here. 
2) Price effects
Large-scale deployment of greenhouse removal tech-
niques and most proposed albedo modification tech-
niques would generally require large investments, 
complicated infrastructures, and major material 
inputs to be effective (Klepper and Rickels, 2012). This 
may have a strong impact on those markets that pro-
vide the sources of such goods and materials. Existing 
cost studies usually neglect these effects. For example, 
measures such as spreading lime or iron in the ocean 
would require a large number of ships, which in turn 
would lead to a substantial demand shift in the global 
shipbuilding market (Klepper and Rickels, 2012). Sim-
ilar effects, although smaller in scale, could be 
expected for the global airplane market if measures 
such as SAI were realised on a large scale using air-
craft for the injection procedure. Price effects could 
also occur on the supply side if any techniques were 
deployed at very large scales: afforestation may 
increase the supply of wood once the trees mature, 
and CCS or BECCS may lead to the creation of addi-
tional CO2 certificates, affecting the market price of 
carbon. These various effects would influence relative 
prices across the entire economy and should therefore 
be considered when assessing large-scale deployment 
of individual techniques. 
Cost types 
1. Operational costs: cost of installing and maintaining a particular technique at  
   current prices for capital goods and material inputs; 
2. Price effects: the effect on prices due to increased demand for certain 
   materials and goods by large-scale implementation of a technique; 
3. Social costs: the overall economic cost of deploying a specific technique 
    (i.e., operational costs plus external costs, accounting for price effects).
Box 3.6
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atmosphere and other carbon reservoirs (Lafforgue et 
al., 2008; Rickels and Lontzek, 2012).
Initial findings from modelling exercises and scenario 
analyses do not yet allow for an overall and compre-
hensive economic evaluation of SAI deployment or for 
identifying its potential role in a future portfolio of 
responses to climate change; however, they do provide 
a starting point for assessment and important guid-
ance for further research. To date, several studies have 
already mapped the economic potentials of albedo 
modification techniques as a policy option, especially 
SAI (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Bickel and Lane, 
2009; Gramstad and Tjötta, 2010; Goes et al., 2011; 
Moreno-Cruz and Keith, 2013; Aaheim et al., 2015 
forthcoming; Bickel, 2013; Bickel and Agrawal, 2013,; 
Emmerling and Tavoni, 2013); With the exception of 
Emmerling and Tavoni (2013) and Aaheim et al. (2015 
forthcoming), these numerical evaluations employed 
various versions of William Nordhaus’ Dynamic Inte-
grated Climate-Economy model (DICE; see Nord-
haus, 2008). DICE is an integrated assessment model 
for assessing the costs and benefits of various climate 
policies. Climate is integrated into the model by link-
ing emissions, via concentrations, to temperature and 
from there to an aggregated damage function. Cli-
mate policies are evaluated by assessing their imple-
mentation costs over a given period (usually hundreds 
of years), compared with the benefits associated with 
the avoided impacts of climate change. Future costs 
and benefits are discounted by a chosen rate, which is 
intended to reflect the return on alternative opportu-
nities for investing the money spent on mitigation. 
The outcome is critically dependent on assumptions 
made about the discount rate, which is discussed in 
further detail in the next section. 
The earliest studies aimed to assess the potential of 
albedo modification by assigning a value for future 
damages that would be avoided, assuming that the 
techniques could be implemented at negligible opera-
tional costs. Later studies put more emphasis on the 
influence of side effects (for example, Gramstad and 
Tjötta, 2010) and in particular on uncertainties associ-
ated with implementations of SAI (Goes et al., 2011; 
Moreno-Cruz and Keith, 2013; Emmerling and Tavoni, 
2013). 
regional climate response to SAI, which would in turn 
shape those climate impacts (Robock et al., 2008; 
Jones et al., 2009; Rasch et al., 2009; Ricke et al., 
2010b; Berdahl et al., 2014). However, not all climate 
impacts are necessarily negative (Klepper and Rickels, 
2014). For example, plant water stress is more strongly 
influenced by the number of extreme hot days than by 
variations in precipitation (Lobell et al., 2013). For 
example, high atmospheric CO2 concentration is asso-
ciated with greater water-use efficiency in some plant 
species (Keenan et al., 2013); in such a scenario, a 
reduction in extremely hot days via the deployment of 
SAI might provide agricultural benefits despite an 
overall reduction in precipitation, at least compared to 
an unmitigated climate change scenario (Pongratz et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, an increase in diffuse irradia-
tion would be expected as a consequence of SAI 
implementation, which might further promote plant 
growth (Mercado et al., 2009). However, these consid-
erations of the economic impacts of albedo modifica-
tion techniques remain very preliminary, since the 
various interactions and feedbacks are not yet well 
understood (Klepper and Rickels, 2014) and potential 
gains in crop yields might only be observed for certain 
crops in certain regions (Xia et al., 2014).
3.2.2.2 Socio-economic insights from 
climate engineering scenarios
If one acknowledges the future technological poten-
tial for efficient abatement technologies and the slow 
transformation of industrial structures, then alterna-
tive approaches such as BECCS for removing green-
house gases might “buy time” for such abatement 
technologies and transformations to develop (e.g. 
Kriegler et al., 2013). Nevertheless, it should be borne 
in mind that the atmosphere is only one reservoir of 
the global carbon cycle budget. Greenhouse gas 
removal will cause changes in natural carbon fluxes 
between the carbon reservoirs, which may signifi-
cantly impact the effectiveness of the measures, either 
negatively or positively (e.g. Mueller et al., 200; Vichi 
et al., 2013; Klepper and Rickels, 2014). Accordingly, in 
order to properly conduct economic assessments of 
techniques for greenhouse gas removal and to appro-
priately model deployment scenarios, studies need to 
consider various carbon costs, which reflect the social 
costs that arise from scarcity of storage sites or from 
the changed ambient carbon fluxes between the 
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3.2.3 Distribution of benefits  
and costs
The distribution of benefits and costs is not only an 
economic issue but also raises important normative 
questions (Burns, 2011). The distributional effects of 
benefits, burdens, and risks vary considerably 
between different climate engineering techniques, 
and therefore need to be discussed individually.  
Several authors have argued that SAI would create so-
called winners and losers (Caldeira, 2009; Scott, 2012; 
Barrett et al., 2014), while others have questioned the 
degree to which SAI would produce inequalities 
(Moreno-Cruz et al., 2012; Kravitz et al., 2014a). 
Whether the deployment of SAI would increase the 
existing inequalities and historical injustice of climate 
change is an open question. The distribution of bene-
fits and costs would depend not only on existing and 
uncertain future climate conditions, but also on popu-
lation density, economic development, and the vulner-
ability and resilience of ecological, economic, and 
social systems (Schäfer et al., 2013b). In some scenar-
ios, those geographically and economically most vul-
nerable to climate change, often living at the subsist-
ence level, would be most likely to be negatively 
affected by uneven effects of SAI while having the 
lowest capacity to adapt to such effects, despite being 
least responsible for global warming (Olson, 2011, 
SRMGI, 2012; Carr et al., 2013; Preston, 2012). How-
ever, others have argued that SAI may also benefit 
some of the most vulnerable and poorest countries by 
reducing risks from climate change (Svoboda et al., 
2011; Pongratz et al., 2012; Svoboda and Irvine, 2014). 
The weighing of risks is also an important topic in the 
context of “lesser evil” arguments, often taken to jus-
tify the further engagement in research and the pos-
sible deployment of SAI (see Box 3.7).
Aaheim et al. (2015 forthcoming) extended these ear-
lier studies by incorporating precipitation changes in 
assessing the side effects of albedo modification. They 
employed the GRACE (Global Responses to Anthro-
pogenic Changes in the Environment) model to com-
pare the impacts of cloud whitening and sulphur 
injection to stabilise global mean temperature over 
the period 2020 – 2070 in the RCP4.5 pathway sce-
nario. In Aaheim et al. (2015 forthcoming), SAI results 
in an economic loss globally. This is explained partly 
by a drier climate, which is expected to result from a 
combination of SAI with increasing greenhouse gases 
(see Section 2.2.6), and partly because the SAI simula-
tion misses out on economic benefits that otherwise 
would have resulted from a moderate increase in tem-
perature in the climate change scenarios without SAI 
implementation. Nevertheless, the model shows 
regional variations, with some regions benefiting from 
the simulated sulphur injection. On the other hand, 
the results suggested that marine sky brightening 
would provide an economic benefit in all regions 
(between 0.1 and 0.8 per cent of GDP). Overall, these 
studies predict small economic impacts of albedo 
modification on GDP, but demonstrate that the pre-
dicted outcomes are not necessarily beneficial even 
when the models neglect the operational costs associ-
ated with the proposed techniques. However, the 
model relies on a very simple description of the dam-
ages associated with the changes in temperature and 
precipitation. As discussed in Section 2.2.6, the 
regional distribution of precipitation changes is not 
yet well understood, precluding reliable assessment of 
their economic consequences. Nevertheless, despite 
these uncertainties, some have argued that the possi-
bility to exert a quick influence on the climate through 
changes in the albedo allows for greater flexibility in 
dealing with the uncertainties associated with climate 
change. Consequently, Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2013) 
argue that SAI could be a valuable tool to manage 
risks even if it is relatively ineffective at compensating 
for CO2-driven climate change, or if its costs are large 
compared to traditional abatement strategies. Based 
on this line of argument, they suggest that in any com-
prehensive risk management approach to climate 
change, emission reductions and the application of 
albedo modification techniques should be considered 
as complementary rather than as substitutes for each 
other. 
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future generations with the possibility of implement-
ing a technique like SAI for their “self-defence” against 
climate change emergencies and, by doing so, com-
pensating them for a crisis that could have been pre-
vented through more benign options that are still 
available, such as increased global mitigation efforts 
(Gardiner, 2010).
In the case of a decision to implement SAI, any subse-
quent failure to maintain the aerosol forcing to coun-
teract greenhouse gas forcing could result in a rapid 
and therefore potentially very damaging warming, 
depending on the scale of the intervention up to that 
point in time and how abruptly the SAI forcing would 
be ended (see Section 2.2.7). It has therefore been 
argued that deploying albedo modification techniques 
may reduce or foreclose options for future generations 
to a greater degree than other climate policies (Smith, 
2012), thereby impairing or violating their right to 
autonomous self-determination (Ott, 2012, Smith, 
2012) or leading to morally tragic, dilemmatic, or haz-
ardous situations in which agents are compelled to act 
in a way that is morally reprehensible in at least some 
sense (Gardiner, 2010, Gardiner, 2011). Generally, 
intergenerational justice is one of several justice per-
spectives that can be brought to bear on assessments 
of the justice aspects of SAI. Others, as discussed by 
Tuana (2013), include corrective justice, ecological jus-
tice, distributive justice, and procedural justice.
From an intergenerational justice viewpoint, the dis-
tribution of effects of SAI also seems problematic. 
Based on the assumption that the present generation 
has a duty to protect the basic interests and rights of 
future generations (Meyer, 2008), it is widely dis-
cussed in the literature that SAI could exacerbate 
inequalities between generations, as it may allow risks 
and costs to be deferred (Gardiner, 2010; Burns, 2011; 
Gardiner, 2011; Goes et al., 2011; Svoboda et al., 2011; 
Ott, 2012; Smith, 2012). Such deferral of risks and 
costs would not be unique to climate engineering, as 
it also applies to the use of fossil fuels and many other 
activities of modern society. In general, there is a lack 
of reciprocity between generations of people who are 
not contemporaries, and an asymmetry in “power”, 
because current behaviour influences future people 
whereas they have no possibility to influence the 
present generation. This can lead to the externalisa-
tion of costs and risks over space and time (Ralston, 
2009, Gardiner, 2011, Lin, 2012). 
In an early analysis, Jamieson (1996) argued that, by 
deploying SAI, one generation would be choosing a 
specific climate path for future generations that may 
be irreversible or only changeable at high costs. Shift-
ing the focus to the generation that would be laying 
the groundwork for a future SAI implementation 
through research and development, Gardiner (2010) 
argued that it is morally questionable to provide 
SAI as the “lesser evil”? 
“Lesser evil arguments” are based on the assumption that if no substantial 
progress on emission reductions is made soon, then at some point in the future 
a choice would need to be made between allowing certain catastrophic impacts 
of climate change to occur versus engaging in SAI or another form of albedo 
modification that might prevent or reduce those impacts but that might also 
introduce novel risks (Gardiner, 2010; Markusson et al., 2014). In the case of a 
climate emergency, the argument suggests that the possible negative side ef-
fects of a direct intervention in the climate system via a technique such as SAI 
may be less worrisome than unmitigated climate change (Virgoe, 2009, Pres-
ton, 2013; Irvine et al., 2014b). However, in the face of uncertain consequences 
and unknown side effects of SAI, such claims are debatable. It cannot be ruled 
out that direct interventions in the climate could worsen some of the harmful 
consequences of climate change, even if it succeeds in alleviating others  
(Hegerl and Solomon, 2009, Matthews and Turner, 2009; Rickels et al., 2010).
Box 3.7
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BECCS, despite at first glance perhaps appearing less 
problematic in terms of distributional effects on the 
global and intergenerational levels, could still cause 
harms via land use changes and effects on biodiversity, 
as a result of the extensive cultivation of monocul-
tures. Due to the need for an adequate feedstock sup-
ply, higher levels of deployment would require vast 
conversion of land. This could decrease the land area 
available for agriculture and lead to increased food 
prices. 
Similarly to SAI, the environmental side effects of 
OIF will likely affect large regions, as well as future 
generations, particularly in terms of irreversible 
effects on ecosystems and biodiversity. OIF in partic-
ular raises questions of ecological justice, in terms of 
considering adverse effects on non-human life and on 
ecosystem sustainability in the context of normative 
evaluations, as well as reflecting upon our responsi-
bilities towards non-human nature (Morrow et al., 
2009, Ralston, 2009).
Climate engineering deployment as a question of justice
Problems of distribution as well as of compensation and decision making can 
also be addressed from a justice perspective. On a general level, issues of justice 
are often based on certain assumptions about obligations towards others, their 
rights to certain goods, or the representation of their interests in decisions that 
could affect their wellbeing. A range of different issues is treated within various 
subdomains of justice, differentiated by the questions that they address as well 
as whose interests are foremost. Most relevant for the normative evaluation of 
the possible deployment of climate engineering techniques are:
 Distributive justice, reflecting upon the question of how benefits and costs 
should be distributed according to certain principles or criteria 
(such as maximisation, the priority view, egalitarianism, or sufficientarianism);  
 Redistributive justice, aiming to redress undeserved benefits or harms;
 Compensatory justice, based on the idea that wrongdoers or the beneficiaries 
of wrongful actions must compensate, in some form, those who were harmed;
 Procedural justice, concerned with the fairness and transparency of the 
processes by which decisions are made;
 Global justice, dealing with principles that should guide one state in its deal-
ings with other states, as well as with questions of the legitimacy (or lack 
thereof) of international institutions;
 Intergenerational justice, asking what current generations owe to future gen-
erations; and of the normative significance of past generations’ actions;
 Environmental justice, reflecting upon the possibilities and mechanisms to in-
clude non-human life and ecosystem sustainability in normative evaluations; and 
how to understand human responsibilities toward non-human nature.
Box 3.8
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It is an open question whether such compensation 
should be based on the wrongfulness or culpability of 
the act, which would place it within the domain of 
compensatory justice; or based on the need to redress 
undeserved benefits or harms, which would then be a 
question of (re)distributive justice (see Box 3.8). 
The answer to the question of “who should be com-
pensated” is often less clear than might initially be 
expected. Different climate engineering techniques 
may harm different countries in different ways, mak-
ing them possibly worse off than they would be under 
global warming alone. The question then is whether 
all countries would deserve equal compensation, 
based on the harms caused. Even if different countries 
faced  similar overall losses, there may still be justifica-
tion for unequal compensation, based on the type of 
loss, the vulnerability and ability to adapt, the respon-
sibility for global warming, and the gains from it 
(Bunzl, 2011). Furthermore, an individual nation may 
simultaneously experience various forms of harm 
(e.g., increased drought) and benefit (e.g., reduced 
warming); the balance of these can be very different 
from one nation to another, adding further complex-
ity to the assessment of who should be compensated. 
A third crucial question is “what should be compen-
sated, and to what extent”. Different normative 
approaches put limits on the kinds of harm that can 
be compensated. It might be considered impossible to 
compensate for actions or outcomes that compromise 
basic human rights or result in the loss of culturally 
significant ways of life or of statehood. Even for harms 
that in principle allow for compensation, attributing 
monetary values may be difficult. The baseline for 
compensation is also open for debate (Maas and 
Scheffran, 2012, Preston, 2013, Svoboda and Irvine, 
2014). Should compensation claims include adverse 
effects of past climate change that might worsen or be 
reduced through climate engineering deployment, or 
should all compensation claims start from the begin-
ning of the climate engineering activity? Furthermore, 
on a case-by-case level, it would be challenging to 
robustly attribute specific harmful impacts, e.g., pro-
longed drought or flooding, to any form of climate 
engineering deployment (Allen, 2003; Stott et al., 
2004). 
3.2.4 Compensation
The potential for some to suffer from the deployment 
of climate engineering techniques raises questions 
concerning compensation for possible harms. Three 
basic questions can be distinguished for these com-
pensation issues:
 Who should compensate? 
 Whom should they compensate? 
 What should be compensated?
The question of “who should compensate” links back 
to the more general debate concerning the main prin-
ciples for compensation for climate change impacts 
(Moellendorf, 2002, Page, 2006). The most promi-
nent of these are the “polluter pays” principle (PPP), 
the “ability to pay” principle (ATP) and the “benefici-
ary pays” principle (BPP) (Page, 2012). As pointed out 
by Svoboda and Irvine (2014) as well as Wong et al. 
(2014), applying one of these principles as the sole gov-
erning principle for compensating SAI-induced harms 
can produce counter-intuitive results. This is often 
due to the neglect of considerations invoked by the 
other principles (Wong et al., 2014). Some concerns of 
applying those principles may be abated if a combina-
tion of principles is adopted, as has been suggested 
more generally for negative effects of anthropogenic 
climate change (e.g., Page, 2008, Caney, 2010). Com-
bining these guiding principles, especially in relation 
to potential harms associated with SAI, would not 
necessarily lead to conflicts between principles, since 
the principles are not mutually exclusive and can often 
suggest similar courses of action and similar responsi-
ble parties. For example, the countries that would be 
able to deploy certain kinds of climate engineering 
techniques over longer periods of time, which would 
indicate causal responsibility for them in the context 
of the PPP, would also be those who would most likely 
gain the greatest benefits, since the form and scale of 
implementation would tend to reflect their interests 
(BPP). Furthermore, these would be the countries 
that would be most able to pay (at least to some 
extent) for the resulting negative consequences (ATP), 
and would also be those responsible for most of the 
historical and/or contemporary emissions (historical 
responsibility).
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Compensation issues would also be complex in the 
case of OIF, and would be concentrated on damages 
in marine ecosystems, especially in coastal regions. 
There are various possible impacts for which compen-
sation could be expected, including impacts on the 
oceanic food web and thus on fish populations and 
the viability of fisheries (Chisholm et al., 2001), as well 
as side effects on the atmosphere (Lawrence, 2002) 
due to various compounds produced by phytoplank-
ton, for instance dimethylsulphide, which can influ-
ence aerosol particle concentrations and cloud prop-
er ties.  A f u r ther complex it y wou ld involve 
determining who could claim a right to be compen-
sated for damages in international waters.
Possible compensation for negative impacts of BECCS 
would depend on where in the process the negative 
impacts occur. Questions of compensation could 
become especially important in the event of possible 
leakage problems. On the other hand, problems aris-
ing during the production of bio-energy could be 
addressed within existing compensation schemes, as 
they would most likely occur within the jurisdiction 
of single nation-states.
Compensation issues are of great importance for SAI. 
Due to the large effects that an implementation of SAI 
would be expected to produce, it is likely that not all 
states would be willing to accept such a course of 
action without some form of compensation. However, 
as concluded by Reichwein et al. (2015 in review): 
“although it is not entirely hopeless, there would be 
several hurdles in ensuring legal accountability for the 
risk of environmental harm from SAI under interna-
tional law”. This is partly because of the inherent non-
linearity and complexity of the climate system, which 
makes the detection of changes that would be caused 
by SAI and their attribution to the specific interven-
tion (as opposed to natural variability) highly chal-
lenging. This could become less prevalent over time as 
more data would become available during the decades 
after deployment (MacMynowski et al., 2011; Jarvis 
and Leedal, 2012). Additionally, it might be unneces-
sary to causally attribute an event to some single 
cause. An alternative option would be to calculate the 
increased likelihood of an event occurring due to the 
change in radiative forcing produced by the SAI 
deployment. However, even calculating the fraction of 
risk attributable to an event would require compari-
son of the observed climate with a hypothetical cli-
mate in which the climate-forcing activity of interest 
is excluded; such methodologies would thus rely 
entirely on model computations, with their associated 
uncertainties (Stott et al., 2004; Svoboda and Irvine, 
2014; Horton et al., 2015; Reichwein et al., 2015 in 
review).
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4. International 
regulation and governance
International law frequently uses broad terms to 
establish the applicability of its provisions. In the issue 
area of climate engineering, the term “geoengineer-
ing” has become established at the CBD, and “marine 
geoengineering activities” has become established at 
the LC/LP. In light of this broad terminology, this 
chapter does not attempt to differentiate clearly 
between the regulation of techniques for greenhouse 
gas removal and for modifying planetary albedo. 
Instead, the analysis in this chapter suggests the exist-
ence of three potential — and partly intertwined —
regulatory approaches toward climate engineering, 
described in Box 4.1, which are slowly becoming 
apparent in different types of normative output at the 
international level. 
The categorisation of regulatory approaches proposed 
here serves to illustrate how international and Euro-
pean law could react to the challenges arising out of 
research on climate engineering techniques and/or 
their deployment. As such, this categorisation is not 
explicitly laid down in any binding or non-binding 
international instrument. That the three approaches 
discussed below cannot and should not be under-
stood as being clearly distinct from each other 
becomes evident when taking into account the 
approach followed by the LC/LP, which is categorised 
here as being activities-oriented. The LC/LP pursues 
the aim of protecting the marine environment; any 
regulatory action taken under its auspices is thus also 
effect-based. That said, it cannot be denied that the 
LP, which is set to eventually replace the LC, is based 
on an entirely different regulatory approach (general 
prohibition of dumping, with few exceptions) than, for 
example, the broadly framed CBD. It is asserted that 
these differences not only legitimise the systematisa-
tion introduced here, but also that this systematisation 
is of key importance for understanding how an effec-
tive governance regime covering one or more climate 
engineering techniques could be designed in future.
Three regulatory approaches for climate engineering 
1. regulation of climate engineering based on its potential role as a situational 
   response to various conditions in the overarching context of climate change          
  (context);
2. regulation through risk management measures for individual climate 
    engineering activities and technical processes at the operational level 
  (activities);
3. regulation through scientific assessment of potential environmental effects
   of different climate engineering techniques (effects).
Box 4.1
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(ENMOD), the Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer, and the Outer Space Treaty (OST; 
for an overview of relevant agreements, see Rickels et 
al., 2011). 
Concerning the ENMOD Convention (which is often 
mentioned in regard to climate engineering), it was 
clearly stated in the “Understandings”, prepared dur-
ing negotiation of the treaty, that the parties did not 
intend its content to be applicable beyond the context 
of armed conflict. Efforts by the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral to convene a COP at the end of 2013 were also 
unsuccessful due to a lack of interest among the par-
ties. For these reasons, the ENMOD Convention is 
not examined further here. 
In general, as described in Box 4.1, three nascent and 
partly interrelated approaches to the regulation of cli-
mate engineering are becoming apparent in the activ-
ities of the parties associated with the aforementioned 
treaties. Recapping, these three approaches — along 
with the treaties that are most closely associated with 
these approaches in the context of current discussions 
around regulation of climate engineering — are: 
1. context: as a situational, or context-driven,  
   response to climate change (UNFCCC); 
2. activities: as an activity or technical process 
    (LC/LP); 
3. effects: based on its effects on the environment  
    (CBD). 
Note that the first point does not imply that the 
UNFCCC would have to be considered as an instru-
ment that has taken account of climate engineering 
from the outset. The categorisation developed in this 
chapter solely aims to distinguish between the behav-
ioural patterns on which the different international 
treaty regimes are based. It has thus been introduced 
for the sake of systematically approaching the relevant 
international instruments. 
Of course, the aforementioned approaches would not, 
taken individually, ever be able to provide a compre-
hensive regulatory framework for climate engineering 
that would go beyond the regulation of specific cli-
mate engineering techniques. Instead, in order to 
develop an effective regulatory structure for the regu-
The analysis then considers how the regulatory 
approaches surrounding the context, activities, and 
effects of climate engineering might manifest at the 
regional level in light of existing sources of EU law, 
and discusses how the EU has gone about implement-
ing international obligations that fall within these nor-
mative categories, which could potentially be applica-
ble to climate engineering. It has already been 
observed elsewhere that there are shortcomings at the 
international level in the existing regulatory frame-
work concerning climate engineering (Bodle, 2010; 
Zedalis, 2010; Rickels et al., 2011; Bodle, 2012; Proelss, 
2012; Bodle, 2013). EU law provides, in part, stricter 
legal standards for environmental protection, and 
introduces legal innovations that strengthen the 
regional implementation of global international law 
and provide a basis for limiting potential climate engi-
neering activities, including unilateral action. An 
examination of EU law may therefore provide a timely 
case study of how regulatory structures at the 
regional/supra-national level might be applicable to 
climate engineering techniques within a broader 
framework of multilevel governance.
The remainder of this section (4.1 and its subsections) 
analyses emerging elements of a potential climate 
engineering regime in the activities of international 
treaty bodies. It begins with an overview of relevant 
treaties and then focuses on three treaties that 
embody the regulatory approaches outlined above: 
the UNFCCC, the LC/LP and the CBD. Section 4.2 
then contextualises the three regulatory approaches 
in light of EU law.
4.1 Emerging elements of a potential 
climate engineering regime in the 
activities of international treaty  
bodies
To date, discussion of the development of regulation 
for climate engineering has primarily taken place in 
the competent treaty bodies of the LC/LP and the 
CBD, although a number of other international trea-
ties, in particular the UNFCCC, would be potentially 
applicable treaty bodies. Concerning techniques to 
reflect sunlight back into space, potentially applicable 
treaties include the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), the Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hos-
tile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 
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These are defined in Articles 1 (8) and 1 (9), respec-
tively. Although no explicit reference is made to cli-
mate engineering in the UNFCCC, the definition of a 
“sink” as “any process, activity or mechanism which 
removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor 
of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere” arguably 
covers some greenhouse gas removal techniques and 
might suggest a potential role for such techniques 
within the UNFCCC (Proelss, 2012). Other treaty 
provisions such as Article 4 (1)(c) may also suggest a 
role for active removal of greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere by setting out a duty to “promote and 
cooperate in the development, application and diffu-
sion, including transfer, of technologies, practices, and 
processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropo-
genic emissions of greenhouse gases…”.
Given that the language of the UNFCCC does not 
provide an explicit legal basis for distinguishing 
greenhouse gas removal techniques from conven-
tional mitigation, and taking into account that it does 
not prohibit such activities — but, quite to the con-
trary, contains references to mechanisms that the aca-
demic community now widely understands as a part 
of greenhouse gas removal — the UNFCCC cannot 
be interpreted as explicitly prohibiting these forms of 
climate engineering. At the same time, however, this 
cannot be expansively interpreted as a blanket author-
isation for all greenhouse gas removal techniques.
In any case, the UNFCCC’s formulation of the pre-
cautionary principle in Article 3 (3) (Parties “should 
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures…”) would require a comprehensive assess-
ment of the risks associated with measures to combat 
climate change (on the basis of the customary duty to 
inform and the duty to prevent transboundary harm) 
before a decision on climate engineering research or 
deployment could be made. This would continue to 
place primacy on conventional mitigation strategies 
that emphasise the reduction and prevention of emis-
sions. Further analysis of the relevance of the precau-
tionary principle in the regulation of climate engineer-
ing can be found in Proelss (2010), Tedsen and 
Homann (2013), and Reynolds and Fleurke (2013).
lation of climate engineering as such (assuming that 
such a development would be considered the ultimate 
objective), all three approaches would arguably have 
to be integrated. The underlying process could, in 
principle, occur: formally, at the international level, 
through a dedicated treaty or protocol; dynamically, 
by way of, for example, amending the relevant binding 
instruments in parallel; or informally, through the 
adoption of assessment frameworks concerning cli-
mate engineering research or conclusion of Memo-
randa of Understanding between the secretariats of 
the aforementioned treaties. Such joint assessment 
frameworks and Memoranda of Understanding pro-
vide weak forms of formal coupling between the 
respective treaties at the operational level by fostering 
the coordinated implementation of shared objectives. 
Catalytic and synergetic results can be seen in the 
Rotterdam, Basel, and Stockholm conventions, where 
treaty integration has virtually been achieved using 
this approach.
The fact that all relevant legal instruments are to 
some extent based on similar approaches (embodied, 
for example, in the precautionary principle) and thus 
reflect a common denominator facilitates their inte-
gration, whatever form that process might ultimately 
take. The following subsections discuss the three legal 
instruments and the regulatory approaches they pur-
sue in their relevance to climate engineering.
4.1.1 UNFCCC — Climate engineering 
as a context-specific response to 
climate change?
Identifying climate change as a “common concern of 
mankind”, the UNFCCC — the most comprehensive 
regulatory instrument adopted by the international 
community in response to the challenge of climate 
change — sets out a very general context into which 
all efforts to protect the Earth’s climate can be placed. 
In order to achieve the objective of the Convention, 
which is set out in Article 2 as the “…stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”, the UNFCCC 
provides for two mechanisms: 
1. emissions reductions at source;
2. sink enhancement. 
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The revised guidelines are envisaged to become bind-
ing for greenhouse gas reporting from 2015 (IEA, 2011). 
Further consideration of CCS under the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) is presented in Box 4.2.
The reporting of biomass related emissions already 
forms part of the requirements under UNFCCC 
reporting guidelines. Annex I Parties are required to 
report such emissions under the LULUCF sector 
(land use, land use change and forestry). However, 
while reporting may be comprehensive, the account-
ing for biomass impacts under the Kyoto Protocol 
may not be, as parties are able to opt into or out of 
accounting for certain LULUCF activities. This raises 
the possibility that the benefits of BECCS in terms of 
greenhouse gas removal may count toward Kyoto 
Protocol greenhouse gas commitments, but that the 
costs of using unsustainable biomass in BECCS may 
be ignored (IEA, 2011).
Incentives for the sustainable development of BECCS 
as a greenhouse gas removal technique under the 
UNFCCC, should such development be regarded as 
desirable, would require as a first step that the net 
impacts of the technology on emissions be recognised 
in international reporting and accounting frameworks 
for greenhouse gases. International climate reporting 
guidelines, as they currently apply to Annex I (indus-
trialised) Parties, only make passing reference to car-
bon capture and storage (CCS), and accounting 
guidelines relating to Kyoto Protocol commitments 
make no mention of CCS at all  (IEA, 2011). In 2006, 
however, a revision of the IPCC guidelines on national 
greenhouse gas inventory reporting was proposed to 
recognise CCS. These guidelines make no distinction 
between CCS using fossil or biomass fuel sources, 
requiring only that any technology involved in the 
reduction of emissions satisfies the requirement of the 
UNFCCC regarding access and technology transfer, 
that such technologies be “environmentally sound”.
CCS under the Clean Development Mechanism 
Incorporating CCS under the CDM has been on the agenda of international 
climate negotiations for several years. At the sixth session of the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 6) 
in 2010, a decision was taken that CCS utilising geological formations should be 
eligible for inclusion as project activities under the CDM. However, that decision 
was provisional and requires that nine issues are “addressed and resolved in a 
satisfactory manner”: 
 non-permanence, including long-term permanence; 
 measuring, reporting, and verification; 
 environmental impacts; 
 project activity boundaries; 
 international law; 
 liability; 
 the potential for perverse outcomes; 
 safety; 
 insurance coverage and compensation for damages 
  caused due to seepage or leakage.
 
Capture and storage of CO2 from biomass were not specifically addressed in 
the decision. In November 2011, the UNFCCC Secretariat released the Draft 
Modalities and Procedures (M&P) for CCS in CDM (Decision 10/CMP.7), which 
discuss how these nine issues should be addressed, and served as the basis for 
the negotiations of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) in Durban. 
Box 4.2
 
EuTRACE Report_85
4. International regulation and governance
towards decision-making in situations involving 
potential pollution of the marine environment, typi-
cally through assessment frameworks and amend-
ments to the treaty/protocol. Activity within the LC/
LP COP with relevance for climate engineering was 
initiated in 2006 in regard to CCS (London Conven-
tion and Protocol, 2006), which involved the adoption 
of an amendment to annex I of the LP to regulate 
CCS in sub-sea geological formations and an accom-
panying assessment framework; and a subsequent 
amendment in 2009  (London Convention and Proto-
col, 2009), to allow cross-border transport of CO2 for 
CCS purposes. Note, however, that the introduction 
of CO2 streams into the water column is prohibited. 
In the context of climate engineering regulation this 
development deserves attention, as CCS is regarded 
as a “bridging technology” when associated with con-
ventionally generated emissions but could arguably be 
defined as a greenhouse gas removal technique when 
conducted in direct connection with relevant activi-
ties, for example as part of a BECCS approach.
In 2008, the COP adopted a resolution (London Con-
vention and Protocol, 2008) banning OIF (legally 
defined by Article 1.4.2.2 of the treaty as “placement 
of other matter”) for purposes other than legitimate 
scientific research. This was followed in 2010 by an 
assessment framework (London Convention and Pro-
tocol, 2010) through which national authorities can 
determine whether scientific research on OIF is “legit-
imate” and how to manage applications to conduct 
research as required under LP Articles 4.1.2 and 9. A 
further development, discussed in more detail below, 
was proposed in 2013. This initial approach to produc-
ing non-binding yet politically authoritative guidance 
for decision making was at the time the most specific 
regulatory tool regarding any form of climate engi-
neering research or deployment in existence, yet its 
scope is limited to the marine environment and those 
atmospheric activities where direct interaction with 
the marine environment can be reasonably expected. 
During the course of these and further ongoing devel-
opments at the LP, several studies provided insight by 
examining the question of whether OIF is compatible 
with international law in general and with the LC/LP 
in particular (Rayfuse et al., 2008; Craik et al., 2013; 
Scott, 2013; Verlaan, 2009; Güssow et al., 2010; 
Markus and Ginzky, 2011).
Conversely, techniques that aim to reflect sunlight 
away from Earth are not generally considered to fall 
within the definitions of “sink” or “emissions reduc-
tion at source”, as they do not target the “stabilization 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere” 
as required under the objectives of the UNFCCC 
(Winter, 2011). Potential attempts to subsume such 
albedo modification measures under adaptation meas-
ures rather than mitigation measures, in order to inte-
grate this category of climate engineering into the 
climate regime, could be challenged on the basis that 
these activities do not represent conventional adapta-
tion measures such as those provided for in Article 4 
(1)(e) of the UNFCCC (“appropriate and integrated 
plans for coastal zone management, water resources 
and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilita-
tion of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by 
drought and desertification, as well as floods”). 
Although this list is non-exclusive, there is no indica-
tion that a broad interpretation of the term “adapta-
tion” to include albedo modification techniques would 
be appropriate given the objectives of the UNFCCC 
contained in Article 2, to stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere and allow ecosys-
tems to adapt naturally to climate change, because 
albedo modification techniques fundamentally influ-
ence the conditions to which ecosystems would adapt.
4.1.2 LC/LP — Climate engineering as 
an activity or technical process? 
The LC/LP was developed with the primary intention 
of regulating the dumping of harmful waste and other 
matter into the oceans. Unlike the UNFCCC and 
CBD, which enjoy quasi-universal legal status, LC/LP 
only has a limited international membership, and 
although most member states of the EU are Parties to 
the treaty, the EU itself cannot become so as it is not a 
“State” as required under Article 24 (1). Also in con-
trast to the UNFCCC, Parties to the LC/LP have 
actively initiated significant steps towards the regula-
tion of certain ocean-related greenhouse gas removal 
and sub-seabed storage techniques. Such efforts have 
concentrated on the development of a risk manage-
ment framework to regulate potential activities at the 
operational level, rather than attempting to address 
the larger contextual questions that climate engineer-
ing raises. As such, the LC/LP is a process-oriented 
instrument which seeks to articulate pathways 
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(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) is 
often interpreted as referring to the rules and proce-
dures codified in and adopted under the LC/LP, which 
would result in their incorporation into the regime of 
that treaty (which is binding upon significantly more 
states, as well as the EU).
In 2013 an amendment to the LP (LP Resolution 4(8) 
of 18 October 2013) was proposed by Australia, 
Nigeria, and the Republic of Korea to extend the 
scope of the Protocol to regulate the placement of 
matter for ocean fertilisation and other marine geoen-
gineering activities. This proposal, which may repre-
sent a major step forward in the development of regu-
lation for climate engineering, was adopted by 
consensus in October 2013, and aims to provide a 
legally binding mechanism to regulate the placement 
of matter for OIF while at the same time “future-
proofing” the LP so as to enable regulation of other 
marine geoengineering activities that fall within its 
scope. It constitutes the first binding regulation in 
international law explicitly referring to a climate engi-
neering activity. However, this statement should not 
be interpreted as implying that no rules of interna-
tional law — particularly customary international law 
and international environmental law — would have 
been applicable in the absence of this first binding 
regulation. At the same time, it should be kept in mind 
that the amendment first enters into force when two-
thirds of the accepting parties have deposited an 
instrument of acceptance, and can be subject to reser-
vations, provided these are compatible with the over-
arching objectives of the treaty. Parties to the LC/LP 
who do not accept the amendment are not bound by 
the amendment, but are nonetheless under the obliga-
tion to take its provisions into account given the con-
tinuing (although legally non-binding) applicability of 
the resolutions on the regulation of ocean fertilisation 
(London Convention and Protocol, 2008) and the 
assessment framework for scientific research involv-
ing ocean fertilisation (London Convention and Pro-
tocol, 2010) for all parties, in conjunction with the 
overarching duty to protect and preserve the marine 
environment derived from the UNCLOS, the LC/LP, 
and customary international law.
The new Article 1 No. 5 bis contains the first definition 
of marine geoengineering to be introduced into a 
binding international treaty. The amendment further-
The most important aspect of the LC/LP process as a 
potential role model for the future development of 
governance of climate engineering has been the con-
sideration of risk assessment of potentially polluting 
activities as a mandatory component of the decision-
making process, subject to the application of the pre-
cautionary principle. The LP mandates a precaution-
ary approach to environmental protection that would 
be applicable to any form of greenhouse gas removal 
research or deployment in the marine environment, as 
well as to the introduction of matter into the marine 
environment for the purpose of enhancing the plane-
tary albedo, requiring in Article 3 (1) that “appropriate 
preventative measures are taken when there is reason 
to believe that wastes or other matter introduced into 
the marine environment are likely to cause harm even 
when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal 
relation between inputs and their effects”. Waiving 
the need to provide conclusive evidence of causation 
helps to overcome one of the central problems in reg-
ulating climate engineering generally — that of scien-
tific uncertainty concerning the effects of research 
and/or deployment. Under the LP, a state cannot law-
fully justify a failure to take preventative measures by 
reference to a lack of evidence for a causal relationship 
between an activity and detectable harm to the 
marine environment. In this regard, the LP’s formula-
tion of the precautionary principle could serve as a 
helpful interpretive aid within an inter-treaty regula-
tory structure where formulations of the precaution-
ary principle differ. This is not meant to suggest that 
the LP’s formulation of the precautionary principle 
might prevail over other formulations in other trea-
ties. Arguably, this formulation should nonetheless be 
taken into account as a component of other legal rules 
applicable between the parties, together with the con-
text, according to Article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), when inter-
preting any of the treaties forming part of an 
inter-treaty regulatory structure. The weighting given 
to a particular formulation, however, will depend on 
how the principle is employed in the facilitation of 
operational cooperation and on the formal recogni-
tion of common objectives between the treaties (i.e., 
within joint COP decisions and Memoranda of Under-
standing between treaties). Problematic in the case of 
the LC/LP is its less than universal membership, as 
noted above. That said, the notion of “global rules and 
standards” in terms of UNCLOS Article 210 (6) 
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Protocol, cf. CBD Article 28 should the parties decide 
to regulate climate engineering research and/or 
deployment in a binding manner). However, in con-
trast to the UNFCCC, the CBD is not dedicated to 
the specific context of climate change, and in contrast 
to the LC/LP it is not designed to regulate specific 
activities. Its potential role in the regulation of climate 
engineering is instead to identify normative catego-
ries and procedures by which the potential effects of 
climate engineering on biodiversity can be monitored, 
assessed, and evaluated, as well as establishing limits, 
which may not be exceeded, for the reduction or loss 
of biological diversity. 
As set out in Article 3 of the CBD, states have the 
“responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction”. To this end, they are 
required to adopt measures to minimise the adverse 
impacts on biodiversity, as described in CBD Article 
14(1). These measures include the duty to “introduce 
appropriate procedures requiring environmental 
impact assessment … and, where appropriate, allow 
for public participation in such procedures”, as 
detailed in CBD Article 14 (1)(a). Read in conjunction 
with the eighth and ninth recitals of the preamble 
(“Noting that it is vital to anticipate, prevent and 
attack the causes of significant reduction or loss of 
biological diversity at source, [n]oting also that where 
there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of bio-
logical diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
avoid or minimize such a threat”), the CBD presents 
an ambiguous version of the precautionary principle 
that cannot be interpreted as either prohibiting or 
authorising climate engineering activities.
To date, the CBD COP has adopted two specific deci-
sions explicitly concerning climate engineering (albeit 
using the term “geoengineering” and without differ-
entiating between albedo modification and green-
house gas removal techniques), at its tenth meeting in 
2010 (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010) and 
eleventh meeting in 2012 (Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2012). Note that there have also been fur-
ther CBD COP decisions referring specifically to OIF. 
The 2010 decision stipulates in Para. 8 (w) that:
more prescribes binding criteria to distinguish 
research from deployment. The amendment, should it 
enter into force, would not automatically render the 
Protocol applicable to all marine greenhouse gas 
removal techniques. Rather, the applicability of the 
Protocol depends on a decision by the States Parties 
to include the activity in question in a new Annex 4 to 
the Protocol. Concerning techniques that aim to 
modify the planetary albedo, while the definition of 
marine geoengineering also encompasses the intro-
duction of matter into the marine environment in 
order to increase the brightness of clouds, seeding 
using sea-spray generated from ocean waters would 
arguably not fall under the regulation. Furthermore, a 
new Annex 5 transforms the aforementioned Assess-
ment Framework into a legally binding text; it reflects 
a comparatively strict implementation of the precau-
tionary approach by foreseeing, at several stages of 
the assessment, that permission should not be granted 
unless sufficient evidence can be provided that the 
activity is unlikely to adversely affect the marine envi-
ronment. Article 6 bis of the Protocol generally pro-
hibits the placement of matter for marine greenhouse 
gas removal activities unless a listing of the activities 
concerned provides that they may be authorised 
under a permit scheme. This process under the LP, of 
first adopting a non-binding COP decision and then 
proceeding to amend the treaty/protocol to create 
binding law, demonstrates a potential model for other 
legal regimes in regulating other forms of climate 
engineering research.
4.1.3 CBD — Climate engineering 
judged in light of its effects on the 
environment?
The CBD was created with the intended objective to 
conserve biodiversity. With reference to each state’s 
sovereign right to sustainably use its natural resources 
and the duty to prevent transboundary harm as the 
two foundations for state action, the CBD sets out a 
regulatory framework to gauge potential harm to bio-
diversity and ecosystems stemming from human 
activities. The CBD has a near-universal membership 
among UN member states, with the sole, but signifi-
cant, exception of the USA, which has signed but not 
ratified the treaty. Like the UNFCCC, the text of the 
CBD itself does not explicitly refer to climate engi-
neering (however, it could be amended by way of a 
88_EuTRACE Report
Final report of the FP7 CSA project EuTRACE 
albedo modification techniques might be considered 
as falling under its mandate.
Irrespective of the type of climate engineering under 
consideration, the CBD contains a general obligation 
to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIAs). 
The wording of Decision X/33 allows for small-scale 
scientific research on climate engineering in control-
led settings under the condition that these studies are 
“justified by the need to gather specific scientific data”. 
Should such experiments take place, the CBD may 
therefore be under increasing pressure to serve as the 
framework within which an “adequate scientific basis” 
can be established “on which to justify such activities”. 
The nature of justification is different, however, 
between that required of scientists wishing to con-
duct small-scale climate engineering research and 
stakeholders calling for actual deployment.
4.1.4 Outlook: bringing together the 
regulatory approaches of context, 
activities and effects 
It was noted in the preceding sections that, in order to 
develop an effective regulatory structure for climate 
engineering techniques, the three approaches to regu-
lation identified in the activities of the UNFCCC, LC/
LP and CBD would need to be integrated. Whether 
— and how — this could be achieved depends firstly 
on better defining the scope of the intended regula-
tion in relation to the specific technical features, areas 
of application and intentions behind the activities 
concerned. These specificities have so far not been 
adequately addressed in international regulatory bod-
ies, mirroring the lack of clarity in the general debate 
surrounding terms like climate engineering, geoengi-
neering, albedo modification, and greenhouse gas 
removal (see Section 1.2). Because of the great differ-
ences between individual techniques, the prospects 
and desirability of a treaty that subsumes a wide range 
of techniques under the general term “climate engi-
neering” and attempts to address the full range of 
aspects involved (i.e., going beyond specific aspects 
such as impacts on biodiversity) are clearly negative, 
taking into account: (1) the time it would take to nego-
tiate such an instrument, (2) that “commons-based” 
and “territorial” climate engineering techniques raise 
different jurisdictional issues and would thus require 
different forms of international cooperation and deci-
“…in the absence of science-based, global, transparent 
and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for 
geo-engineering, and in accordance with the precau-
tionary approach […] no climate-related geo-engineer-
ing activities that may affect biodiversity take place, 
until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to 
justify such activities and appropriate consideration 
of the associated risks for the environment and biodi-
versity and associated social, economic and cultural 
impacts, with the exception of small-scale scientific 
research studies that would be conducted in a control-
led setting in accordance with Article 3 of the Conven-
tion, and only if they are justified by the need to gather 
specific scientific data and are subject to a thorough 
prior assessment of the potential impacts on the envi-
ronment”. 
Although this decision is legally non-binding, it con-
stitutes a politically authoritative statement by the 
States Parties to the CBD and as such is to be taken 
into account when measuring climate engineering 
activities against the biodiversity protection-oriented 
requirements contained in the CBD.
Decision X/33 also provides a definition of geoengi-
neering that refers to “…any technologies that deliber-
ately reduce solar insolation or increase carbon 
sequestration from the atmosphere on a large scale 
that may affect biodiversity (excluding carbon capture 
and storage from fossil fuels when it captures carbon 
dioxide before it is released into the atmosphere)…”. It 
is clear that the CBD considers itself an appropriate 
treaty body for discussing both greenhouse gas 
removal and albedo modification techniques, in con-
trast to the UNFCCC, where the language of the 
treaty has so far been interpreted as restricting the 
discussion to greenhouse gas removal techniques 
(note, however, that the interpretation of the 
UNFCCC described here might change over time, 
subject to political will, given the flexible wording of 
the treaty provisions and the possibility for interpreta-
tion of a treaty to change as a result of subsequent 
agreement between the parties or subsequent practice 
concerning the application of its provisions, cf. Article 
31 (3) lit. a and lit. b of the VCLT, 1155 UNTS 331). Deci-
sions X/33 and XI/20 of the CBD COP are therefore 
particularly important in relation to albedo modifica-
tion techniques, as the CBD is arguably at present the 
only treaty with near-universal legal status in which 
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the EU itself. Although present EU law (the scope of 
which is limited to the territory of EU member states 
and to activities undertaken by EU citizens abroad) 
cannot be interpreted as generally prohibiting or 
authorising climate engineering, it serves to structure 
the decision-making process and provide essential 
provisions for environmental protection, which are in 
any case required to be implemented and enforced. 
EU law consists of both primary and secondary 
sources, with the former consisting of the multilateral 
treaties adopted by the member states defining the 
objectives and competences of the EU as an institu-
tion, and the latter consisting of the supranational 
legal mechanisms created by the EU itself for realising 
those objectives. In some cases such as the UNFCCC 
and CBD, the EU is also a party to multilateral treaties 
alongside its individual EU member states, which pro-
vides a further source of secondary law for the realisa-
tion of EU objectives. In other cases such as the LC/
LP, the EU is not a party, meaning that member states 
are exclusively and independently responsible for 
implementing their obligations under this treaty, 
something which must nonetheless take place in com-
patibility with the framework of EU law. The EU is 
generally not precluded from enacting compatible (or 
even stricter) internal regulations, provided that the 
subject matter falls within its competences. However, 
it cannot exercise a formal coordinating role among 
the EU member states’ positions within treaty bodies 
to which it is not a party. This fact considerably com-
plicates the formation of a common EU position on a 
given topic “externally”, within the sphere of interna-
tional relations, and therefore the influence that such 
a common position might have for the evolution of the 
treaty. This complex and continually evolving legal 
landscape on the one hand complicates an assessment 
of existing and emerging legal instruments at the 
international level, but on the other hand opens the 
analysis of new sources of law and provides an addi-
tional normative forum within which climate engi-
neering can be subjected to more democratically 
legitimated legal scrutiny, at least within the EU, than 
at the level of international law alone.
sion making, and (3) that a clear sense is yet to emerge 
of what the interests of different actors might be. 
Shared understandings of technical features, areas of 
applications and intentions behind climate engineer-
ing activities will only emerge — if at all — in light of 
active, open research programmes and assessments. 
More fundamentally, the effectiveness of any potential 
regulatory structure depends on a clear understand-
ing of its object and purpose. It is still premature to 
speculate on what purpose or purposes the regulation 
of climate engineering might have and what goals it 
might be intended to pursue. In the meantime, until a 
clearer consensus emerges to guide decisions on 
whether to develop more specific regulation, the alter-
native is to focus on bringing together the aforemen-
tioned regulatory approaches at the operational level 
(i.e., through parallel action, common assessment 
frameworks or Memoranda of Understanding) using 
the example of those climate engineering techniques 
that are most relevant to research and practice. In this 
respect, developments that have taken place within 
the legal framework of the LC/LP might serve as a 
model for other non-ocean-related climate engineer-
ing activities.
4.2 The EU law perspective: consider-
ing a potential regulatory strategy for 
climate engineering including applica-
tion of the approaches of context, 
activities and effects 
Due to climate engineering’s inherent potential for 
significant transboundary environmental effects, the 
question of its overarching permissibility remains at 
the level of public international law. An exclusively 
“top-down” perspective, however, would fail to take 
into account the more heterogeneous processes by 
which international law is created and implemented, 
as well as the different yet interlinked normative 
planes necessary for a coherent and stable legal sys-
tem. Regulatory structures that would be initially 
applicable to climate engineering research or deploy-
ment activities already exist at the national and supra-
national levels, and these could provide a structure for 
implementing a new international legal regime within 
the dynamics of multilevel governance. Without a 
comprehensive international regulatory structure in 
place, EU law provides a “bottom-up” source of limi-
tation on climate engineering for member states and 
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States shall again exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising 
its competence”. Were the EU to enact a moratorium, 
prohibition or authorisation of climate engineering in 
general or for individual climate engineering tech-
niques, this would either need to be set out in an inter-
national treaty to which it is a party, which would 
then be transposed into EU secondary law, or by mak-
ing use of its environmental competence codified in 
TFEU Article 192 (2), on the basis of a Commission 
proposal through the standard legislative process.
Regarding the Union policy on the environment, 
TFEU Article 191 (1) sets out the primary objectives, 
including “preserving, protecting and improving the 
quality of the environment, protecting human health, 
prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, 
promoting measures at the international level to deal 
with regional or worldwide environmental problems, 
and in particular combating climate change”. As the 
central guiding provision of EU primary law with rel-
evance for climate engineering, TFEU Article 191 (2) 
expressly requires that environmental policy “shall be 
based on the precautionary principle and on the prin-
ciples that preventive action should be taken, that 
environmental damages should as a priority be recti-
fied at source and that the polluter should pay”. On 
this basis, all climate engineering activities would be 
judged against the precautionary principle as a bind-
ing rule of law, as well as the duty of preventive action 
against emissions and the mitigation of emissions at 
source, as opposed to either their dispersal or seques-
tration via other environmental media as intended by 
greenhouse gas removal techniques, or the manage-
ment of solar radiation as targeted by albedo modifi-
cation techniques. In accordance with TFEU Article 
191 (3), the Union is also required to take account of 
available scientific and technical data in preparing 
environmental policy, as well as of the potential ben-
efits and costs of action or lack of action, taking into 
account the enormous degree of scientific uncertainty 
concerning climate engineering. 
Given these principles and standards of care for inter-
action with the environment, it is unlikely that most 
climate engineering methods would satisfy the princi-
ple of preventive and precautionary action. At the 
same time, as far as greenhouse gas removal is con-
cerned, the distance between the source of emissions 
4.2.1 EU Primary Law — An overarch-
ing context for climate engineering 
regulation and competences for its 
implementation within the EU
Questions regarding a regulatory strategy to deter-
mine a potential context within which research or 
deployment of climate engineering could be author-
ised or prohibited in the EU are best posed at the level 
of EU competences and objectives, i.e., against the 
provisions of EU primary law. The Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU) (The Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, 2012a) sets out the organisational struc-
ture and objectives of the European Union that are 
relevant for potential EU action in the field of climate 
engineering. The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) (The Member States of the 
European Union, 2012b) sets out in more detail the 
nature of competences between the Union and the 
member states, including the environment, energy, 
and common safety under TFEU Article 4 (2). TFEU 
Article 4 (3) adds that “[i]n areas of research, techno-
logical development and space, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities, in particular to 
define and implement programmes; however, the 
exercise of that competence shall not result in Mem-
ber States being prevented from exercising theirs”. 
Because action concerning environmental protection 
on the one hand and research on the other hand is 
subject to shared competences under EU law, both 
national and supranational activity in climate engi-
neering research and deployment are possible at 
present. As evidenced by the developments concern-
ing CCS, this could potentially mean that both the EU 
and some member states engage in research and tech-
nological development of climate engineering meth-
ods, while other member states, despite not being in 
the position to veto EU-level research and develop-
ment following the adoption of the CCS Directive, 
find themselves unable to promote such activities 
domestically due to public opposition of the kind wit-
nessed in Germany over CCS (for an overview on the 
state of implementation of the CCS Directive and the 
divergent positions taken by EU member states, see 
COM(2014) 99 final). With regard to environmental 
competence, it should be noted, though, that accord-
ing to TFEU Article 2 (2) the member states may only 
“exercise their competence to the extent that the 
Union has not exercised its competence. The Member 
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2004/35/CE) are central examples of this category of 
EU secondary law.
Regarding potential regulatory strategies to address 
the potential environmental effects of climate engi-
neering, there are several relevant EU substantive 
directives  in the form of legislative acts, including the 
Air Quality Directive (Directive, 2008/50/EC), the 
Water Framework Directive (Directive, 2000/60/EC), 
the Habitats Directive (Council, Directive 92/43/EEC), 
the Birds Directive (EU-Directive, 2009/147/EC), and 
the Environmental Noise Directive (Directive, 
2002/49/EC). Particularly relevant for the special case 
of CCS is the CCS Directive  (EU-Directive, 2009/31/
EC). This family of directives uses similar types of 
measures for avoiding, preventing, or reducing harm-
ful effects on specific environmental components, as 
well as on human health and the environment as a 
whole, in line with the objectives and relevant provi-
sions of EU primary law. At the same time, they also 
include provisions allowing exceptions from envis-
aged levels of protection under certain conditions 
(e.g., when compliance costs are judged excessive, or 
when overriding public interest or wider sustainable 
development concerns require exceptions from the 
protection standards established by these instru-
ments). Directives are binding upon member states in 
their objectives but not in the manner in which they 
are transposed and implemented in national law by 
member states. As such, the transposition and imple-
mentation of EU secondary law, binding for EU mem-
ber states, also provides an important demonstration 
of commitment to international treaty obligations as 
well as a source of state practice contributing to the 
formation of customary international law, as member 
states are parties to the treaties and at the same time 
independent actors in the broader practice of interna-
tional relations. Thus, the standard of protection and 
care mandated by EU primary law and further devel-
oped through EU secondary law, sometimes imple-
mented to an even higher standard by member states, 
contributes to international understanding and con-
sensus-building as to how international law on a given 
topic is to be interpreted and implemented by other 
parties. 
and their point of sequestration would be a decisive 
factor in determining whether a certain activity can 
be seen as sufficiently rectifying emissions “at source” 
as required by EU law. Finally, the overarching objec-
tive of EU environmental policy of “improving” the 
quality of the environment and rationally using natu-
ral resources could be threatened by the prospect of 
climate engineering. Despite the prominent position 
given to combating climate change within EU envi-
ronmental objectives and the clear intention behind 
climate engineering to contribute to such ends, in 
order to be consistent with EU policy climate engi-
neering techniques would nonetheless need to be 
judged on their capacity to satisfy all objectives of EU 
environmental policy simultaneously, rather than 
merely as a second-order measure to satisfy one indi-
vidual objective.
4.2.2 EU Secondary Law
To date, no act of EU secondary law has sought to 
explicitly regulate climate engineering research and/or 
deployment. That said, examples of EU secondary law, 
both procedural and substantive, can be identified 
that could potentially be triggered, subject to more 
detailed assessment, in the context of climate engi-
neering research or deployment of climate engineer-
ing techniques.
Regarding the regulation of activities as one of the 
three approaches to a potential regulatory strategy for 
climate engineering, EU secondary law on environ-
mental procedures is of central importance as it gives 
insights into the potential legitimisation of climate 
engineering activities and corresponding liability 
mechanisms. Regulation can perform specific legiti-
mising functions, for instance by articulating proce-
dural mechanisms by which the public can be included 
in decision-making processes on whether or not to 
pursue climate engineering, and by which liability for 
potential environmental damages ensuing from such 
techniques can be at least partially attributed. Proce-
dural approaches to the legal questions surrounding 
climate engineering provide safeguards at the opera-
tional level, which are applicable to all potential forms 
of climate engineering and to both state and non-state 
actors at regional, national, and sub-national levels. 
The EIA Directive (Directive, 2011/92/EU) and the 
Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) (Directive, 
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As presented here, EU law contains a wide variety of 
provisions potentially applicable to both climate engi-
neering research and deployment. Although these 
provisions do not, in themselves, provide an all-
encompassing regulatory regime for climate engineer-
ing, their structure and relationship to emerging 
dynamics at the international level suggest pathways 
forward on different elements of climate engineering 
regulation and may help in the substantiation of a 
legal regime at the international level. What they do 
contribute is a notably high level of environmental 
protection and, most prominently, the central objec-
tive of improving the quality of the environment 
rather than merely maintaining it. Given this basic 
foundation, it can safely be said that EU law provides 
a further and, compared to the requirements of public 
international law, more stringent scrutiny of potential 
climate engineering activities. Moreover, it does so at 
a level closer to the sources of those activities, with 
well-established mechanisms to ensure public partici-
pation, access to justice, and legitimisation of decision 
making. Having these provisions at the EU level 
rather than merely at the level of the individual mem-
ber states, where further implementing legislation 
exists, also provides an important coordinative func-
tion that might serve to effectively limit the scope for 
national decision makers to unilaterally undertake any 
form of climate engineering. Ultimately, however, EU 
law demonstrates the same types of deficits that are 
becoming apparent in international legal efforts to 
regulate climate engineering, suggesting that initia-
tives beyond formal legal approaches will be neces-
sary to govern climate engineering.
4.2.3 Taking a regional perspective on 
climate engineering
Notwithstanding some scepticism concerning EU 
unilateralism in fields such as shipping and emissions 
trading (Proelss, 2013), it has often been noted that 
legal developments at the EU level have clear and 
often very constructive feedbacks into international 
processes — particularly in relationship to environ-
mental concerns. By approaching these existing tools 
as regional contributions to the completion of the 
international legal regime applicable to climate engi-
neering, the international community may be able to 
harness a dynamic model for future regime-building 
beyond classic “top-down” multilateral treaty 
approaches. It is widely recognised that a joint course 
of regulatory action is often easier at the regional level 
than at the international level, and it may thus be 
appropriate to transpose the analytical approach cur-
rently being taken toward the dilemmas posed by cli-
mate engineering to a different scale. The adoption of 
a new perspective might highlight considerable 
opportunities and insights available for climate engi-
neering regulation, by better grasping the interrela-
tionships between legal regimes, both laterally at the 
international level and subsidiarily through the per-
spectives of multi-level governance. 
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5.1 Background
Over the past decades, there has been a substantial 
increase in the general interest in the various pro-
posed climate engineering techniques. This growing 
interest has been accompanied by an increase in 
research on the range of climate engineering tech-
niques, as shown in Figure 5.1. Within this context, 
there are notable differences in the growth of research 
on planetary albedo modification and on greenhouse 
gas removal, as well as differences in the framing and 
perception of each within the research community 
and among associated funding bodies.
For planetary albedo modification, high-level discus-
sions and preliminary research date back to at least 
the early 1960s (Keith, 2000, Fleming, 2010). How-
ever, prior to the early 2000s, serious research on 
such techniques was being conducted by only a lim-
ited number of researchers worldwide. This changed 
in the mid-2000s, particularly following the publica-
tion of an article by Crutzen (2006), revisiting the 
idea of SAI, which had originally been published in the 
mid-1970s (Budyko, 1974). The subsequent rapid 
growth in peer-reviewed research articles on this sub-
ject is depicted in Figure 5.1. Five commentaries were 
published together with the Crutzen (2006) article, all 
of which cautioned about the risks of steps toward 
implementation of any form of albedo modification, 
but at the same time generally supported “breaking 
the taboo” and encouraged basic research on albedo 
modification (Cicerone, 2006, MacCracken, 2006, 
Bengtsson, 2006, Kiehl, 2006, Lawrence, 2006). 
Research and scientific publications on the topic have 
since proliferated, including the development of sev-
eral international projects such as GeoMIP (Kravitz et 
al., 2011), IMPLICC (Schmidt et al., 2012b), SRMGI 
(SRMGI, 2012) and EuTRACE. The article by Crutzen 
(2006) was quickly followed by the first major assess-
ment report, conducted by the Royal Society (Shep-
herd et al., 2009), as well as by several other assess-
ments (Blackstock et al., 2009; Rickels et al., 2011; 
Bodle et al., 2013; Edenhofer et al., 2011, McNutt et al., 
2015a; McNutt et al., 2015b; Ginzky et al., 2011; UK 
House of Commons Science and Technology Com-
mittee, 2010; Gordon, 2010; Caviezel and Revermann, 
2014). The topic has also been addressed in the IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report, in all three Working Groups 
(IPCC, 2013a, IPCC, 2014a, IPCC, 2014b).
5. Research options
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This multi-purpose nature of knowledge production, 
described above for the case of OIF, also exists for 
research on albedo modification techniques. For 
example, perturbative field experiments examining 
cloud–aerosol interactions would simultaneously pro-
duce knowledge about one of the key uncertainties in 
contemporary climate models and about potential cli-
mate engineering strategies through cloud brighten-
ing. It remains to be seen what kind of effect the 
multi-purpose nature of knowledge production will 
have for research on climate engineering, e.g., facilitat-
ing, leading to a normalisation of albedo modification 
research, or alternately disruptive, leading to a contes-
tation of fundamental atmospheric and climate 
research that is interpreted as being related in pur-
pose to albedo modification research.
For greenhouse gas removal, interest has grown more 
gradually over a longer period of time. In the case of 
OIF, numerous research articles were already pub-
lished by the mid-1990s. Prominent publications on 
other techniques to remove greenhouse gases also 
started appearing in the mid-1990s (e.g., Lackner et 
al., 1995). With the key exception of OIF, attitudes 
within the scientific community were less resistant to 
investigating these approaches than to planetary 
albedo modification. Even though OIF was and 
remains heavily criticised by many within the scien-
tific and stakeholder communities, research was not 
as limited by the sense of “taboo” as it was for albedo 
modification, as evidenced by the 13 open-ocean field 
experiments testing various aspects of OIF that were 
conducted between 1992 and 2009. This may be at 
least partly due to the circumstance that several of 
these experiments were primarily aimed at investigat-
ing the fundamental nutrient uptake and cycling proc-
esses in the oceans, with a combined interest in the 
potential applications for enhancing CO2 removal 
from the atmosphere. 
Figure 5.1:   
Main trends in scientific 
publications on climate 
engineering (number  
of publications per year, 
indexed in Web of  
Science). 
 
Source:   
Oldham et al. (2014). 
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Information requirements: This argument suggests 
that climate change negotiations and policy making 
require a breadth of information, and since the IPCC 
has now taken up discussions of both greenhouse gas 
removal and albedo modification in its Fifth Assess-
ment Report, the requirements are becoming more 
significant for information on related issues, for both 
types of climate engineering techniques, as a basis for 
supporting international policy development. The 
need for direct advice of policy-making organisations 
has driven, directly or indirectly, several of the assess-
ments carried out to date, including those of the UK 
Royal Society (Shepherd et al., 2009), the US House of 
Representatives (Gordon, 2010), the UK House of 
Commons (UK House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee, 2010), the German Ministry 
for Education and Research (Rickels et al., 2011), the 
German Federal Environment Agency (Ginzky et al., 
2011), the report of the German Office of Technology 
Assessment (Caviezel and Revermann, 2014), the 
Working Group I, II and III contributions to the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2013a, IPCC, 
2014a, IPCC, 2014b), the reports of the US National 
Research Council (McNutt et al., 2015a; McNutt et al., 
2015b), and of course the EuTRACE project commis-
sioned by the European Commission.
Knowledge provision: In addition to the formalised 
discussions in the context of the IPCC and climate 
change negotiations, there is also already a broader 
discussion about greenhouse gas removal and albedo 
modification among the international scientific, 
policy, and civil society communities and in parts of 
the broader public. Many researchers have indicated 
feeling a responsibility to provide knowledge that is 
scientifically sound as a basis for further discussion 
and decision making.
Deployment readiness: The argument has been 
made that the readiness with which different tech-
niques can be deployed should be increased in order 
to allow for “buying time” for the implementation of 
mitigation measures, or to “be prepared” for the 
implementation of various forms of climate engineer-
ing if future environmental conditions worsen dra-
matically as a result of climate change (MacMartin et 
al., 2014; Blackstock et al., 2009; Swart and Marinova, 
2010). 
Currently, research on both types of climate engineer-
ing is extensive compared to 20 years ago, although it 
is — appropriately, from the standpoint of this con-
sortium — far less extensive and attracts less funding 
support than research on mitigation and adaptation 
(including both technical and non-technical meas-
ures). Nevertheless, there is an extensive dialogue 
amongst and between researchers and key stakehold-
ers (in particular funding agencies, policy makers, and 
NGOs) about whether this level of research is appro-
priate, whether public funding for research on inten-
tional interventions into the climate system in general 
should be stopped, continued or intensified, and how 
research should be governed. Although decisions for 
or against research on different techniques are com-
monly made at the national level, there is a need at the 
international level to reflect on governance issues, a 
topic that has been intensified recently by the publica-
tion of proposed experimental designs for open-
atmosphere field experiments for albedo modification, 
especially stratospheric aerosol injections (Dykema et 
al., 2014; Keith et al., 2014).
This chapter considers the current perspectives on 
climate engineering research and the options for 
funding and governing research, which the European 
Commission and other governing bodies may wish to 
take into consideration. In the next section, numerous 
arguments for and against research on greenhouse gas 
removal and albedo modification are considered, 
which have been prominently raised thus far. Section 
5.3 then outlines the key knowledge gaps that have 
become evident throughout the body of this assess-
ment.
5.2 Arguments for and concerns with 
climate engineering research
5.2.1 Arguments in favour of climate 
engineering research 
A wide variety of arguments has been made in favour 
of conducting research on both greenhouse gas 
removal and albedo modification, although often in 
different ways and frequently differentiated between 
individual techniques. The main arguments in the 
current discourse are:
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gas removal and albedo modification techniques, but 
also often improves the general understanding of the 
Earth system. This applies both to albedo modifica-
tion, whereby the model simulations provide addi-
tional insights into the behaviour of the climate sys-
tem under various perturbation scenarios, and to 
greenhouse gas removal techniques, whereby research 
on, for example, OIF or BECCS would be expected to 
inform ecosystem management and improve our 
knowledge of biogeochemical cycles.
5.2.2 Concerns with climate 
engineering research 
A wide variety of arguments has also been made 
against conducting research on both greenhouse gas 
removal and albedo modification, noting, however, 
that arguments against research often apply in differ-
ent ways for the two classes of techniques. The argu-
ments noted below generally apply either primarily to 
research into direct interventions in the climate sys-
tem by albedo modification, or similarly to both 
classes of techniques.
The “moral hazard” argument: As described in Sec-
tion 3.1.1, the moral hazard argument posits that 
research on climate engineering may weaken society’s 
willingness to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
adapt to climate change, either now or in the future. 
This applies similarly to both greenhouse gas removal, 
especially when aiming for large-scale deployment, 
and to albedo modification.
Allocation of resources for research: This argu-
ment partially applies to greenhouse gas removal, but 
is most relevant to albedo modification techniques. It 
rests on the competition for financial resources, infra-
structure, and expertise between research on such 
techniques and research on other topics (Gardiner, 
2010, Jamieson, 1996). One concern is that research 
may divert crucial investments away from energy-
efficient technologies, the renewable energy sector, or 
even from studies to better understand the causes and 
effects of climate change (Robock, 2011). Such appre-
hensions often contend that the appeal to a possible 
“climate emergency” may particularly privilege cli-
mate engineering research and shield it from normal 
competition for funding (Gardiner, 2013, Ott, 2012).
Premature implementation avoidance: It has been 
argued that research can provide decision makers 
with sound scientific information as a basis for deter-
mining courses of action, helping to avoid premature 
implementation of high-risk and highly uncertain 
techniques (Lawrence, 2006; Keith et al., 2010; Cal-
deira and Keith, 2010; Morgan et al., 2013). In particu-
lar, it is contended that limiting research would not 
necessarily reduce the probability of greenhouse gas 
removal and albedo modification techniques ulti-
mately being deployed, but instead that limiting 
research could increase the likelihood of a technique 
being deployed without sufficient knowledge con-
cerning effects and side effects (Rayner et al., 2013; 
Morgan and Ricke, 2010; SRMGI, 2012; Robock, 2012).
This argument is primarily raised in discussions of 
albedo modification techniques but also applies to 
greenhouse gas removal.
Proposals elimination: It has also been suggested 
that research can help to weed out “bad” proposals, 
classified as those that are cost-ineffective or unrealis-
tic, thereby determining which ideas should not be 
pursued further (Lawrence, 2006, Cicerone, 2006). 
This applies equally to greenhouse gas removal and 
albedo modification techniques, given that both can 
have substantial adverse side effects which might out-
weigh their potential benefits. As an example, promi-
nent researchers have contended that past research 
has already made it clear that OIF should not be pur-
sued further (Strong et al., 2009b).
National preparedness: States may want to know 
what other nations or groups of nations might be con-
sidering, what kinds of impacts and side effects to 
expect in case of implementation by third parties, and 
what to monitor in order to detect possible “covert” 
implementations (Lawrence, 2006; Seidel et al., 2014). 
This applies generally to direct interventions in the 
climate system by albedo modification, as well as to 
any greenhouse gas removal techniques for which 
potential large-scale side effects are expected, such as 
for marine biology as a result of OIF, or for crop prices 
due to BECCS.
Scientific freedom: Scientific curiosity and scientific 
freedom are occasionally cited as arguments in favour 
of research, particularly since such research not only 
contributes to a better understanding of greenhouse 
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ability of investigators to carry out fundamental scien-
tific research that increases the level of understanding 
of the Earth system, which can support climate policy 
development (Schäfer et al., 2013a).
5.3 Knowledge gaps and key research 
questions
There are very many open research questions on cli-
mate engineering, ranging from natural science and 
technological aspects to social sciences, humanities, 
and legal issues. Here the results of the previous chap-
ters of this assessment are used to identify important 
knowledge-gaps and to draw up a list of pertinent 
research questions. This list is intended to give an 
overview of a range of issues that would benefit from 
further investigation for various purposes, e.g., in 
order to provide a better basis for stakeholder groups, 
including policy makers, to develop positions on vari-
ous issues associated with climate engineering. How-
ever, no attempt is made to prioritise the questions, 
e.g., for direct use in guiding research funding pro-
gram developments. Such prioritisations are necessar-
ily heavily context-dependent, and are thus likely to 
differ for different stakeholder groups (e.g., research-
ers of various disciplines, national policy makers, 
international policy makers, representatives of civil 
society, etc.). This is the first known compilation of 
this breadth of research questions on climate engi-
neering, and can serve as a basis for follow-up devel-
opments of prioritised sets of research questions 
based on the individual needs and values of various 
stakeholder groups. 
The questions are grouped into the following areas:
 natural sciences and engineering;
 public awareness and perception; 
 ethical, political, and societal aspects; 
 governance and regulation. 
Here, the umbrella term "climate engineering" is 
employed; however, the issues relevant to individual 
techniques or to broader categories are carefully dif-
ferentiated, and the umbrella term is only applied 
where appropriate. 
Slippery slope: The concern is often raised that 
research into climate engineering may render its ulti-
mate deployment inevitable, sitting at the top of a 
“slippery slope” toward deployment (Hulme, 2014; 
Morrow et al., 2009, Bracmort and Lattanzio, 2013). 
These arguments refer to path dependency and poten-
tial scientific or financial lock-in effects in the area of 
technological developments, emphasising that the 
step from research to deployment cannot always be 
easily controlled (Collingridge, 1980, Arthur, 2007), 
and that research cannot be easily separated from its 
potential application as technology (Jamieson, 1996; 
Morrow et al., 2009; Gardiner, 2010; Ott, 2012). These 
assumptions also play a role in the so-called “on the 
shelf” argument, which posits that technologies, once 
developed, tend to be used. Even though these argu-
ments are primarily directed against albedo modifica-
tion techniques, similar concerns can be raised for 
greenhouse gas removal techniques, which could 
hinder long-term major societal transformations 
toward more sustainable societies, for example by 
extending the lifetime of fossil-fuel-based production 
and consumption. 
Concerns about large-scale field tests: Large-scale 
field tests could have direct and widespread impacts 
on both human populations and the biosphere. It is 
not clear how large a field test of albedo modification 
would need to be in order to establish confidence in 
the effectiveness of a proposed technique. It has been 
argued that only testing on a large (perhaps even plan-
etary) scale and over longer periods of time could 
establish confidence in effects and side effects (Rob-
ock et al., 2010; Seidel et al., 2014), although proposals 
for more limited testing have also been made 
(Dykema et al., 2014; Keith et al., 2014; MacMynowski 
et al., 2011). It has been argued that albedo modifica-
tion field tests of sufficient scale to produce measura-
ble climate effects for a specific technique would be 
tantamount to full-fledged deployment (Robock et al., 
2010), since small- and medium-scale field tests would 
be insufficient to characterise the climate response 
(Tuana et al., 2012; Blackstock et al., 2009). 
Backlash against research: Concerns have been 
voiced that a strong civil society and public backlash 
against perturbative climate engineering field tests 
might generally hinder future research on greenhouse 
gas removal and albedo modification techniques, and 
furthermore that such a backlash might also affect the 
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To support the development of effective climate pol-
icy, an understanding of the timescales required to 
develop the various climate engineering techniques 
may be important: 
 If the decision were made to implement a given climate 
engineering technique, how long would it take to develop 
the technology and necessary infrastructure? How would 
various factors, for example the desired scale of deploy-
ment, affect this development?
 Is it possible to postpone specific kinds of research on a 
given technique (for example, field experiments and the 
development of prototypes) while retaining the possibility 
of timely future deployment if broadly desired; if so, for 
how long could that research be delayed?
Greenhouse gas removal: Greenhouse gas removal 
raises a number of specific research questions regard-
ing its capacity and potential benefits, measurements,
and monitoring, relationships to socioeconomic sce-
narios and potential drawbacks: 
 What are the physical, technological, and economic 
potentials of various techniques to remove greenhouse 
gases, taken individually or in combination, and how do 
these compare to available mitigation technologies?
 What monitoring, reporting, and verification pro-
grammes would be needed? 
 For each technique, how does it relate to various socioe-
conomic scenarios (e.g., the mitigation pathways that 
underlie the RCP scenarios)? 
 What would be the implications of deploying land-based, 
biological techniques at a large scale, given the existing 
demands on land and natural resources? 
 What limits and trade-offs would such techniques face?  
 What would be the long-term fate of carbon captured by 
these techniques? How can this be accounted for? 
 What would be the long-term implications of employing 
techniques like OIF, which are expected to eventually 
release the carbon back to the atmosphere?  
1) Natural sciences and engineering
Questions regarding potential consequences, risks, 
and technological feasibility differ between tech-
niques, although some questions concern many or all 
techniques simultaneously. Hence, general questions 
are considered first, followed by those specific to 
greenhouse gas removal and albedo modification.
General: In recognition of the finite nature of 
research funding, one option for posing questions is 
to start by identifying the most promising techniques 
and to focus funding upon those, and to then proceed 
by asking about the potential combination of remain-
ing techniques: 
 Which proposed techniques currently appear to be the 
most promising, and according to which criteria can this 
be assessed?
 Are there any proposed techniques for which it can be 
confidently said that further research is, at this point in 
time, not a prudent investment, due to physical limitations 
or significant side effects of the technique uncovered by ini-
tial research? 
 If a set of climate engineering techniques were to be 
deployed, is there an “optimal” configuration of one tech-
nique or combination of techniques for achieving specific 
climate goals, noting that goals are stakeholder-dependent?
To help in evaluating different climate engineering 
techniques, it is useful to ask a range of questions that 
apply to the full portfolio of techniques under consid-
eration: 
 Is the technique technically and economically feasible 
and scalable to have a significant effect on the climate?
 As many climate engineering techniques are little more 
than hypothetical proposals, what scientific uncertainties 
or technical challenges would need to be resolved before a 
given technique could be regarded as practicable?
 Many of the proposed techniques, if deployed at large 
scale, would have substantial resource requirements in 
terms of land area, raw materials, etc., and could also have 
significant side effects; what might be the associated 
broader environmental and economic consequences of ful-
filling these input requirements?
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SAI and marine cloud brightening seem to be the 
most feasible albedo modification techniques, based 
on current knowledge, but there are many unan-
swered questions relating to their feasibility, includ-
ing: 
 Could technologically-robust and cost-effective spraying 
methods be developed for the purpose of SAI and marine 
cloud brightening? 
 Could millions of tonnes of material annually be afford-
ably and safely lofted and released at altitudes of 20 – 25 
km in the tropics, where research indicates that injections 
would be most effective?
More general questions to inform governance devel-
opments include: 
 What scales of field experiments would be required in 
order to develop a sufficient understanding of the relevant 
processes and responses to the various albedo modification 
techniques? 
 Attributing the consequences of albedo modification to 
the implemented techniques would pose many challenges, 
and would require long timescales before the control of 
these schemes could be verified; what are the implications 
of this?
2) Public awareness and perception
Public awareness of climate engineering techniques 
remains low at present, yet the public is likely to play a 
key role in determining whether deployment of such 
techniques ever occurs, and prior to that, how much is 
invested into research on the technological and natu-
ral science aspects of the technique. Hence research is 
warranted into the questions: 
 To what extent is the public aware of different green-
house gas removal and albedo modification techniques, 
and how do attitudes and responses to these ideas vary? 
 Can the different scales and types of climate engineering 
research (modelling, study of analogues, field experiments, 
test bed demonstrations, prototypes, development, and 
deployment) be unambiguously defined and agreed 
between stakeholders; what purposes would such a defini-
tion serve; and what might be the implications of choosing 
specific definitions and distinctions between activities? 
Broadening the scope to the removal of greenhouse 
gases besides carbon dioxide: 
 Are there practical techniques that would make it possi-
ble to remove non-CO2 greenhouse gases from the atmos-
phere, or to increase their rate of destruction in the atmos-
phere?
Albedo modification: Evaluating proposals to 
modify planetary albedo would require research into 
the fundamental capacity of the techniques, their 
various impacts, and potential side effects. 
 How would the climate that results from a specific imple-
mentation of an albedo modification technique differ from 
that predicted without such intervention, as well as from 
the previously known (e.g., present-day and pre-indus-
trial) states of the climate?
 Cloud and aerosol processes are critical in shaping the 
way many albedo modification techniques would affect the 
climate, but many aspects of these processes are poorly rep-
resented in global climate models. What are the implica-
tions of these shortcomings for our confidence in the cli-
mate response to these techniques? 
 Given that many albedo modification techniques would 
allow some control over the spatial pattern of their climate 
forcing, would it be possible to “optimise” the climate 
response, and what would be the limitations and implica-
tions of such an endeavour?
 How well can research into the climate impacts of albedo 
modification techniques provide the information necessary 
to judge whether the benefits of a given deployment strat-
egy would outweigh the risks?
 The climate is highly variable on a timescale of years to 
decades, and as such it will prove challenging to detect and 
attribute, and hence perhaps to control, the climatic 
response to albedo modification. What monitoring and 
control strategies would be needed to verify and manage a 
large-scale deployment of albedo modification?
 Given the rapid and potentially disastrous warming that 
would follow from an abrupt termination of large-scale 
albedo modification, what “exit strategies” exist and what 
would their implications be for long-term climate policy?
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 What can be learned from other multi-generational 
projects (for example, radioactive waste treatment and 
storage) that can be applied to analysing the risks and 
potential success (or lack thereof ) of greenhouse gas 
removal and albedo modification techniques?
Climate engineering also brings forward interesting 
economic, societal, and political research questions, 
such as: 
 How would the application of different techniques affect 
financial systems, particularly with respect to fossil-fuel 
and resource markets, and the carbon markets? 
 How would the implications differ if specific techniques 
were to be applied in a centralised or decentralised way? 
 How does the perception of different techniques by differ-
ent stakeholders influence the further development of these 
techniques?
 How does the emergence of the proposition of climate 
engineering, and the possible emergence of specific climate 
engineering techniques, change societies and social behav-
iour?
 How might climate engineering techniques themselves be 
shaped by the societal context from which they emerge?
Finally, climate engineering raises questions at the 
very foundation of our understanding of the role of 
humanity in the world, particularly in light of the 
recent development of the concept of the Anthro-
pocene:
 How does our understanding of the degree to which 
humanity has the “right” to intentionally intervene in the 
global Earth system vary across cultures, political back-
grounds, and beliefs held by the various religious tradi-
tions around the world? 
 How does the prospect of climate engineering impact our 
understanding of what it means to be human in the 
Anthropocene? 
 Similar to considerations of the deeper meanings sur-
rounding the possibilities presented by control over the 
human genome, what is the deeper meaning of contemplat-
ing the coordinated control of the Earth system on a global 
scale?  
 What are the differences in awareness, attitude, and 
acceptance of theoretical and laboratory research, field 
tests, and potential deployment at different scales for dif-
ferent forms of greenhouse gas removal and albedo modi-
fication? 
 What factors shape public awareness, and which are 
most influential for the development of public attitudes 
toward different techniques? 
 How do stakeholders respond to information about cli-
mate engineering techniques? How does this depend on the 
context and style in which the information is presented? 
3) Ethical, political, and societal aspects
 
The possibilities of albedo modification and green-
house gas removal raise many ethical, political, and 
legal issues, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. At a fun-
damental level, research needs to address: 
 What is the relationship between individual climate 
engineering techniques and human rights? 
Furthermore, the severe uncertainties about the con-
sequences, side effects, and future development of dif-
ferent techniques present challenges that can be 
examined in various ways, for example through the 
development of risk ethics and by putting forward 
challenging normative questions such as: 
 How can the risks of certain techniques be weighed 
against those of severe climate change or climate tipping 
points? 
 How can the difference between unintentional and 
intentional interventions in the climate and the moral 
properties associated with such interventions be better 
understood, and what do these differences mean for the 
development of standpoints on the various proposed tech-
niques in different stakeholder contexts? 
 Could certain techniques transfer risks and costs to 
future generations, and how are they to be evaluated based 
on different assumptions about our duties towards them? 
Historical research could add to this by addressing: 
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 Further questions in the domain of legal research are: 
How might a future liability regime for damages arising 
out of experiments and potential future deployment be 
structured? 
 Would the deployment of some techniques require new 
compensation schemes? How would those relate to existing 
liability schemes?
 How are the precautionary principle and the preventive 
principle, and the different interpretations of each, rele-
vant for regulating research on, and potential deployment 
of, individual climate engineering techniques? 
At the international level, research needs to clarify: 
 How do different climate engineering techniques relate 
to the three existing Rio Conventions (UNFCCC, CBD, 
and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifi-
cation, UNCCD) and other existing legal regimes? 
 How are the goals of each convention affected by the 
prospect of climate engineering, and how would they be 
affected by an actual large-scale implementation of vari-
ous forms of climate engineering? 
 Are there greenhouse gas removal activities that fit 
within the flexible mechanisms of a potential post-Kyoto 
Protocol?
 How do greenhouse gas removal and albedo modifica-
tion techniques and their potential effects relate to the cur-
rent Millennium Development Goals and the anticipated 
Sustainable Development Goals?
4) Governance and regulation
Some of the research questions on governance and 
regulation relate directly to the policy options that are 
presented in Chapter 6, highlighting that these should 
be seen as evolving options, whose prioritisation will 
vary over time and as a function of stakeholder per-
spectives. Questions on governance and regulation of 
the variety of proposed techniques for climate engi-
neering have mostly only recently started to emerge, 
and it is unclear what the advantages and disadvan-
tages are in distinguishing between governance for 
research and governance for deployment. Thus, future 
research must articulate questions like: 
 What (if any) are the differing requirements for political 
processes considering research and deployment of different 
greenhouse gas removal and albedo modification tech-
niques? 
 Is it more sensible for the governance of various types 
and scales of research to be distinct, or to be a component 
of the overall governance of climate engineering implemen-
tation? 
With regard to governance of research, several ques-
tions arise: 
 Which actors should be responsible for monitoring, 
authorising, and/or prohibiting research of various types 
into the different climate engineering techniques? 
 Should the public be engaged in developing governance 
for research, and if so, in what ways? 
 How differentiated should governance be for different 
albedo modification and greenhouse gas removal tech-
niques? 
Also important is the issue of who owns such tech-
niques: 
 What could an intellectual property rights regime look 
like, specifically for climate engineering techniques? 
 Should private investment in techniques for planetary-
scale interventions be allowed, or should some or all tech-
niques be government-owned?
102_EuTRACE Report
Final report of the FP7 CSA project EuTRACE 
The complex socio-technical context within which 
discussions of climate engineering are emerging 
necessitates careful engagement with scientific, legal, 
political, economic, and ethical aspects of climate 
engineering as a basis for sound decision making. As 
outlined in the previous chapters of this report, ques-
tions arise about technological feasibility, global fair-
ness, international cooperation, distribution of costs 
and benefits, and social acceptability. Decision makers 
will thus face complex choices and trade-offs. While 
many general principles that can guide policy develop-
ment are likely to apply to most or all climate engi-
neering techniques, the differing stages of develop-
ment and discourse about the various techniques 
subsumed under the umbrella term “climate engineer-
ing” need to be taken into account when assessing 
policy options and pathways. In this sense, cases in 
which policy development is comparatively advanced 
(for example, OIF) may inform the policy develop-
ment for emerging techniques such as SAI.
This chapter first outlines the policy context within 
which discussions of climate engineering are emerg-
ing (Section 6.1), with a special focus on the EU. Sec-
tion 6.2 proceeds to examine general policy consid-
erations, first at an abstract level and then more 
specifically for climate engineering research govern-
ance and the international governance of climate engi-
neering. Section 6.3 discusses technique-specific pol-
icy considerations for BECCS, OIF, and SAI. Section 
6.4 concludes by summarising the discussion of policy 
options, discusses the difficulties of policy making in 
this area, and reflects on some of the broader ques-
tions that result for science and society.
6.1 Policy context 
The discussion of climate engineering techniques is 
emerging within the broader context of responses to 
climate change, and thus alongside existing and 
potential strategies for mitigation and adaptation. 
These mitigation and adaptation strategies cannot be 
expected to remain unaffected should discussions of 
climate engineering emerge significantly onto national 
and international political agendas. There is much 
concern in the climate engineering research commu-
nity and among other stakeholder groups engaging 
with the topic, that the emergence of the climate engi-
neering discourse might reduce overall willingness to 
invest in mitigation efforts, including diverting atten-
tion or reducing incentives for international emission 
reduction commitments (see also section 3.1).
For the past two decades, the EU has championed the 
internationally agreed target of limiting global warm-
ing to a 2°C increase in global mean surface tempera-
ture compared to pre-industrial levels. The EU has 
committed to reducing its emissions by 80 – 95 % com-
pared to 1990 levels by 2050 as its declared contribu-
tion under the Durban Platform process. It has also 
committed to reducing emissions by 20 %, deriving 
20 % of its power from renewable sources, and to 
improving energy efficiency by 20 % by 2020, also rela-
tive to 1990 (the so-called 20–20–20 targets, whereby 
it should be noted that only the first two are binding). 
However, even if the EU successfully reduces its own 
emissions, it represents only a comparatively small 
and declining (currently around 11 %) proportion of 
global emissions. All other major emitters would need 
to achieve similar reductions in order to actually limit 
global warming to less than 2°C. Model simulations 
6. Policy development 
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and situated within the broader landscape of climate 
action processes and initiatives.
Sustainable development and protection and improve-
ment of the quality of the environment (Lisbon Treaty 
Article 2) are key objectives of EU policy. In these 
policy areas, the EU has established processes for 
ensuring comparatively high standards of environ-
mental and social protection that can be built upon 
when devising governance for climate engineering. 
Should the EU decide to act as a global leader on cli-
mate engineering research, it could draw on this body 
of policies and principles to develop farther-reaching 
propositions for the governance and regulation of 
both climate engineering research and deployment, 
with the goal of informing and guiding international 
discussions.
Discussions of climate engineering governance are 
not emerging in a legal void (see Chapter 4). Custom-
ary international law includes established principles 
such as the duty to inform and the duty to prevent 
transboundary harm. National laws equally apply, for 
example the obligation to conduct environmental 
impact assessments, depending on the jurisdiction in 
question. Furthermore, provisions established to gov-
ern scientific research, such as peer review and ethics 
boards, also apply to climate engineering research. 
The developments at the CBD and LC/LP represent 
the first steps specific to the international governance 
of climate engineering techniques. The LC/LP in par-
ticular has been instrumental in providing legally 
binding rules on the testing and deployment of ocean 
iron fertilisation and has laid the groundwork for reg-
ulating other marine geoengineering activities that 
fall within its scope (see Section 4.1.2). At the level of 
bottom-up norm generation, attempts have been 
made to formulate principles that might contribute to 
the emergence of a collective understanding of what 
constitutes “appropriate behaviour” (March and 
Olsen, 1998) in the emerging field of climate engineer-
ing. This is particularly relevant at the current early 
stages of research, during which positions are not yet 
hardened and perceptions of appropriateness remain 
malleable. Sets of suggestions are contained in the 
“Oxford Principles” (Rayner et al., 2013), which also 
provided the basis for principles derived at the Asilo-
mar International Conference on Climate Interven-
tion Technologies in 2010 (MacCracken et al., 2010), 
indicate that even the most optimistic IPCC scenario, 
RCP 2.6, is “likely” — but far from certain — to limit 
average warming to less than 2°C by the end of the 21st 
century. Moreover, Fuss et al. (2014) found that the 
majority of the scenarios that would limit global 
warming to below 2°C require global net negative 
emissions, i.e., implementation of some form of cli-
mate engineering by greenhouse gas removal, and 
generally already by the second half of this century. 
Despite widespread recognition of this situation, 
emissions have nevertheless increased more rapidly in 
the past few years than envisioned even in the most 
pessimistic IPCC scenario, RCP  8.5. It remains an 
open question whether fixed temperature thresholds 
like the 2°C target might increase political pressure to 
actively deploy climate engineering techniques on a 
scale that would affect the global climate — either 
greenhouse gas removal techniques, as envisioned in 
the “vast majority” (IPCC, 2014d, p. 83) of scenarios 
that underlie RCP 2.6,  or albedo modification and 
related techniques. 
Of course, there are still opportunities to develop 
meaningful international agreements on emission 
reduction targets, for example at the international cli-
mate negotiations in Paris in late 2015. However, even 
though recent negotiations in Lima showed less pro-
nounced differences between developed and develop-
ing countries than previous negotiations, no break-
throughs have been achieved yet. Nevertheless, 
individual actions by states and bilateral agreements, 
as well as new initiatives such as the Climate and 
Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), have raised hopes that 
meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
(including non-CO2 greenhouse gases) are still achiev-
able.
 It is from this context that discussions around climate 
engineering techniques have been emerging onto sci-
entific and (albeit less so) political agendas, although 
overall research funding and political interest in pur-
suing climate engineering currently remain low. It will 
be important for the EU and its member states to 
develop a common understanding of — and shared 
perspective on — climate engineering techniques in 
order to respond to and, if desired, shape potential 
future developments in this area. In this process, the 
vast differences between the various climate engi-
neering techniques need to be carefully accounted for 
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ciples (section 6.2.3). Finally, section 6.2.4 discusses 
considerations specific to the international govern-
ance of climate engineering.
6.2.1 Urgency, sequencing, and multi-
ple uses of climate engineering 
research
There are several considerations that need to be 
applied to the formation of a position on research on 
greenhouse gas removal and albedo modification. 
This section will discuss three key considerations: 
 urgency/timeliness
 sequential versus parallel research approaches
 connection to other research. 
6.2.1.1 Urgency and timeliness of  
climate engineering research
Various arguments can be made about the urgency of 
conducting research on albedo modification. On the 
one hand, one could argue that research should only 
be initiated or scaled up when it is demonstrated that 
there is insufficient time left to achieve climate targets 
via mitigation alone. Conversely, one could also argue 
that research on climate engineering should be initi-
ated or scaled up as long as it is not demonstrated that 
there is sufficient time left to achieve climate targets 
via mitigation alone. Independent of whether long-
term climate targets can be achieved, it can be argued 
that albedo modification represents the only potential 
method for reducing the near-term impacts of climate 
change and should therefore be researched independ-
ent of successes or failures in mitigation efforts. Vari-
ous other intermediate perspectives could be consid-
ered, for instance a scenario in which it would only be 
possible to achieve climate targets through mitigation 
combined with the removal of greenhouse gases. 
Another possible argument is that research should 
mainly focus on key issues that will likely require the 
most time to resolve. A broad range of similar argu-
ments is being applied to research on climate engi-
neering in general, and a particularly critical debate in 
the literature presently concerns field experiments for 
albedo modification techniques. Example applications 
of these and other arguments for and against field 
testing of albedo modification are outlined in Box 6.1.
and recommendations governing the conduct of the 
SPICE project test bed (Stilgoe et al., 2013).
There is no directly applicable governance in place for 
perturbative albedo modification experiments in the 
open environment, beyond existing mechanisms such 
as: peer review; requisite conditions for receiving 
funding; and EIAs in cases where specified thresholds 
of environmental harm may be crossed. Although 
research principles and frameworks are being broadly 
discussed or implemented in specific projects (such as 
in the case of SPICE, see Box 3.5), there is neither 
coherence nor consensus on their value for all field 
experiments. This gap would need to be filled by fur-
ther actions taken at (inter)governmental levels (this 
could be initiated through ministries or by interna-
tional collaborations between research organisations, 
as well as through regional, supranational, and inter-
national organisations) and within the research com-
munity, to ensure the prevention of environmental 
harm and to provide sufficient legitimacy and 
accountability (Schäfer et al., 2013a; Schäfer and Low, 
2014).
6.2 General policy considerations for 
climate engineering 
Building upon the assessment of the legal landscape in 
Chapter 4 and upon the state of research in Chapter 5, 
this section provides some considerations on develop-
ing climate engineering policy in the EU. Choosing 
whether or not to support research on climate engi-
neering — and if so, at what level to support the 
research and how to fund and govern it — will involve 
significant value judgments. Thus, the EuTRACE 
project can only provide guidance on setting priorities 
and developing policies from the perspective of the 
consortium, but will avoid being specifically prescrip-
tive for the European Commission or other bodies. 
This sub-section focuses on general considerations 
that could be applied to developing policy on climate 
engineering. It begins with a discussion of factors that 
should be considered in forming a position on climate 
engineering research — the urgency of such research, 
possible sequences in which the research might be 
conducted, and the multiple uses for which climate 
engineering may create relevant knowledge (section 
6.2.1). It proceeds to discuss policy considerations in 
developing principles for climate engineering govern-
ance (section 6.2.2) and strategies based on these prin-
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In favour 
 There is a widely accepted urgency 
to halt or slow climate change before 
it reaches levels associated with large-
scale dangerous consequences (which 
current knowledge suggests increases 
significantly in probability when  
global warming exceeds 2°C). 
 Specific knowledge gaps (for exam-
ple, on environmental impacts of vari-
ous techniques) can only be closed  
by conducting field tests. Some small-
scale field experiments would have a 
negligible impact and could proceed 
without concern for environmental 
harm (applying a low threshold,  
for example, global average radiative 
forcing equivalent to less than  
10 – 6 W/m2 as suggested by Parson 
and Keith (2013).  
 Beyond climate impacts, robust 
examination of which would need 
very large-scale tests, many aspects 
of albedo modification techniques 
can be tested at small scales, such as 
aerosol particle and cloud microphys-
ics, impacts on stratospheric ozone 
chemistry, etc. These may give early 
insights into whether it is sensible to 
pursue specific techniques.
Box 6.1
Against 
 There is currently insufficient justi-
fication for small-scale field tests of 
albedo modification techniques until 
further modelling and laboratory 
work have sufficiently developed our 
basic understanding of the tech-
niques and their impacts. 
 Regulatory backlash and/or public 
contestation due to a real or percei-
ved lack of legitimacy might endan-
ger other important research efforts, 
particularly for related basic climate 
science (for example, understanding 
basic aerosol–cloud–climate interac-
tions). 
 Limited detectability of effects 
against the background of large 
natural variability means that field 
tests intended to examine climate 
impacts of albedo modification tech-
niques would have to be conducted 
on a very large scale.
 
Summary of arguments in support  
of or against field tests of albedo modification
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and can have spill-over effects and create conflicts. 
Social science research can help the community 
involved in the discourse around climate engineering 
to better understand the concerns associated with 
individual techniques and their development.
It is therefore emphasised that this consortium has 
followed the approach of parallel research, which is 
thus viewed favourably here, since the results allow 
consideration of how normative, social, and political 
factors would influence the potential development of 
climate engineering techniques; how these factors 
influence each other; and how the potential develop-
ment of climate engineering techniques may impact 
the socio-political world.  Future parallel research 
could involve studies on the public acceptance of cli-
mate engineering in more EU countries; for example, 
participatory governance programmes to elicit public 
values on climate engineering via a coordinated 
approach (e.g., deliberative focus groups, social media, 
etc.). The findings could systematically inform policy 
making and the investigation of governance struc-
tures intended to prevent moral hazard and “slippery 
slope” dynamics; simultaneously, natural science and 
engineering research could provide these studies with 
improved information on the potential physical char-
acteristics of various designs for climate engineering 
techniques and their potential environmental impacts.
6.2.1.3 Multiple uses of knowledge: 
Connection to other research 
It has been noted that climate engineering research 
and its broader discourse will be most valuable if it 
does not occur in isolation from other fields and top-
ics, and particularly that it is valuable to place climate 
engineering research in the broader context of mitiga-
tion and adaptation (Bellamy et al., 2013).
Furthermore, a more specific connection can be made 
between climate engineering research and other 
research topics. It is not always easy or even possible 
to distinguish climate engineering research from basic 
research on the climate system and its components, 
which is not aimed at generating knowledge for cli-
mate engineering. Findings in atmospheric physics 
and chemistry, the ocean system, and other research 
topics may also yield insights into climate engineer-
ing, and vice versa. Climate engineering builds on a 
While concerns regarding field tests apply especially 
to albedo modification, some of these concerns also 
apply to higher-risk or higher-impact techniques for 
the removal of greenhouse gases, such as OIF.
6.2.1.2 Sequencing: Advantages and 
disadvantages of a parallel research 
approach
Some arguments call for a sequential approach to cli-
mate engineering research, in which it is usually sug-
gested that one specific form of research should be 
conducted before any other. This may be natural sci-
entific research, based on the assumption that if cli-
mate engineering is found to be technically infeasible, 
then investments in social science research and gov-
ernance development specific to climate engineering 
techniques will have been wasted. It may also be 
social scientific research and governance develop-
ment, based on the assumption that if climate engi-
neering is socially inacceptable, opposed by the public 
and/or ungovernable, then investments in natural sci-
ence research and engineering development specific 
to climate engineering techniques will have been 
wasted.
Conversely, it can be argued that governance is 
required to ensure that research, especially on albedo 
modification techniques, is equipped with an ade-
quate degree of legitimacy, and that social scientific 
research can contribute to better understanding this. 
If a decision to invest in climate engineering research 
and to pursue the development of climate engineering 
options is to be based on a societal discussion on the 
desirability of such a course, then this discussion and 
related research would need to take place before such 
a decision is made. Once technologies have been 
developed to full scale, a discourse on their political 
and social desirability might then be too late to effec-
tively contribute to guiding socio-political decisions. 
Lessons learned from other technologies, such as nan-
otechnologies and genetic modification, show that 
politics and decision making do not simply “follow the 
science”. In particular, field tests in the absence of 
what is perceived as appropriate governance would 
lack legitimacy (Schäfer et al., 2013a), which could 
result in extensive public opposition, in turn render-
ing investments in natural science wasted. Natural 
science experiments take place in a societal context 
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for different fields of interest such as the natural sci-
ences, public awareness, ethical, political, and social 
aspects, as well as governance and regulation. As one 
conclusion of the interdisciplinary EuTRACE project, 
the consortium advocates a parallel research approach 
that simultaneously addresses questions of natural 
scientific and social scientific interest, without priori-
tising one to be carried out before the other.
A great challenge remains for funding agencies and 
governing bodies, and also for research institutes and 
individual researchers, to weigh the arguments that 
speak in favour of and against research into climate 
engineering (Section 5.2). It is not possible to provide 
blanket answers and judgments about the relative 
weighting of these arguments for all the individual 
techniques discussed in this report, since such weight-
ings are strongly dependent on values and stakeholder 
perspectives. Below, in Section 6.3, guiding principles 
are distilled and provided, with an interest in provid-
ing support to the European Commission and the 
broader policy and research community. A conscien-
tious application of these principles in accordance 
with the continuously developing knowledge base on 
climate engineering may facilitate the development of 
European policies on research and on the potential 
implementation of climate engineering techniques 
that are coherent and consistent with the basic princi-
ples upon which broader European research and envi-
ronmental policy are built.
6.2.2 Policy considerations in 
developing principles for climate 
engineering governance
Given the strong arguments outlined above (Section 
5.2) both for and against research, there is a consider-
able debate about whether research into greenhouse 
gas removal and albedo modification should take 
place in the first place; if so, what forms it should take; 
and on the need for, and possible forms of, governance 
for the differing techniques during the various stages 
of their research and development trajectories. In 
order to guide the scientific community and policy 
makers in this debate, several principles have been 
derived for this report, and are presented in this sec-
tion. These principles have been distilled from exist-
ing provisions in EU primary law, supplemented by 
international law and the development of climate 
large body of research, for example on climate change 
mitigation (for greenhouse gas removal techniques, 
especially BECCS), climate and climate change mod-
elling (especially for albedo modification techniques), 
and biogeochemistry (especially for ocean fertilisa-
tion). Analogues for climate engineering (such as vol-
canic eruptions and natural ocean fertilisation events) 
have been studied extensively, independent of any 
specific interest in climate engineering applications. 
Research on greenhouse gas removal and albedo 
modification not only depends on the knowledge base 
established through research in related fields, but also 
provides benefits by feeding back into the broader 
topics of climatic and Earth system research. The 
same holds for technological research, which may find 
applications outside the field of climate engineering 
(for example, gas separation techniques and spraying 
techniques). Climate engineering research could 
therefore create synergies with other scientific issues, 
and may create valuable knowledge wholly independ-
ent of whether or not any climate engineering tech-
niques are ultimately deployed. Similarly, social sci-
ence research can develop insights from investigating 
the debate and dynamics around climate engineering 
that will remain valuable even if climate engineering 
itself were never to be pursued any further. Thus, if a 
decision is made that climate engineering research is 
justified, then from the perspective of efficient use of 
resources it is sensible to look for opportunities to 
maximise synergies such as those described here, but 
without masking the intention of creating knowledge 
for climate engineering.
6.2.1.4 Outlook: a challenge and 
opportunity
Various arguments for and against climate engineer-
ing research, based on different assumptions, have 
been applied to inform the international debate (see 
Section 5.2). Against the background of increasing 
research funding, also in several EU member states, a 
detailed analysis of the range of arguments, including 
those about how and under which conditions to pur-
sue research on greenhouse gas removal and albedo 
modification techniques, could help to inform societal 
debate and political decision making. The previous 
chapter (see Section 5.3) provided guidance on the 
questions that such an analysis might address, sum-
marised in the form of important research questions 
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 Origin: TFEU Article 191 (2) – “Union policy on the 
environment shall aim at a high level of protection 
taking into account the diversity of situations in the 
various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the 
precautionary principle and on the principles that pre-
ventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and 
that the polluter should pay”.
The principle of transparency: The principle of 
transparency calls for the open distribution of rele-
vant information about research activities. The back-
ground for this is that, in order to adequately judge 
whether such activities should be supported, tolerated 
(allowed), or opposed (banned), the scientific, civil 
society, and policy communities have a need for infor-
mation on research activities related to climate engi-
neering. Transparency can also be considered to be of 
instrumental value, as it can foster future scientific 
research by reassuring the public of the integrity of 
the research process (Rayner et al., 2013). Transpar-
ency thus serves both substantive and procedural 
ends, and mechanisms that establish transparency 
will need to take this dual purpose into account 
(Craik and Moore, 2014).
 Origin: TEU Article 11 (2) provides that “the institu-
tions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil 
society” while Article 11 (3) provides that the Com-
mission “shall carry out broad consultations with par-
ties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s 
actions are coherent and transparent”.
The principle of international cooperation 
requires action to be undertaken involving the inter-
national community as far as possible, in order to 
build global legitimacy and peaceful resolution of pos-
sible conflicts of interest and legal disputes. It does 
not follow from this whether climate engineering con-
stitutes a task flowing from the treaties, and it would 
first need to be determined whether climate engineer-
ing reflects the values of the Union. In international 
law, it is derived from the principle of “good neigh-
bourliness”, which is normally extended given the 
concepts applied in states’ agreements. Thus the con-
tent and scope of cooperation are derived from the 
text of the agreements themselves and may normally 
include a commitment to further develop a legal 
engineering governance through the CBD and LC/LP, 
as well as principles from the academic literature 
(Rayner et al., 2013; Morrow, 2009)
The set of principles below may guide policy develop-
ment for a very broad range of techniques throughout 
their respective technological development trajecto-
ries. Intentionally remaining at an abstract level, they 
lay down basic normative parameters that can guide 
decision making in the area of climate engineering. 
Decision making will necessarily require the balanc-
ing of different values; specific policy options will 
therefore embody the values of one or more of the 
principles to various extents, and in their application 
may conflict with each other.
The principles and their implications for climate engi-
neering techniques are as follows:
The minimisation of harm: The risk of individuals 
being exposed to harm from climate engineering, the 
number of people exposed to risks, and the magni-
tude of the potential harm should all be kept as low as 
possible, and serious and irreversible harm should be 
avoided. A stricter reading of this principle may con-
clude that there is an obligation to not cause environ-
mental harm, as well as a duty of prevention as a mat-
ter of due diligence.
The precautionary principle (see also Sections 
4.1.1 – 4.1.3, 4.2.1): The precautionary principle is to be 
applied in situations of scientific uncertainty. It 
demands preventive measures against plausible envi-
ronmental and human health threats that are serious 
or irreversible. Necessary and appropriate precaution-
ary measures may be permitted or even required, 
depending on the formulation of the principle, when 
the best available scientific and technical data indicate 
the existence of risks. In order to decide on appropri-
ate precautionary measures, policy makers need to 
define the appropriate level of protection to be 
applied, and the severity, persistence, and reversibility 
of the potential impact, were a threat to transpire. It is 
important to note, however, that some have drawn a 
different interpretation from the application of the 
precautionary principle: an obligation to conduct 
research, as it represents a possible measure for pre-
venting damage and harm associated with climate 
change (Bodansky, 1996, Bodansky, 2012, Reichwein, 
2012, Ralston, 2009). 
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Independent assessment: An important instrument 
for achieving transparency as well as for the minimi-
sation of harm is the independent assessment of pos-
sible environmental impacts and other impacts of 
research activities involving greenhouse gas removal 
and albedo modification field tests. Particularly in the 
case of expected transboundary impacts, such assess-
ments will be most respected if they are carried out 
through independent regional bodies, international 
bodies, or both (Rayner et al., 2013; Morrow, 2009).
Disclosure mechanisms and transparency: Craik 
and Moore (2014) explore the multiple functions that 
transparency may have as a mode of governance for 
climate engineering research. They identify two over-
arching purposes in this regard: 1) minimisation of 
risks associated with research through disclosure of 
information, which allows regulators, proponents, 
opponents, and other actors to understand the risk 
profile of research and thereby take action toward 
reduction of risks, and 2) trust-building through 
acknowledgement and operationalisation of the nor-
mative right to know about activities that may be of 
interest. Together, these dual roles should help to situ-
ate climate engineering research as a global public 
good in which all interested parties have a stake, are 
able to assess their interests, and to understand where 
opportunities occur for their engagement in decision 
making. Furthermore, Craik and Moore (2014) iden-
tify three procedural mechanisms which might be 
applied to serve these functions: environmental 
impact assessment (see also the previous point), 
research registries, and information clearinghouses. 
Particularly for the governance of field experiments 
into albedo modification techniques, they encourage 
regulatory bodies at the national and international 
levels to undertake actions toward the implementa-
tion of these procedural mechanisms.
International codes of conduct: Hubert and Reich-
wein (2015) explore a model of an informal, harmonis-
ing draft code of conduct to govern and regulate cli-
mate engineering, focusing on the near-term prospect 
of scientific research and development of these pro-
posed techniques, and set against the background of 
advancing scientific, political, social, and economic 
discussions on this subject. Their analysis of a wide 
range of existing legal sources  suggests that this 
topic is situated within a large body of evolving inter-
regime. Also, as a principle, it encompasses many 
other stand-alone legal obligations, both procedural 
and substantive, including information sharing, par-
ticipation in decision making, EIA, information 
exchange, consultation and notification, provision of 
emergency information, and transboundary enforce-
ment of environmental standards.
 Origin: TEU Article 4 (4) provides that “the Union 
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, 
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Treaties”. TEU Article 8 (1) provides for 
cooperation with neighbouring countries “founded 
on the values of the Union”.  
Greenhouse gas removal and albedo modification — 
or at least some of the techniques — may be under-
stood as public goods, allowing for the regulation of 
such techniques in the public interest (Rayner et al., 
2013). The view of both forms of techniques as a pub-
lic good is based on concerns about the future orien-
tation of research and the role of private enterprises 
and commercial interests. These concerns are often 
based on the profit orientation of the private sector, 
the possible limitation of accessibility if such tech-
niques would be commercialised, and the potential 
bypassing or neglect of the socio-economic, environ-
mental, regulatory, and humanitarian dimensions of 
certain climate engineering techniques by private 
enterprises (Robock, 2008; Blackstock and Long, 
2010; Shepherd et al., 2009).
6.2.3 Strategies based on principles
Based on these principles, different strategies have 
been proposed that could be applied across all climate 
engineering approaches, including:
Early public engagement: The demand for early 
public engagement in research and development of 
albedo modification and greenhouse gas removal 
techniques can be grounded in reflections upon pro-
cedural justice (see Section 3.1.3). It is also instrumen-
tal in building trust in scientific activities (Bodansky, 
2012) and in improving the quality of socially robust 
scientific and technological solutions, especially in 
situations of uncertainty (Stirling, 2008; Carr et al., 
2013; Corner and Pidgeon, 2010; Stilgoe et al., 2013).
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gate” process), set up by funding agencies, in which an 
expert panel assesses research along specific criteria. 
In Stilgoe et al. (2013), these are: 
 risks identified, managed, and deemed 
acceptable;
 compliant with relevant regulations;
 clear communication of the nature and purpose 
of the project;
  applications and impacts described and 
mechanisms put in place to review these;
 mechanisms identified to understand public 
and stakeholder views.
The principles of transparency and participation may 
suggest establishing a platform for disclosure of rele-
vant information regarding climate engineering- 
related research and/or deployment activities. Infor-
mation could be provided on risks and opportunities 
associated with individual activities, as well as on the 
rationales for policy decisions. Transparency can also 
be aided through independent environmental and 
social impact assessments to generate relevant infor-
mation for the public. Binding standards for reporting 
can assist comparability between individual activities. 
The realisation of some of these principles, demands, 
and instruments, especially in the governance of 
small-scale field tests of albedo modification tech-
niques, but also similarly for perturbative experiments 
such as open-ocean OIF experiments, requires ade-
quate governance mechanisms and institutions at 
national and international levels that currently do not 
exist (Schäfer et al., 2013a); furthermore, it can be 
anticipated that new governance gaps may emerge, 
requiring the creation of new rules and institutions. 
On the other hand, some have expressed scepticism 
over whether international governance of research is 
necessary or even possible, given the present stage of 
development of many techniques (Victor et al., 2013; 
Morgan and Ricke, 2010; Parson and Keith, 2013).
national norms established in other contexts, which 
even if they are not directly applicable can make an 
important contribution to the elaboration of guidance 
on the  responsible  conduct of climate engineering 
research at all levels. They also explore issues related 
to legal form, taking into account issues related to the 
high degree of regime interaction and normative over-
lap implied by the subject matter of climate engineer-
ing, and the need to develop and harmonise measures 
at various levels and involve different actors. This 
approach could serve as a possible flexible and adap-
tive governance approach to advance and coordinate 
the efforts of governments, existing or new interna-
tional organisations and treaty bodies, and non-state 
actors such as NGOs, business, scientific academies, 
research institutes, and individual scientists in 
addressing this topic.
Responsible innovation and anticipatory govern-
ance: Stilgoe et al. (2013) develop a “framework for 
responsible innovation” in which an interactive proc-
ess allows scientists to convene with stakeholders to 
exchange views on the (ethical) acceptability, sustain-
ability, and societal desirability of their work (Stilgoe 
et al., 2013; citing Schomberg 2011). This can be situ-
ated alongside wider efforts toward anticipatory gov-
ernance: a strategic approach to enabling early inves-
tigative and regulatory actions in emerging 
(technological) debates. A key tenet here is that pre-
cautionary or predictive approaches base action on 
reducing uncertainty and reacting as much as possible 
to a “known” future. Anticipatory practices seek to 
navigate uncertainty and to forestall technocratic 
management (prediction) or an indeterminate state of 
inaction (precaution) by integrating diverse bodies of 
knowledge from scientific and societal constituencies, 
and by pointing out key nodes and modes of interac-
tion as context to decision making (Barben et al., 
2008; Guston, 2014; Karinen and Guston, 2010; Foley 
et al., 2015 forthcoming). 
This could enable early warnings, public scrutiny of 
science, public legitimacy and inclusiveness, and pro-
vide the flexibility and responsiveness necessary to 
respond to emerging knowledge and public contesta-
tion. In the context of climate engineering, with spe-
cific insights drawn from the SPICE project (see Sec-
tion 3.1.4), the responsible innovation framework 
envisions an institutional review process (a “stage- 
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may, as a result, noticeably affect the global popula-
tion, it has been argued that the scope of public 
engagement should therefore be global (Preston, 2012, 
Preston, 2013). 
Democratic processes at the national level alone 
appear insufficient for decisions on deploying tech-
niques that could have transboundary effects. Deci-
sions affecting a shared natural resource and common 
heritage are often seen to require a cooperative legal 
framework in which the sovereignty and interests of 
all states are taken into account (Abelkop and Carlson, 
2012). However, agreements involving the global com-
mons that are acceptable to all parties may be impos-
sible to reach due to significantly different interests 
that are grounded in geopolitical, economic, and 
related issues (Athanasiou and Baer, 2002, SRMGI, 
2012). Furthermore, international decision-making 
structures often exclude or marginalise those who are 
especially vulnerable (Jamieson, 1996; Pogge, 2002; 
Corner and Pidgeon, 2010,; Gardiner, 2011; Joronen et 
al., 2011). Procedural norms (see Box 6.2) provide 
guidance on how these difficulties and shortcomings 
can be overcome.
6.2.4 Policy considerations for  
international governance of climate 
engineering
Taking into account the possible side effects and risks 
associated with different climate engineering tech-
niques, the question arises: who can legitimately 
decide on climate engineering deployment or even 
research (especially field tests), and through what 
processes? Answers to this question can be derived 
from, or related to, principles of procedural justice, 
which deals with the idea of fairness in the processes 
that resolve disputes and allocate resources, benefits 
and costs. Claims of procedural justice are often 
based on the assumption that to be morally accepta-
ble, all those affected by a decision must be notified 
and consulted and must have the ability to contribute 
to the process of decision making, or have their inter-
ests represented (Jamieson, 1996; Morrow et al., 2009; 
Rayner et al., 2009; Svoboda et al., 2011; Carr et al., 
2013; Rayner et al., 2013). As climate engineering is 
designed to address a global problem and therefore 
Procedural norms 
There are several procedural norms that could help facilitate and improve the 
quality and legitimacy of climate engineering decision making:
 notification and consultation of those affected as well as the wider public and 
other nations (Morrow et al., 2009; Svoboda et al., 2011; Carr et al., 2013; 
Rayner et al., 2013);
 fostering public engagement early in the research phase (Poumadère 
et al., 2011); 
 open preparation and execution of environmental as well as societal impact 
assessments prior to conducting activities that can have significant 
environmental or other impacts (Abelkop and Carlson, 2012); 
 transparency and public disclosure of the rationales for policy decisions on 
climate engineering techniques (Craik and Moore, 2014);
 providing a mechanism for appeal and revision to ensure fairness (Daniels and 
Sabin, 1997, Tuana, 2013).
Box 6.2
 
112_EuTRACE Report
Final report of the FP7 CSA project EuTRACE 
an uptake of climate engineering in future discussions 
at the UNFCCC. It also demonstrates the scientific 
and policy relevance of climate engineering to the 
problem of climate change. Whether the fact that cli-
mate engineering has been taken into account by the 
IPCC will lead to its inclusion in future UNFCCC 
COPs cannot be foreseen, but the visibility of the 
issue in general can be expected to increase. 
6.2.4.2 The Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD)
Milestones in the development of climate engineering 
governance at the CBD were the COPs in the years 
2008 (decision on ocean fertilisation), 2010 (decision 
on climate engineering more broadly), and 2012 
(where several decisions were adopted that relate to 
climate engineering). This is of considerable relevance 
given the almost universal validity of the CBD, with 
the key exception of the USA, which is not a member 
state. While these decisions are not legally binding (as 
described by Proelss (2009) for the 2008 decision) 
and therefore far from providing a legally binding 
moratorium, the call for science-based, global, trans-
parent, and effective control and regulatory mecha-
nisms, adopted with consent by all parties, conveys a 
strong political will to engage in further discussion on 
and regulation of climate engineering at the interna-
tional level. Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, 
the CBD Decision could provide guidance for future 
regulatory activities. 
6.2.4.3 The London Convention and 
Protocol (LC/LP)
Parties to the LC/LP have developed governance for 
marine climate engineering activities at a compara-
tively rapid pace over recent years (as outlined in Sec-
tion 4.1.2). As a well-developed legal instrument for 
the protection of the marine environment, the LC/LP 
provide a suitable institutional setting for comprehen-
sively addressing marine climate engineering activi-
ties, with the major consideration that their scope 
remains specifically limited to the protection of the 
marine environment. It has also been pointed out that 
regulation of climate engineering within the LC/LP 
may impact not only research on climate engineering, 
but also basic research on the marine environment 
more generally (Hubert, 2011).
Many possible variants for an institutionalisation of 
climate engineering governance have been set forth in 
the literature (Cicerone, 2006; Victor, 2008; Davies, 
2009; Morrow et al., 2009; Virgoe, 2009; Benedick, 
2011; Bodansky, 2011; Bodansky, 2012; Lloyd and 
Oppenheimer, 2011; Galaz, 2012; Dilling and Hauser, 
2013; Morgan et al., 2013; Zürn and Schäfer, 2013; Bar-
rett, 2008b). Currently, three institutional loci are at 
the centre of attention: the UNFCCC, the CBD, and 
the LC/LP. The following subsections will briefly 
review the state of discussions on climate engineering 
within these frameworks, highlight possible ways for-
ward for international governance of SAI, OIF, and 
BECCS, and examine possible actions the EU could 
take.
6.2.4.1 The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)
To date, the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties 
(COPs) have remained silent on climate engineering, 
which is of little surprise given that alternatives to 
conventional mitigation are frequently considered a 
source of moral hazard, threatening the premise of 
the current climate regime that is based on reducing 
emissions. Although the UNFCCC, with its explicit 
focus on climate change, could provide a viable frame-
work for the climate engineering debate to unfold, the 
present provisions of the treaty only allow for consid-
eration of techniques for greenhouse gas removal. No 
straightforward avenue is currently available for 
incorporating albedo modification techniques into 
the discussions. Principally this could be done by pos-
ing climate engineering as an additional response 
strategy to anthropogenic climate change; however, as 
noted, a widespread concern is that this could be det-
rimental to the negotiations around CO2 reductions. 
Beyond the treaty bodies, the only specific activity 
related to climate engineering within the broader 
UNFCCC regime is the inclusion of a brief discussion 
of climate engineering methods in the Fifth Assess-
ment Report of the IPCC (IPCC, 2014c). However, 
since the IPCC has a purely scientific advisory func-
tion (to analyse existing science and identify priority 
needs for further research activities), this cannot be 
interpreted as having legal relevance, although it 
might contribute to a political dynamic that leads to 
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biodiversity. A functional linkage between the two 
institutions could potentially contribute to providing 
a more comprehensive regulatory approach, but this 
may be overshadowed by the potential for political 
and legal conflict between the individual elements of 
such a regulatory structure. The legal relationship 
between the CBD and UNFCCC is still a matter of 
discussion (see Wolfrum and Matz, 2003).
A possible way to prevent political and legal inter- 
institutional conflict could be seen in the conclusion 
of memoranda of understanding negotiated by the 
institutions’ secretariats and then submitted to the 
respective COPs. Specifically for the CBD and the LC/
LP, given the apparent similarities between the two 
conventions’ views on climate engineering as evi-
denced by their consistent approaches as well as 
mutual references contained in their statements on 
the objectives and the future of climate engineering 
regulation, this seems to be an achievable near-term 
goal. That said, while the CBD can claim a large 
degree of input legitimacy for its decisions arising 
from its quasi-universal membership, it suffers from 
the general nature of its provisions, the legally non-
binding character of its COP Decisions on climate 
engineering, and its limited focus on biodiversity. 
Similarly, the LC/LP is characterised by its limited 
focus on protection of the marine environment from 
the dumping of waste and other matter, and its impact 
is further reduced by the limited number of parties 
that have ratified or acceded to it. Finally, the norma-
tive strength of the UNFCCC must also be consid-
ered as being limited in light of its exclusive focus on 
the climate and its often cumbersome negotiation 
process. 
These weaknesses of the emerging global regime raise 
the question of the potential role of regional suprana-
tional entities such as the EU in the future governance 
of climate engineering. While climate engineering 
governance at the EU level would not provide a solu-
tion to the deficiencies of governance at the global 
level, it has the potential to initiate a process of har-
monisation across instruments and to substantiate 
and complement governance emerging at the interna-
tional level.
6.2.4.4 Possible future development 
of the emerging regime complex on 
climate engineering
This section provides an outlook on possible develop-
ments in climate engineering governance based on 
the preceding sections, and ties in the analysis of ethi-
cal, legal, and political considerations in the climate 
engineering discourse with that of past developments 
and current features of the existing climate engineer-
ing governance landscape, along with an analysis 
focusing on what an EU perspective on this might be.
The comparatively rapid development of international 
governance for climate engineering over the past cou-
ple of years at the CBD and the LC/LP suggest a will-
ingness of states to cooperate on the issue of climate 
engineering. In the medium term, this might signal 
the emergence of a regime complex consisting of reg-
ulatory provisions that include the CBD and the LC/
LP, as well as potentially the UNFCCC (given the 
considerations noted above), supported by strategies 
designed to manage interplay between these institu-
tions and by scientific assessments from the IPCC 
(Zürn and Schäfer, 2013).
The concept of a regime complex describes a situation 
in which there is no “fully integrated [institution] that 
[imposes] regulation through comprehensive, hierar-
chical rules” (Keohane and Victor, 2011), but rather a 
set of separate, fragmented institutions that partly 
overlap and might complement or contradict each 
other. From the above discussion, it is clear that there 
is no single body that at present is likely to claim the 
authority to comprehensively govern climate engi-
neering. Instead, there is evidence for the emergence 
of different forms of governance in different institu-
tional settings, most notably the CBD and the LC/LP.
The limited focus of the UNFCCC on climate protec-
tion could potentially lead to a “blending-out” of the 
non-climatic effects of climate engineering activities, 
such as effects on ecosystems and biodiversity, if it 
became the main institution for handling the issue. 
These could, however, be accounted for by the CBD; 
here, the inverse problem occurs, as the CBD, with its 
limited applicability focusing on issues related to bio-
diversity, does not address the effects of climate engi-
neering techniques outside of their relationship to 
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options that are more uniquely suited to individual 
technologies. 
6.3.1 Policy development for BECCS
Scientific state of the art and technological matu-
rity: As described in section 2.1.2, the technologies 
involved in BECCS are not yet fully developed and it 
is currently unclear how effectively they might be 
scaled up to the sectoral-scale deployment required to 
have an impact on the global carbon cycle at the level 
classified as climate engineering. However, a substan-
tial role for BECCS is envisaged in many of the sce-
narios that succeed in limiting temperature rise to 
2°C in the 21st century. The “vast majority” (101 out of 
116) of scenarios that underlie the IPCC’s RCP 2.6, the 
only scenario in which meeting the 2°C goal is consid-
ered “likely” (IPCC, 2014d), include some form of 
greenhouse gas removal, especially BECCs and affor-
estation. BECCS is also included in “many” (235 out of 
653) of the scenarios that underlie RCP 4.5 (Fuss et al., 
2014). 
Early commercial-scale CCS projects are operational 
and CO2 capture, transport, and storage technologies 
are proven (Scott et al., 2013) and are directly applica-
ble to BECCS. CO2 capture from pure biomass burn-
ing (or from fossil fuel and biomass co-firing in pro-
portions capable of delivering a net CO2 removal) can 
initially adapt CCS CO2 capture technologies, but fur-
ther research and development on capture technolo-
gies specific to biomass will be required to maximise 
efficiency (IEAGHG, 2011, Bracmort and Lattanzio, 
2013).
Nevertheless, the possible scales and rates of deploy-
ment for BECCS are primarily technically limited by 
the availability of sustainably produced biomass and 
the availability of pre-existing CCS infrastructures for 
CO2 transport and storage (IEA, 2011, see also Section 
2.1.2 in this report). 
Concerns associated with BECCS: Provided the 
required resources (biomass growth and processing 
facilities, CO2 storage) are available, small-scale initial 
deployment of BECCS could take place largely within 
national jurisdictions, so that local and national 
authorities would be primarily responsible for manag-
ing any resulting local environmental effects and soci-
6.3 Technique-specific policy 
considerations
The following discussion on the development of pol-
icy options examines the three individual techniques 
(BECCS, OIF, and SAI) that are focused on in this 
report. Each technique-specific section begins by 
summarising the state of the art of scientific knowl-
edge (see Chapter 2 for more extensive discussion) 
and then goes on to consider the state of technological 
maturity. 
This is followed by a brief discussion of the particular 
concerns associated with a given technique. However, 
it is also valuable to note a number of common con-
cerns applicable to all three example techniques, 
including: 
 siphoning resources away from research in 
other areas; 
 decreasing overall willingness to invest in 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions; 
 creating forms of socio-technical lock-in due 
to vested interests and institutional inertia; 
 having resource demands that significantly 
exceed initial estimates; 
 causing resistance to and contestation of scientific 
activities in the open environment that are technically 
related to climate engineering technologies but do not 
share its intents, especially if field research is con-
ducted under conditions of insufficient accountability 
and legitimacy. 
An example of the latter could be perturbative tests of 
cloud microphysics, where understanding would be 
advanced for both albedo modification approaches as 
well as for basic climate science (see Section 5.1). 
Finally, each section examines the current state of 
legal and norm development before discussing the 
policy context and range of policy considerations. A 
number of cross-cutting options were discussed in 
Section 6.2 on pursuing research, deriving principles 
for governance and for enacting policy at the EU and 
international levels. Here the focus is placed on 
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framework for the geological storage of CO2 captured 
from large anthropogenic sources, and associated revi-
sion to the EU ETS recognises CCS as mitigation. 
The 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) 
and Fuel Quality Directive (2009/30/EC) provide the 
background to current EU efforts to develop biomass 
as an energy resource. The Renewable Energy Direc-
tive requires that by 2020, 20 % of all energy used in 
the EU must come from “renewable sources”, includ-
ing biomass, bioliquids and biogas (translating into 
different targets for individual member states). The 
2030 Council conclusions agree to an EU-level 27 % 
target for 2030, but without binding contributions 
from individual member states. This growing incen-
tive for biomass-derived energy has raised concerns 
over the risk of indirect land use change (ILUC), land 
conversions resulting from displacement of food 
crops that might counter the direct carbon saving. 
At the international level, the 2011 UNFCCC COP 
adopted modalities and procedures for including CCS 
within the CDM (Dixon et al., 2013). The Decision 
does not explicitly distinguish between the storage of 
carbon from conventional uses in, for example, coal-
fired power plants and the storage of carbon from 
bioenergy generation or biofuel production, but the 
eligibility of any specific proposed project is subject to 
agreement between the individual parties. After the 
2011 Durban COP, the May 2012 meeting of the execu-
tive board of the CDM in Bonn released procedures 
for the submission and consideration of a new base-
line and monitoring methodology for CCS CDM 
project activities, along with guidelines for project 
design. 
BECCS policy context and considerations: 
 EU policy attention to BECCS may be warranted 
for three reasons: 
 the suggested importance of BECCS to achieving 
decarbonisation (IPCC 2013a, 2014a, 2014b); 
 the experience that establishing deployment of 
technologies reliant on large resources and infrastruc-
tures requires many decades;
etal responses. However, BECCS on the scale consid-
ered in the IPCC RCP 2.6 scenario would very likely 
have noticeable transboundary environmental, eco-
nomic, and societal impacts. These could be both 
positive (for example, CO2 removal; biomass produc-
tion creating long-term economic activity in rural 
regions) and negative (for example, biomass produc-
tion displacing food crops and thereby reducing food 
security; reducing biodiversity; depleting water sup-
plies). While these impacts could be further explored 
in theoretical and small-scale studies, practical experi-
ence at full operational scale would likely be necessary 
to generate an adequate level of understanding to 
make an informed decision about its large-scale imple-
mentation, as well as to inform the technical develop-
ment of BECCS processes in terms of sustainability, 
CO2 removal efficiency, and the characterisation and 
reduction of associated impacts.
Legal and norm development: From an EU per-
spective, at present there are several regulatory and 
policy regimes that set the contemporary context for 
BECCS, including: 
 EU greenhouse gas emission reduction targets 
(the 20–20–20 targets, see Section 6.1); 
 the EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS); 
 the EU CCS Directive (Directive 2009/31/EC) 
and associated policies; 
 the EU Renewable Energy Directive 
(Directive 2009/28/EC) and renewable policies; 
 the Fuel Quality Directive (Directive 2009/30/EC); 
the CDM under the UNFCCC, particularly in 
the context of a broader international setting.
 
The recent European Council 2030 climate and 
energy conclusions agree to a binding target of a 40 % 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, further aim-
ing for an 80 % reduction by 2050. The primary EU 
mechanism to drive this decarbonisation is the EU 
ETS. Under the ETS, accounting for and incentivising 
greenhouse gas removal is currently ineligible — a 
tonne of CO2 (or equivalent) removed does not “create” 
a saleable equivalent emissions permit. The 2009 CCS 
Directive (under review in 2015) provides the legal 
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Given the public opposition to CCS in some Euro-
pean countries, it seems important to enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of decision making by allowing 
publics to voice their hopes and concerns about 
BECCS and to contribute to decision-making proc-
esses. This should particularly include decisions about 
the further development of BECCS and about poten-
tial sites for BECCS power plants and CO2 storage 
sites.
Comprehensive lifecycle assessments appraise 
projects independently according to criteria for envi-
ronmental effectiveness (this would need to incorpo-
rate all emissions generated by a BECCS project over 
its lifecycle), as well as their social and environmental 
sustainability (see Section 2.1.2 for details). Activity 
boundaries are critical when assessing the costs and 
benefits of individual projects (see Section 4.1.1), as are 
other aspects of how the lifecycle assessment is car-
ried out, including the standards that are applied (and 
how they are set, monitored and enforced). Crucially, 
accounting for emission reductions through BECCS 
in the UNFCCC may not be comprehensive, as par-
ties are presently able to opt in or out of accounting 
for certain activities under Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (LULUCF; see section 4.1.2 and 
IEA, 2011). It would also be challenging to account for 
net emission reductions in Annex I countries, as the 
resources (such as biofuels) are often produced in 
other countries (among them non-Annex I Parties) 
that employ different accounting and reporting 
requirements (IEA, 2011).
Finally, based on these considerations, one option for 
policy development at the EU level would be to build 
on the European Commission’s proposal for the intro-
duction of EU-wide binding sustainability criteria for 
solid and gaseous biomass, thereby coordinating and 
establishing linkages between the existing frame-
works for regulating biomass and CCS, e.g., the CCS 
Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive dis-
cussed above. This could, for example, take the form 
of an inter-agency panel consisting of members from 
different relevant EU agencies.
 the opposition that is becoming evident in some 
European countries against proposals for developing 
BECCS. 
Should the EU envisage a substantial role for BECCS 
in its domestic emissions reduction strategy, steps 
toward this would include research and technology 
development, infrastructure provision, market de-
velopment and societal engagement. Research and 
development, would need to focus both on specific 
technologies and on analysis and development of 
assessment criteria to account for removed CO2 
across the full BECCS system (this could build on the 
current development of sustainability criteria for 
bioenergy). 
As stated above, the rate and scale at which BECCS 
could be undertaken depends primarily on biomass 
supply, and on the provision of CCS infrastructures. 
The identification, assessment, and approval of large 
capacities of geological storage for CO2 and the con-
struction of CO2 transportation networks have long 
(decadal) lead- and build times. Should substantial 
BECCS deployment be desired in the EU, the prior 
acceptance and deployment of CCS is likely to be a 
precondition.    
With respect to market development, some propo-
nents of BECCS suggest creating economic incentives 
for net carbon reductions through the inclusion of 
BECCS in carbon markets. It is argued that this would 
also accelerate technological development (IEAGHG, 
2011, EASAC, 2013). Others argue the opposite: that 
BECCS should be excluded from carbon markets to 
avoid, among other effects, the displacement of other, 
perhaps more sustainable, mitigation options 
(McLaren, 2012). A possible approach to limiting this 
risk could be to set initial contribution quotas (analo-
gous to those suggested for the contribution of first-
generation bioenergy towards renewable energy tar-
gets, cf. EU COM (2012) 595 final) with specified 
review and assessment periods.
In relation to CCS, it has been argued that far-reach-
ing policy interventions at an early stage of develop-
ment can lead to overregulation that is arguably detri-
mental to research and development. However, given 
the concerns noted above, the following points 
emerge as potential policy interventions.
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scientific research proposals should be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis using an assessment framework to 
be developed by the Scientific Groups responsible for 
providing scientific and technical advice. In 2010, an 
Ocean Fertilisation Assessment Framework (OFAF) 
was adopted by the LC/LP for determining whether 
proposed ocean fertilisation research represents 
“legitimate scientific research”, as well as a component 
on environmental assessment (London Convention 
and Protocol, 2010). 
In October 2013, the Contracting Parties to the Lon-
don Protocol adopted an amendment to the agree-
ment, which provides a legally binding mechanism to 
regulate the placement of matter in the oceans for the 
purpose of OIF, and allows for the possible regulation 
of other “marine geoengineering” activities that fall 
within the scope of the Protocol in the future. The 
London Protocol has thus become the first interna-
tional treaty that expressly addresses a particular cli-
mate engineering technique in a legally binding man-
ner and, moreover, has worded its amendment to 
allow for expansion to a considerable number of cli-
mate engineering techniques. Ratification of these 
amendments by the Contracting Parties is still pend-
ing at the time of writing.
Membership of the LC and LP is not universal, and 
not all states that are parties to the LC are also parties 
to the LP. Although most member states of the EU are 
party to the LP, the EU itself cannot become a party 
because it is not a “State” as required under Article 24 
(1) of the London Protocol. While the amendment 
thus only binds the States Parties to the LP, the notion 
of “global rules and standards” in terms of UNCLOS 
Article 210 (6) may be interpreted as referring to the 
rules and procedures codified in and adopted under 
the LC/LP, which would result in their incorporation 
into the UNCLOS regime (which is binding upon sig-
nificantly more states, as well as the EU).
UNCLOS also applies to ocean fertilisation activities 
and includes the general obligation, set out in Article 
192, to protect and preserve the marine environment, 
as well as a more specific obligation, in Article 194, to 
take all measures necessary to ensure that activities 
under a state’s jurisdiction or control are conducted 
so as not to cause damage by pollution to other states 
and their environment.
6.3.2 Policy development for OIF
Scientific state of the art and technological matu-
rity: As described in section 2.1.7, thirteen field exper-
iments have examined OIF. The findings demonstrate 
potential for inducing significant plankton blooms 
that persist over several weeks in some regions of the 
oceans, but also that the actual increases in CO2 
uptake and drawdown are very uncertain (Boyd et al., 
2007; Buesseler et al., 2008; Williamson et al., 2012b). 
Studies suggest a maximum potential uptake of about 
3 Gt CO2  per year for fertilisation of the entire South-
ern Ocean (Oschlies et al., 2010a), noting that storage 
of CO2  would not be permanent, since it would 
mostly resurface after several centuries due to the 
thermohaline ocean circulation. The technique’s 
effectiveness and feasibility as a carbon sequestration 
method remain highly uncertain. Due to this uncer-
tainty, as well as controversies associated with its eco-
logical and societal impacts, there has been relatively 
little work on issues of technical feasibility (e.g., sus-
tained provision of sufficient amounts of soluble iron, 
effective delivery techniques, technical requirements 
for ships and the numbers of ships that would be 
needed, frequency and distribution of fertilisation, 
forecasting of particularly susceptible gyres, etc.). 
Concerns associated with OIF: This technique 
would be highly environmentally disruptive if imple-
mented at a scale sufficiently large to impact the global 
CO2 budget. If deployed at large scale, OIF could have 
severe or irreversible side effects on marine ecosys-
tems; for example, by disrupting the food web and 
affecting biodiversity (Chisholm et al., 2001; Strong et 
al., 2009a), as well as by influencing the atmosphere 
through the production of gases such as dimethylsul-
phide (DMS) and N2O (Lawrence, 2002, Jin and Gru-
ber, 2003; Liss et al., 2005). The complexity of the 
ocean system and the lack of scientific knowledge of 
its structure and functioning increase the uncertain-
ties surrounding the effects of OIF.
Legal and norm development: The legislative his-
tory of marine climate engineering governance at the 
LC/LP dates back to 2008 with the adoption of a non-
binding resolution that no ocean fertilisation activities 
other than “legitimate scientific research” should be 
allowed, given the present state of knowledge (Lon-
don Convention and Protocol, 2008), and stating that 
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simulations (see section 2.2.1 for further details). 
Given the substantial risks known to be associated 
with continued global warming (IPCC 2013a, 2014a, 
2014b), reducing the rate at which global mean tem-
peratures are increasing would be expected to reduce 
some of the impacts of climate change, including sea 
level rise, heat waves, and the rate of sea ice decline. 
Modelling also indicates that the increase in the inten-
sity of the hydrological cycle expected from global 
warming could be reduced by reducing global average 
temperatures; lessening the magnitude of changes to 
precipitation patterns, the intensity of floods and 
droughts, and changes to local weather (Kravitz et al., 
2014b). However, modelling studies have shown that 
SAI cannot simultaneously restore both global mean 
temperature and global mean precipitation changes to 
an earlier state (Schmidt et al., 2012a; Tilmes et al., 
2013), thereby necessitating some form of trade-off 
between these potential benefits.
Research has shown that there would also be numer-
ous inequities, uncertainties, and risks associated with 
an implementation of SAI, including a non-homogene-
ous cooling (especially as a function of latitude) asso-
ciated with various risks that include modifying large-
scale weather patterns, the distribution of pre- 
cipitation, and impacts on ozone (Kravitz et al.; 2014b, 
Ferraro et al., 2014; Tilmes et al., 2009; Heckendorn et 
al., 2009). The inability to simultaneously restore glo-
bal mean temperature and precipitation patterns 
would mean that if global mean temperature were 
restored to some earlier state there would be substan-
tial, novel hydrological changes that may prove detri-
mental to some regions.
Knowledge about the effectiveness and impacts of 
SAI originates primarily from a range of modelling 
studies. Early experimental designs for field tests have 
recently been set forth in the peer-reviewed literature 
(Dykema et al., 2014; Keith et al., 2014) but have not 
yet been conducted.
SAI is therefore at an early stage of development. 
Large uncertainties regarding the technical feasibility 
of this technique remain: for example, whether it 
would be possible to produce aerosol particles at the 
appropriate size and injection rate to avoid coagula-
tion (larger particles may be less efficient at reflecting 
sunlight and fall out of the atmosphere more quickly), 
OIF policy context and considerations: In October 
2013, the Contracting Parties to the London Protocol 
adopted by consensus an amendment to provide a 
legally binding mechanism to regulate the placement 
of matter for ocean fertilisation. The amendment will 
enter into force 60 days after it is ratified by two-
thirds of the Contracting Parties. 
The EU has very successfully taken the role of an 
“enforcement organ” of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) in the shipping context. This is 
due to the fact that the EU has the power to enforce 
its legal measures by way of the “treaty infringement 
procedure”. This would require the EU to enact meas-
ures that correspond with the LP amendment or sub-
stantiate its provisions if, and to the extent to which, 
these establish minimum standards.
A central policy option for the EU would be for the 
European Commission to urge all LP member states 
to ratify the amendment and for all LC members to 
become parties to the LP. Recent developments in the 
governance of OIF arguably place this technique at 
the most advanced stage of legal and norm develop-
ment among climate engineering techniques. As such, 
it might provide insights into overall developments in 
climate engineering governance and accordingly guid-
ance for developing governance for other techniques. 
There are other instructive aspects of this case relat-
ing to precipitous commercial development and rogue 
private actors, protection of global commons areas, 
and the societal acceptability and public controversy 
associated with climate engineering. 
In principle, EU member states could also be bound 
via incorporation of the standards to the LP by refer-
ence into UNCLOS (Art. 210(6) UNCLOS). Further-
more, the EU could enact binding measures consist-
ent with the requirements set out in the amendment. 
Future measures could potentially aim to provide for 
the effective implementation of the LP. 
6.3.3 Policy development for SAI
Scientific state of the art and technological matu-
rity: The artificial injection of large amounts of aero-
sol particles or their precursor gases into the strato-
sphere (SAI) could produce a global cooling effect of 
up to several degrees Celsius, according to model 
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Preston, 2013); altering humanity’s relationship with, 
and sense of responsibility toward, the natural world 
(Buck, 2012, Tuana, 2013); difficulties in framing and 
conducting engagement with members or representa-
tives of civil society (Corner et al., 2012); and the pos-
sibility of resistance to and contestation of related 
scientific activities in the open environment (Schäfer 
et al., 2013a; Parker, 2014). 
Legal and norm development: At present, there are 
few international governance mechanisms that would 
directly apply to SAI and other planetary albedo mod-
ification research, even though international custom-
ary law and a number of existing regimes at the UN 
level may apply in piecemeal fashion or could conceiv-
ably incorporate SAI governance within their man-
dates (Bodansky, 1996; Virgoe, 2009; Lin, 2009; Rey-
nolds, 2011; Bodle et al., 2013; Zürn and Schäfer, 2013). 
In addition to the lack of specific international regula-
tion of SAI, law on the protection of the atmosphere is 
less developed than the law of the sea, where UNC-
LOS is often declared a “constitution of the oceans” 
that supplies a legal order for the study, use and pro-
tection of seas and oceans (UNCLOS, Preamble; for 
further discussion, see Hubert and Reichwein (2015)).
Expert opinions diverge regarding a suitable frame-
work that could accommodate the governance of SAI 
research. Earlier legal assessments tended to address 
the applicability of existing legal regimes to manage 
the political issues surrounding SAI deployment. 
However, recent literature, corresponding to the 
emerging question of field tests, has started to assess 
capacities to additionally govern near-term, small-
scale actions. Some argue that the UNFCCC is a nat-
ural platform for SAI governance at its earliest stages, 
as a regime with universal membership that could 
develop a holistic governance process and appropriate 
mechanisms for field tests and even deployment 
(should this be deemed necessary), based on an 
expansion of its existing mandate and funding, 
reporting, and decision-making mechanisms. The 
UNFCCC may also be able to incorporate delibera-
tions on SAI more cohesively into wider develop-
ments in climate policy (Honegger et al., 2013; Lin, 
2009; Zürn and Schäfer, 2013). Others note that the 
UNFCCC agenda may not be able to accommodate 
the entry of a debate whose objectives and manage-
ment may distract from stated goals and activities sur-
rounding mitigation and adaptation.
or what the cost-effectiveness and technical capacity 
would be for various delivery methods  (aircraft, teth-
ered balloons, etc.) to inject particles at altitudes of 
20 km or higher. Beyond theoretical and laboratory 
work, field experimentation may eventually be needed 
to adequately understand the technical requirements 
and limitations involved.
Concerns associated with SAI: Numerous technical 
and environmental uncertainties surround the 
deployment of SAI, including the appropriate system 
of delivery, as well as impacts on and feedbacks with 
ozone (Tilmes et al., 2008) and cirrus clouds (Kueb-
beler et al., 2012) that complicate projections of the 
distribution of aerosols and wider climatic conse-
quences. 
Concerns also focus on the intertwined consequences 
of deployment for human societies and the natural 
world. For example, depletion of the ozone layer 
would also create health concerns, and although SAI 
may reduce the overall risks of climate change, 
regional impacts on temperature, precipitation, and 
weather patterns would be unevenly distributed, 
shifting the impacts and burdens of climate change 
(Kravitz et al., 2013a; Tilmes et al., 2013), potentially to 
those regions with the least capacity to accommodate 
them (Olson, 2011; SRMGI, 2012; Carr et al., 2013; 
Preston, 2012). An escalation in conflict potential 
could result from various factors, including: impacts 
on natural resources (e.g., water, agriculture or for-
estry); development of military applications for SAI; 
power plays; or inadequate compensation for those 
regions suffering from perceived negative side effects 
(Maas and Scheffran, 2012; Scheffran and Cannaday, 
2013; Brzoska et al., 2012; Link et al., 2013). Moreover, 
there would be a “termination effect” if SAI were to be 
used to mask large amounts of warming and then 
abruptly stopped, which would subject ecosystems 
and the societies dependent on them to far greater 
rates of change than under a business-as-usual sce-
nario (Jones et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, reservations have been expressed about 
researching SAI or even discussing the subject with 
the public or policy makers, originating in various 
concerns, including: the risk of a “moral hazard” that 
would reduce the incentives and motivation to invest 
in mitigation (see, for example, Hale, 2012, Lin, 2013, 
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a list of outstanding research and policy questions 
arising from previous investigations) and that might 
be modelled on flagship projects akin to that currently 
conducted on the human brain, or Joint Programming 
Initiatives co-funded between the EC and national 
research budgets (see section 6.4). 
SAI occupies a different policy space than BECCS 
and OIF: in contrast to the governance developments 
for BECCS and OIF, at present there are no clear 
international governance developments for SAI, so 
that one policy option for the EU would be, for now, 
to avoid taking concrete positions on international 
governance forms for SAI, especially any that may 
prove inflexible under changing conditions for itself 
and its member states. At the same time, the EU 
would likely benefit from closely observing the rele-
vant developments in the CBD, LC/LP, and possibly 
the UNFCCC, particularly to determine whether any 
of these developments, e.g., for marine climate engi-
neering activities, could serve as a template for SAI 
and other albedo modification techniques. 
As discussed in detail in Section 6.2.1.1, one of the key 
challenges for SAI, and generally for albedo modifica-
tion, is the governance of near-term outdoor experi-
mentation. One option for the EU is to consider 
thresholds for the impacts of outdoor experiments on 
radiative forcing, as proposed by Morgan and Ricke 
(2010) and Parson and Keith (2013). However, it has 
also been pointed out (Schäfer et al., 2013a) that such 
thresholds only aim to address known environmental 
concerns associated with field tests of SAI, but not the 
wider concerns discussed earlier in this Chapter and 
in Chapter 3, which should be taken into account in 
developing effective governance. In this context, a fur-
ther policy option for the EU would be to draw les-
sons, where possible, from prior and existing efforts 
to develop principles, criteria, and procedures for pub-
lic engagement and risk assessment that explore and 
incorporate societal concerns (see for example, the 
stage-gate process for the SPICE test bed in Section 
3.1.4, case study 4). 
Other regimes may be applicable, and pursuing gov-
ernance at one regime or another may present trade-
offs due to their different mandates and capacities, as 
well as how these might address the currently indeter-
minate objectives for SAI research (Bodle et al., 2013). 
The CBD, as noted, has already taken non-binding 
decisions on research relating to all climate engineer-
ing approaches, and a number of others including 
ENMOD (the prohibition of hostile weather modifica-
tion) and the Montreal Protocol under the Vienna 
Convention (the regulation of ozone-depleting mate-
rials) have loosely applicable mandates (Bodle et al., 
2013). 
On the other hand, a number of norms embodied by 
sets of principles are being discussed amongst the aca-
demic community as useful guidelines for more sub-
stantive governance processes and mechanisms in 
research and field tests (Rayner et al., 2013; Mac-
Cracken et al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2013), although 
these do not qualify as legal developments. A tangible 
example of how principles of responsible innovation 
can inform governance processes can be seen in the 
“stage-gate” for the SPICE project’s test bed (Stilgoe 
et al., 2013). Still, this constitutes a single example, and 
whether such a framework will be taken up more 
widely in the future — or whether it would be the 
appropriate framework to adopt in the first place — is 
an open question.
SAI policy context and considerations: The CBD is 
the only instrument that has directly addressed the 
issue of SAI, but only by generally referring to the 
umbrella term of “climate-related geoengineering”. 
SAI, however, presumptively falls within the regula-
tory and geographic scope of numerous multilateral 
instruments that apply to the atmosphere, including 
the UNFCCC and Vienna Ozone Convention. At the 
same time, given the extensive uncertainties sur-
rounding SAI as a measure for partly counteracting 
climate change, it is not clear whether international 
legal bodies — particularly the UNFCCC — would be 
prepared to debate SAI technological development, or 
to develop appropriate governance for it. It may there-
fore be valuable, at least in the near term, for the EU to 
maintain an exploratory stance on SAI, supporting 
research programs that investigate its physical, politi-
cal, legal, and societal implications, and that help to 
provide options for future actions (see Section 5.3 for 
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Programming Initiatives”, which cover activities that 
are co-funded between the European Commission 
and national research budgets, or “Joint Technology 
Initiatives”, which are intended as joint public/private 
research endeavours. In the latter case, however, some 
concern has been expressed by the NGO community 
regarding undue industry influence, to the exclusion 
of broader societal concerns (CEO, 2011). Greater 
legitimacy could potentially be provided by wider 
adoption of the type of stage-gate approach adopted 
in the UK as a means to operationalise the concept of 
responsible innovation (see Section 6.2.3). Neverthe-
less, all these forms of research give the EU a quite 
flexible set of programming lines to engage in 
research. 
With regard to the emerging regime complex, the EU 
is arguably in a unique position: On the one hand, its 
member states are all parties to both the UNFCCC 
and the CBD. In addition, the EU itself, being a supra-
national organisation equipped with the competence 
to effectively enforce proper application of its laws 
vis-à-vis its member states, is a party to both conven-
tions. Therefore, EU member states could, in princi-
ple, agree on a common position to be proposed to 
both the UNFCCC and the CBD. So far, however, no 
specific EU perspective on climate engineering has 
been agreed upon. Leaving aside the fact that EU 
politics have naturally had to focus on the challenges 
arising from the economic and financial situation of 
certain member states, the current focus of environ-
mental policy is primarily on the difficulties in achiev-
ing consensus over the EU’s low-carbon “roadmap” 
and on achieving a binding global emissions reduction 
agreement in 2015. The political will to address cli-
mate engineering questions in this context is cur-
rently likely to remain very limited. Furthermore, the 
logic of European mitigation politics is not likely to 
directly apply to the climate engineering debate, since 
there are notable differences in the incentives and 
uncertainties involved in the two issues. Thus, taking 
into account its considerable political influence, the 
EU might one day contemplate leveraging and 
advancing a common position on climate engineering 
within the different regulatory settings, thereby — 
following internal negotiations — perhaps also con-
tributing to the prevention of conflicts among its 
member states. 
6.4 An EU perspective
With a focus on near-term governance and in light of 
the aforementioned, two perspectives need to be dis-
tinguished with regard to the EU:  firstly, its position-
ing vis-à-vis climate engineering research; secondly, 
where the EU as a whole fits into the wider emerging 
regime complex. An explicit focus on research govern-
ance within the EU can provide an outlook on possi-
ble pathways that the EU might pursue in this area in 
the near term. The questions of where the EU as a 
whole fits into the wider emerging regime complex, 
and what the EU's possible courses of action are, then 
re-open the perspective, focusing on the governance 
of both research and deployment within a multilevel 
governance framework.
With regard to climate engineering research, the EU, 
through its seventh framework research programme 
(FP7), has already funded two projects that focus 
explicitly on climate engineering: Implications and 
Risks of Engineering Solar Radiation to Limit Climate 
Change (IMPLICC) and the project that produced 
this assessment report, the European Transdiscipli-
nary Assessment of Climate Engineering (EuTRACE). 
IMPLICC was a modelling study focusing on albedo 
modification techniques, whereas EuTRACE was an 
assessment study, focusing on collecting and synergis-
ing existing information. There has been hardly any 
debate about climate engineering at the EU level, 
although of course the priorities of the framework 
programme, including its individual calls, are not 
decided upon by the European Commission alone, but 
are also influenced by the member states. Despite 
some changes, this procedure will continue in the 
future, i.e., for Horizon2020, the next framework pro-
gramme.
The EU is currently financing two flagship projects 
set to run for ten years, one on new materials (graph-
ene) and another on modelling the human brain, each 
receiving approximately one billion euros of funding 
(information available at http://cordis.europa.eu/). It is 
not implausible that a future flagship project, for 
example in the 2020s, may involve climate engineer-
ing or some aspects thereof (e.g., an individual tech-
nique such as BECCS or SAI). Such a large-scale 
project would naturally require substantial prepara-
tory work. A different approach may be the new “Joint 
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ment in climate engineering research is likely to pro-
voke comparable reactions from third-party actors. 
An alternative approach to this challenge might 
involve initiating negotiations on a global code of con-
duct for climate engineering research (Hubert and 
Reichwein, 2015). By incorporating criteria relating to 
general principles for promoting the responsible con-
duct of scientific research involving climate engineer-
ing, such a code could assist the responsible national 
authorities in the assessment of climate engineering 
research projects. It could also provide for transpar-
ency (e.g., by establishment of an open registry of rel-
evant projects), and thereby not only foster coopera-
tion between states but also contribute to the 
formation of trust between scientists on the one hand 
and trust in science on the other hand.
Politically, implementation of a European climate 
engineering research policy would influence the 
structure and content of the EU’s climate change 
response portfolio as it stands today. The EU is a 
major advocate of the 2°C warming limit. Given that 
the IPCC indicates that in the “vast majority” of sce-
narios that limit warming to 2°C in the 21st century, 
some form of greenhouse gas removal is required 
(IPCC, 2014d), this commitment may have challeng-
ing implications for climate engineering policy in the 
EU. Seen from this perspective, research on green-
house gas removal could become a significant compo-
nent of developing and evaluating policy options for 
staying below the 2°C limit. Furthermore, given the 
currently slow progress on implementing mitigation 
measures, combined with the limitations of green-
house gas removal techniques (in particular the tech-
nical uncertainties and the long timescales involved to 
significantly influence global atmospheric CO2 con-
centrations), a strict commitment to the 2°C limit 
could eventually lead to a very difficult decision over 
whether to deploy albedo modification techniques in 
order to stay within a given temperature threshold 
(e.g., the 2°C limit) or, in recognition of the risks of 
such deployment, to allow the threshold to be crossed. 
Legally, member states have equipped the EU with 
appropriate legislative competences which can be 
applied to climate engineering research and deploy-
ment. However, EU primary law also sets compara-
tively strict limits to activities that include the risk of 
significant adverse consequences for the environment 
With regard to its institutional design, however, the 
EU is not a unified body: Its executive organ, the 
European Commission, is divided into 28 Directorate-
Generals (DGs), with DG Environment responsible 
for the CBD, DG Climate responsible for the 
UNFCCC, and DG Research responsible for research 
programmes. The challenges present at the CBD, 
UNFCCC, and LC/LP are thus mirrored at the level 
of the European Commission, or the EU as a whole, 
and are furthermore reflected in the fragmentary 
nature of existing EU secondary law relevant to cli-
mate engineering. Conflict avoidance and capitalisa-
tion on the EU’s unifying power would thus require 
an inter-service consultation within the Commission 
and subsequently a process of developing communi-
cation and a common strategy (or an EU-wide docu-
ment) galvanising a common position on the issue. 
Any such action would have to be regarded as a com-
paratively cautious approach. It is worth adding in this 
respect that the European Parliament, as part of a 
wider 2011 resolution on the Rio+20 summit, rejected 
the idea that climate engineering should be discussed 
there.
The potential consequences of EU research activities 
and the adoption of a joint EU position on climate 
engineering research are worth considering. Inter-
ested or “third” states might respond by initiating 
their own research programmes, in particular, if any 
kind of future EU conduct were considered as unilat-
eral action. The danger of such a “race for climate 
engineering research” could be addressed by way of 
open research frameworks, i.e., frameworks aiming at 
the integration of third-party actors in order to foster 
international cooperation. For example, the EU–
China Near Zero Emissions Coal (NZEC) initiative 
aims to build demonstration plants in China to test 
the feasibility of CCS technology on an industrial 
scale. Similarly, climate engineering research coordi-
nated at the European level could actively involve 
international partners in order to build trust through 
transparency and information sharing. Mobilisation 
and Mutual Learning (MML) Action Plans, which are 
designed to bring together a diverse set of stakehold-
ers and may include participation from non-EU states, 
could provide a framework for this at the EU level. 
Examples include MMLs on synthetic biology with 
the involvement of the US, and on biometrics with the 
involvement of China. Any joint European involve-
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and for human life. The adoption of the CCS Directive 
can be regarded as a precedent in this context. While 
it can be argued that the link between CCS and con-
ventional energy production is significantly closer 
than that between CCS and climate engineering, the 
CCS Directive also arguably constitutes a first step in 
the transformation of “traditional” climate policy 
approaches that aim to reduce emissions by increasing 
efficiency and reducing demand, into a climate policy 
framework that also includes reduction of emissions 
“at the tailpipe”, and consideration of the associated 
environmental consequences (e.g., issues around long-
term storage), within which issues of intergenera-
tional justice and the handling of risks and uncertain-
ties will gain increasing importance.
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7. Extended Summary 
7.1 Introduction  
There is a broad scientific consensus that humans are 
changing the composition of the atmosphere, and that 
this is leading to global climate change, as described 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in its Fifth Assessment Report of 2013 – 14. 
However, the national and international mitigation 
efforts encouraged by this recognition have not yet 
been sufficient to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, or 
even to significantly slow their annual increase. Fur-
thermore, steps toward adapting to climate change 
are proving difficult and often costly, and in some 
cases might not be possible, e.g., for small island states 
at risk of inundation by sea level rise, and for heavily 
populated coastal regions. 
Against this background, various researchers, policy 
makers and other stakeholders have begun to consider 
and discuss responses to climate change that cannot 
easily be subsumed under the categories of mitigation 
and adaptation. The first question that is often raised 
is: Are there viable ways to remove large amounts of 
CO2 and other greenhouse gases from the atmos-
phere? Many ideas have been proposed for doing so, 
which vary considerably in their approach, and 
include: combining biomass use for energy generation 
with carbon capture and storage (BECCS); large-scale 
afforestation; and fertilising the oceans in order to 
increase the growth and productivity of phytoplank-
ton, thus increasing the uptake of CO2 from the 
atmosphere and the sedimentation of dead carbon 
mass to the deep oceans.
Going beyond ideas for removing greenhouse gases, 
another question has also been raised: Are there pos-
sibilities for directly cooling the Earth? Several ideas 
have been proposed for doing so, mostly via increas-
ing the planetary albedo, i.e., the amount of solar radi-
ation that is reflected back to space (mostly by clouds 
or at the Earth’s surface) and therefore not absorbed 
by the Earth. Techniques for albedo modification have 
been proposed that would act at a range of altitudes, 
including whitening surfaces, making clouds brighter, 
injecting aerosol particles into the stratosphere, and 
placing mirrors in space. 
Taken together, ideas for greenhouse gas removal and 
for albedo modification are commonly referred to by 
the umbrella term “climate engineering” (or “geoengi-
neering”, which is often used synonymously).  
This summary gives an overview of the results of the 
assessment report prepared for the European Com-
mission by EuTRACE (the European Transdiscipli-
nary Assessment of Climate Engineering), a project 
funded by the European Union’s 7th Framework Pro-
gramme. The project assessed the current state of 
knowledge about the techniques subsumed under the 
umbrella term climate engineering and developed 
considerations for potential future research and policy 
development from a specifically European perspec-
tive. EuTRACE brought together academics from 14 
partner institutions across Europe, with expertise in 
disciplines ranging from Earth sciences to economics, 
political science, law, and philosophy. Through the 
large and interdisciplinary composition of the 
EuTRACE project consortium, the assessment report 
is able to capture a broad range of perspectives across 
disciplines and to reflect on the field’s development 
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chapters is not always followed. Nevertheless, the 
broad topics and headings within this summary cor-
respond closely to the chapter contents, making it 
generally straightforward to locate further details in 
the main report corresponding to any points made in 
this summary. To further enhance readability, refer-
ences are not included in this extended summary; for 
the original literature on which the various points are 
based, the reader is referred to the full report.
7.2 Characteristics of techniques to 
remove greenhouse gases or to modify 
the planetary albedo 
7.2.1 Greenhouse gas removal 
A wide range of techniques is discussed in the assess-
ment report for the removal of CO2 and other green-
house gases from the atmosphere and sequestering 
them over long periods, including terrestrial and 
marine techniques, as well as biotically and chemically 
based techniques. Among the primarily terrestrial 
biotic techniques are afforestation, BECCS, biochar, as 
well as other biomass-based techniques; the main ter-
restrial chemical technique is direct air capture, while 
enhanced weathering is both terrestrial and marine; 
finally, two techniques are considered that would aim 
to increase the rate of carbon transfer to the deep 
ocean, with ocean fertilisation involving the “biologi-
cal pump”, and artificial upwelling involving the 
“physical pump”. The scale of these techniques ranges 
from those with primarily domestic influence that 
have minor consequences outside a given domain 
(except for the small global reduction in the atmos-
pheric greenhouse gas concentrations), to those with 
transboundary influences on the environment and on 
global economics, and thus on global societies.
In order to have a substantial impact on the global 
budgets of long-lived greenhouse gases such as CO2, 
any removal technique would have to achieve a 
removal rate equivalent to at least a significant frac-
tion of current global emissions; for CO2 emissions, 
which now exceed 30 Gt CO2/yr, this would mean 
removing at least 1 Gt CO2/yr to have a noticeable 
influence, and much more than that to figure promi-
nently in global climate policy. Many of the techniques 
considered in this assessment have a theoretical, 
though unproven, uptake capacity which is within this 
through all of them. Thus, it should be of interest not 
only for the European Commission but also for the 
broader community of interested stakeholders. 
This assessment report provides an overview of the 
individual techniques that have been proposed for 
greenhouse gas removal and albedo modification. The 
state of scientific understanding and technology 
development (including estimates of potential opera-
tional costs) is described, followed by an examination 
of key questions that arise in the social, ethical, legal, 
and political domains, such as: the possible influence 
of climate engineering techniques on mitigation and 
adaptation efforts; how these techniques are per-
ceived by the public; as well as their conflict potential, 
economic aspects, distributional effects, and compen-
sation issues. The current regulatory and governance 
landscapes are then assessed, along with potential 
avenues for future research and options for develop-
ing policy for climate engineering. While the report 
gives a broad overview of issues around climate engi-
neering and the range of techniques involved, it also 
carefully distinguishes between the individual tech-
niques wherever appropriate. Furthermore, in order 
to illustrate many of the key issues, three selected 
techniques are discussed in greater detail throughout 
the report, two for greenhouse gas removal — bioen-
ergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and 
ocean iron fertilisation (OIF) — and one for modify-
ing the Earth’s albedo — stratospheric aerosol injec-
tion (SAI). These techniques were chosen for several 
reasons: they are among the most discussed tech-
niques; they include some of the most advanced gov-
ernance discussions and developments (especially for 
OIF); two of the techniques (OIF and BECCS) have 
undergone dedicated field experimentation; they 
include one land-based, one ocean-based, and one 
atmosphere-based technique; they encompass tech-
niques that could potentially be confined to small 
areas (BECCS) and others that are transboundary in 
nature (OIF and SAI); they are currently at very dif-
ferent stages of research and technological develop-
ment; and their presumed levels of effectiveness and 
potential risks differ greatly.
 
This summary follows the overall structure of the 
assessment report in terms of the order of the chap-
ters, although in order to facilitate reading in the form 
of a summary, the structure within the individual 
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 the degree of permanence of storage, i.e., the poten-
tial for the future natural release or unintended leak-
age of the removed carbon; this becomes particularly 
relevant considering that, in order to prevent an 
enhanced future build-up of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide, the removal process would need to be con-
tinually maintained.
In addition to these limitations, there are numerous 
potential negative impacts of the techniques on the 
environment, ecosystems, and societies to take into 
consideration, including:
 competition and conflicts over land use and water 
supply being applied for various purposes; 
 societal impacts of landscape and land use changes;
 degradation of ecosystems and the environment, 
e.g., due to chemical inputs for OIF or ocean alkalisa-
tion, modification of the marine biosphere due to OIF, 
or industrial agriculture and introduction of non-
native species and monoculture;
 health impacts, e.g., associated with dust production 
from biochar;
 production and release of nitrous oxide (N2O) and 
other climate-forcing gases (by OIF as well as due to 
agriculture practices for producing biofuel); 
 major mining, processing, and distribution opera-
tions for any techniques such as artificial weathering, 
which would require substantial material resource 
inputs. 
These various considerations, taken together, indicate 
that, based on current knowledge, greenhouse gas 
removal techniques cannot be relied upon to notably 
supplement mitigation measures in the next few dec-
ades. However, if significant investments were made 
in researching and developing some forms of green-
house gas removal techniques, and if it were to emerge 
that they could be successfully scaled up, with well-
understood and acceptable side effects, then green-
house gas removal could eventually significantly sup-
plement mitigation efforts and provide an additional 
degree of flexibility in international climate negotia-
tions. 
range. However, for nearly all of the proposed tech-
niques, accomplishing this would require massive 
infrastructures and energy input, which would take 
long timescales to develop and would incur costs that 
could be comparable to or even exceed those of miti-
gation measures. Furthermore, even at such scales of 
implementation, atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
would still only decrease slowly (over decades). 
The capacity for deployment at scale, along with the 
effectiveness of the proposed techniques, if deployed, 
would be constrained by several factors. These vary 
between the various techniques, but broadly include: 
 the operational costs, both for installation and 
maintenance, which is one of the most important 
issues to resolve before serious consideration can be 
given to scaled-up implementation of any of the 
greenhouse gas removal techniques; 
 the total biomass resources that would be available 
and their regeneration rate for biomass-based tech-
niques, as well as the sustainability of intensive, large-
scale agricultural practices; 
 the strength of the “rebound effect”, in which any 
CO2 removed from the atmosphere is counterbal-
anced by reduced uptake of CO2, or by the release of 
CO2 from other components of the global carbon 
cycle;
 the total capacity of various storage sites (e.g., 
depleted hydrocarbon fields and saline aquifers) and 
reservoirs (e.g., the deep ocean) under consideration; 
the total storage capacity on the global land surface 
(in biomass and soils) is at least an order of magnitude 
smaller than available fossil carbon reserves; the 
ocean has much greater storage capacity, theoretically 
in excess of all known fossil carbon resources, but 
methods to access this storage and the timescales of 
such storage have not yet been established, and it is 
unclear if it will ever be possible to establish appropri-
ate long-term storage methods in the oceans.
 the degree of co-location of storage sites with major 
emissions sites (including bio-energy power plants in 
the case of BECCS), determining the need for devel-
opment of significant CO2 transportation infrastruc-
tures or relocation of CO2-emitting facilities;
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 reducing climate risks as much as possible, 
potentially substituting for some degree of mitigation; 
 use as a “stopgap” measure to allow time for 
reducing emissions; 
 use in a potential “climate emergency”. 
These potential roles are accompanied by 
various drawbacks, among them:
 albedo modification impacts the climate in a man-
ner that is physically different from the impact of 
greenhouse gases, so that it would not directly reverse 
the effects of global warming; regional differences in 
the response could be expected, and precipitation 
would respond differently than temperature, so that 
albedo modification techniques may reduce some 
risks but in turn increase others;
 if any technique were being employed at a scale that 
had a significant cooling impact on global tempera-
ture, and then had to be stopped abruptly or over a 
short period of time, a rapid warming or “termination 
shock” would ensue, with concomitant risks for socie-
ties and ecosystems; the impacts could be made less 
severe by phasing out the implementation slowly, if 
possible;
 albedo modification does not address the direct 
effects of CO2 on the environment, such as ocean 
acidification and impacts on terrestrial vegetation, so 
there is a risk that those issues might receive less 
attention or be neglected if terrestrial climate change 
— manifested in temperature, precipitation, and other 
parameters — is made less severe. 
All of the techniques considered in this assessment 
harbour substantial uncertainties. In terms of effec-
tiveness and technological feasibility, some of the 
main issues involved include:
 delivery mechanisms, which have received some 
attention for SAI, with initial studies suggesting that 
the most economically feasible method is likely to be 
atmospheric injection via high-flying aircraft or via 
tethered balloons in the tropics;
7.2.2 Albedo modification and related 
techniques
Albedo modification refers to deliberate, large-scale 
changes of the Earth’s energy balance by increasing 
the reflection of sunlight away from the Earth, with 
the aim of reducing global mean temperatures. Sug-
gestions for increasing the Earth’s reflectivity include: 
 enhancing the reflectivity of the Earth’s surface; 
 injecting particles into the atmosphere, either at 
high altitudes in the stratosphere to directly reflect 
sunlight or at low altitudes over the ocean to increase 
cloud reflectivity; 
 placing reflective mirrors in space.
A few other related techniques have been proposed to 
alter the Earth’s energy balance, especially by thin-
ning or reducing the spatial coverage of cirrus clouds 
to decrease the amount of terrestrial radiation that is 
trapped in the atmosphere and radiated back towards 
the Earth’s surface. Taken together, these are referred 
to here as albedo modification and related techniques.
Albedo modification and related techniques are dis-
tinct from mitigation and from most greenhouse gas 
removal techniques, in three key ways:
 their effects are potentially rapid and large — 
according to climate model calculations and observa-
tions of large volcanic eruptions, albedo modification 
might be capable of cooling the Earth’s surface by 1°C 
or more, with the response being observable within a 
year or less; 
 their operational costs are potentially low in com-
parison to the costs of mitigation, adaptation, or 
greenhouse gas removal at scales that have an impact 
on the global atmospheric CO2 concentrations and 
thus on global temperatures; 
 their evaluation is better characterised as a 
risk–risk trade-off. 
In light of these distinctions, various potential roles 
for albedo modification and related techniques have 
been proposed: 
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Based on this assessment, while it might be possible to 
relatively quickly develop and implement the techno-
logical capability to modify the Earth’s radiation 
budget on a global scale, it would very likely take 
many decades to be able to do so in an informed and 
responsible manner. This applies not only to under-
standing the environmental consequences, but also 
the societal context in which such an intervention 
would occur, including its broader ethical implications 
and the challenges for international regulation and 
governance that would need to be addressed; these 
considerations are summarised in the following sec-
tions.  
7.3 Emerging societal issues
The range of techniques that have been proposed for 
removing greenhouse gases or for modifying the plan-
etary albedo or cirrus clouds all raise complex ques-
tions in the social, ethical, legal, and political domains. 
However, despite a few decades of discussion, and 
intensified research and dialogue over the last decade 
(including several prior assessment reports), the 
EuTRACE assessment highlights that the vast major-
ity of the societal, ethical, legal, and political concerns 
raised by climate engineering are still subject to sub-
stantial uncertainties and unknowns. 
This section gives an overview of the main societal 
issues that are discussed in the assessment, starting 
with the political and societal context in which the 
discourse is unfolding, along with the public aware-
ness and perception of this discourse, particularly in 
the context of field experiments and prototype 
deployments. Three further issues and their potential 
consequences are then described: “moral hazard”, 
environmental responsibility, and conflict emer-
gence. The potential economic impacts of greenhouse 
gas removal and albedo modification techniques are 
then considered, along with the broader issues of the 
distribution of benefits and costs and how this relates 
to questions of justice associated with possible cli-
mate engineering deployment and to considerations 
of compensation for harms. 
 Uncertainties about the scale and degree of imple-
mentation, e.g., for SAI or marine cloud brightening, 
the amount of aerosol particle mass that would need 
to be injected into the atmosphere to achieve a certain 
amount of cooling; 
 Uncertainties about the maximum possible effect 
(e.g., in terms of radiative forcing in W/m2), due to 
various environmental limitations and diminishing 
returns; 
 Uncertainties about the relationship between the 
details of implementation (e.g., injection location and 
particle size) and the climate response; 
 In terms of the impacts, these vary widely between 
the techniques, with the key impacts for a selection of 
the main techniques being: 
SAI: reduction of polar stratospheric ozone, changes 
in the heating rates in the stratosphere, impacts on 
the dynamics of the stratosphere, impacts on tropo-
spheric cirrus clouds, influence on vegetation growth, 
increased fraction of diffuse- to direct-radiation, 
among others.
Marine cloud brightening: changes in the hydro-
logical cycle, potentially changes in the El Niño South-
ern Oscillation (ENSO), enhanced precipitation over 
low-latitude land regions, and corrosive destruction of 
infrastructures and detrimental effects on coastal 
plants due to increased atmospheric concentrations of 
sea salt.
Desert reflectivity enhancement: substantial 
perturbation of desert ecosystems, considerable 
regional climatic changes, e.g. reduced regional pre-
cipitation adjacent to deserts and reductions in mon-
soon intensity, along with reductions in the nutrient 
supply to the Amazon and oceanic regions downwind 
of the Sahara Desert.
Vegetation reflectivity enhancement: changes 
in land use may conflict with other goals of land use 
management such as biodiversity preservation and 
carbon sequestration; effects on market prices and 
local ecosystems, as well as on soil moisture and local 
meteorology.  
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of field trials, and in turn the impacts of stakeholder 
engagement activities on the ways in which field trials 
are perceived. Nevertheless, the example field experi-
ment cases are useful to demonstrate that several con-
crete questions are appropriate for future considera-
tion, including: 
 What is the role of risk assessment in designing cli-
mate engineering field experiments? 
 What is the role of private sector interests in shap-
ing public perceptions of climate engineering field 
experiments? 
 What is the role of trust and public participation in 
shaping public perceptions of climate engineering 
field experiments? 
 What is the role of governance in climate engineer-
ing field experiments?
A few key points that arise from the brief analysis in 
the assessment report are:
 Transparency and openness (about intent, design, 
scale, intellectual property, commercial or other 
vested interests, etc.) play apparently important but as 
yet indeterminate roles in shaping public perception;
 In all cases, those responsible for the projects con-
sidered early and ongoing public participation and 
engagement, as well as the application of some form of 
governance (including novel assessment frameworks 
or modifications of existing frameworks) to be of 
importance; however, anecdotally, it was found that 
neither of these guaranteed acceptance or the ability 
to successfully complete the projects.
The “moral hazard” argument 
There is concern that discussing, researching, and 
developing climate engineering techniques may 
reduce the overall motivation to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. This concern applies to the range of 
techniques under both greenhouse gas removal and 
planetary albedo modification. The moral hazard 
response may occur via several different mechanisms, 
with a range of associated background assumptions. 
There are also sceptical viewpoints that suggest the 
Political and societal context
Climate engineering techniques are each situated in a 
specific socio-political context, which may in turn be 
affected through the further development of that 
technique, e.g., through the use of resources during 
the deployment process, the direct impacts upon the 
environments in which the techniques might be 
implemented, and any unexpected consequences of 
the techniques. Furthermore, these changes would 
also be influenced by climate change, which would 
potentially intensify during the development and pro-
gressive deployment of any climate engineering tech-
niques. To date, there has been no integrated analysis 
of the linkages between climate change, the different 
climate engineering techniques, and their combined 
effects on human security, conflict risks, and societal 
stability.
Public awareness and perception
According to the few studies conducted thus far, most 
public groups are broadly unaware of the various pro-
posed climate engineering techniques and the debates 
around their possible consequences. Perceptions of 
climate engineering, including the degree of accept-
ance, are strongly dependent not only on the cultural 
background, but also on the context and framing in 
which information on climate engineering proposals 
is provided. Concepts that are often associated with 
climate engineering include “messing with nature”, 
“science-fiction”, “Star Wars”, and “environmental 
dystopia”. Key concerns expressed by members of the 
public include the potential for inducing international 
conflict, scepticism about predictability of impacts 
and about effective governance, and a “NIMBY” (Not 
In My Back Yard) attitude toward both deployment 
and field trials.
Public perception and stakeholder engagement in 
the context of field experiments and prototype 
deployments
Four example cases for field tests of various proposed 
techniques (two for BECCS, one for OIF, and one for 
SAI) were examined. However, given that thus far 
there have only been a very limited number of field 
trials of these and other techniques, it is not yet pos-
sible to derive clear lessons about the societal context 
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ingly, economic assessments of greenhouse gas 
removal techniques need to consider various carbon 
costs, which reflect the social costs that arise from 
scarcity of storage sites or from the changed ambient 
carbon fluxes between the atmosphere and other car-
bon reservoirs.
In contrast to the economics of greenhouse gas 
removal, proposals for planetary albedo modification 
raise novel economic considerations. It has been 
argued that this could have the potential to immensely 
simplify climate change negotiations, transforming 
them from an extremely complex regulatory regime 
into a problem grounded in the familiar issue of inter-
national cost-sharing. However, this simplification 
would be accompanied by the numerous other chal-
lenges outlined in this section, along with the uncer-
tainties and unknowns in the physical climate system 
discussed in the previous section, and the difficulties 
of developing regulation and governance mechanisms 
outlined in the following sections. It is thus clear that 
any implementation of albedo modification would 
entail various costs, such as price effects and social 
costs. Nevertheless, economic analyses of albedo 
modification have been primarily concerned with the 
possibility of cooling the planet at very low opera-
tional cost, often neglecting the other associated 
costs, so that present knowledge of such other costs is 
very limited. Further complicating the situation, 
potential side effects, which can take the form of 
external costs or external benefits, also need to be 
taken into account for a comprehensive analysis, and 
to be incorporated in the social costs associated with 
each technique.
Distribution of benefits and costs 
The distribution of benefits, costs and risks — fre-
quently posed as an issue of “winners and losers” — is 
not only an economic issue but also raises important 
normative questions, which vary considerably 
between different climate engineering techniques. It 
is not yet clear how, and to what degree, the various 
techniques would produce inequalities, or whether 
some would instead act to decrease the existing ine-
qualities and historical injustice of climate change. It 
is also unclear how the possible redistribution of ben-
efits, costs, and risks might influence inequalities 
between generations, as the future deployment of cli-
opposite mechanism may dominate in some contexts 
(i.e., that fear over the mere consideration of climate 
engineering techniques might drive an invigorated 
effort toward mitigation). 
Environmental responsibility
While it is sometimes argued that the Earth system is 
already undergoing a large-scale experiment due to 
the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and 
aerosol particles, a key distinction is often drawn 
between unintentional (albeit not necessarily 
unknowing) versus intentional interventions in the 
climate system; associated with this concern is that 
the potential use of climate engineering techniques in 
general has been ascribed various negative character 
traits, including hubris, arrogance, and recklessness. 
Conflict emergence
It has been argued that various forms of conflict may 
emerge throughout the lifecycle of climate engineer-
ing activities; these can broadly be distinguished as: 
 competition over scarce resources; 
 resistance against impacts and risks;
 conflicts over distribution of benefits, costs, 
and risks; 
 complex multi-level security dilemmas and 
conflict constellations;
 power games over climate control.
Economic impacts 
As with other societal concerns, economic analysis of 
climate engineering is in its infancy. The economics of 
removing greenhouse gases is commonly discussed 
within the context of the economics of mitigation, 
particularly considering the slow transformation of 
industrial structures that would be necessary for 
effective mitigation, so that greenhouse gas removal 
techniques such as BECCS are sometimes framed as 
possibly being useable to “buy time” for such mitiga-
tion technologies to be developed and for the trans-
formation of industrial structures to occur. Accord-
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well as with questions of the legitimacy (or lack 
thereof) of international institutions;
 Environmental justice, reflecting upon the possi-
bilities and mechanisms to include non-human life 
and ecosystem sustainability in normative evalua-
tions; and how to understand human responsibilities 
toward non-human nature.
Compensation 
The issues of justice, and the associated potential for 
some to suffer while others might benefit from the 
deployment of climate engineering techniques, raise 
questions concerning compensation for possible 
harms. Three basic questions can be distinguished:
 Who should compensate? This question relates to 
the main principles of compensation for climate 
change impacts, with the most prominent approaches 
being the “polluter pays” principle (PPP), the “ability 
to pay” principle (ATP), and the “beneficiary pays” 
principle (BPP); these three approaches are not mutu-
ally exclusive and can often suggest similar courses of 
action and similar responsible parties.
 Whom should they compensate? The answer to this 
question is often less clear than might initially be 
expected. Different climate engineering techniques 
will affect different countries in many different ways, 
likely making them worse off in some ways and better 
off in other ways than they would be under global 
warming alone, thereby complicating judgments on 
which stakeholders should be compensated and in 
which ways, which leads to the third crucial question: 
 What should be compensated? There are many 
aspects to this question, including: whether different 
normative approaches put limits on the kinds of 
harms that can be compensated; how to attribute 
monetary values to principally compensable harms; 
whether those who are compensated should all be 
equally compensated based on the degrees and types 
of harms caused; and how to attribute specific harm-
ful impacts, e.g., prolonged drought or flooding, on a 
case-by-case basis to any form of climate engineering 
deployment.
mate engineering techniques may allow risks and 
costs to be deferred to future generations; however, 
this issue is not unique to climate engineering, as it 
also applies to the use of fossil fuels and many other 
activities of modern society. Thus, while climate engi-
neering techniques have the potential to reduce some 
of the worst impacts of climate change for both 
present and future generations, they might also lead 
to the externalisation of costs and risks over both 
space and time. 
Questions of justice associated with possible cli-
mate engineering deployment
Problems concerning the distribution of benefits, 
costs, and risks can be addressed from various justice 
perspectives, such as that of intergenerational justice 
noted in the previous point. These perspectives are 
frequently based on assumptions about obligations 
towards others, their rights to certain goods, or their 
interests in decisions that could affect their wellbeing. 
Various subdomains of justice are particularly rele-
vant for the normative evaluation of the possible 
deployment of climate engineering techniques:
 Distributive justice, reflecting upon the question of 
how benefits and costs should be distributed accord-
ing to certain principles or criteria (such as maximisa-
tion, the priority view, egalitarianism or sufficientari-
anism);  
 Redistributive justice, aiming to redress unde-
served benefits or harms;
 Intergenerational justice, asking what current gen-
erations owe to future generations, and what the nor-
mative significance is of past generations’ actions;
 Compensatory justice, based on the idea that 
wrongdoers or the beneficiaries of wrongful actions 
must compensate, in some form, those who were 
harmed;
 Procedural justice, concerned with the fairness and 
transparency of the processes by which decisions are 
made;
 Global justice, dealing with principles that should 
guide one state in its dealings with other states, as 
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These three treaty bodies have very different charac-
teristics. While the UNFCCC is focused on minimi-
sing the harmful impacts of human activities on the 
climate system, the LC/LP is focused on protection of 
the marine environment, and the CBD on conserva-
tion of biodiversity. While the UNFCCC and CBD 
enjoy quasi-universal legal status (with the sole but 
significant exception of the USA, which has signed 
but not ratified the CBD), the LC/LP has only a limi-
ted international membership, although most mem-
ber states of the EU are Parties to the treaty. 
The LC/LP was the first treaty body to actively initi-
ate significant steps towards the regulation of certain 
(maritime) greenhouse gas removal techniques, espe-
cially OIF. The LC/LP is a process-oriented instru-
ment that seeks to articulate pathways toward decis-
ion making in situations involving potential pollution 
of the marine environment; it typically acts through 
developing assessment frameworks. As such, the 
efforts of the LC/LP have concentrated on the deve-
lopment of a risk management framework to regulate 
potential activities at the operational level, rather 
than attempting to address the larger contextual 
questions that climate engineering raises, which 
would be a role more befitting of the UNFCCC. This 
risk assessment approach of the LC/LP, following the 
precautionary principle, has the potential to be a role 
model for the future development of governance for 
climate engineering. The process followed by the LP 
— first adopting a non-binding COP decision and 
then proceeding to amend the treaty/protocol to 
create binding law — is also a potential model for 
other legal regimes in developing regulation for vari-
ous forms of climate engineering.
In contrast to the LC/LP, the CBD is not designed to 
regulate specific activities, and in contrast to the 
UNFCCC, it is not dedicated to the specific context 
of climate change. The potential role of the CBD in 
the regulation of climate engineering is instead to 
identify normative categories and procedures by 
which the potential effects of climate engineering on 
biodiversity can be monitored, assessed, and evalua-
ted. The CBD could also have the role of establishing 
limits, which may not be exceeded, for the reduction 
or loss of biological diversity. To date, the CBD COP 
has adopted two specific Decisions explicitly concer-
ning climate engineering (using the term “geoengi-
The societal concerns outlined in this section form 
the basis for the development of regulation, policy, 
and governance frameworks for climate engineering 
research and possible deployment, as described in the 
following sections.
7.4 International regulation and 
governance
Three broad regulatory approaches for climate engi-
neering are put forth in the EuTRACE assessment 
report: 
i) based on its potential role as a situational response 
to various conditions in the overarching context of 
climate change (context); 
ii) through risk management measures for individual 
climate engineering activities and technical processes 
at the operational level (activities); 
iii) through scientific assessment of potential envi-
ronmental effects of different climate engineering 
techniques (effects).
To date, most discussion toward developing regulati-
ons for climate engineering has taken place within 
the competent treaty bodies of the London Conven-
tion/London Protocol (LC/LP), focused specifically 
on maritime climate engineering (“marine geoengi-
neering activities” in the terms of the LC/LP), and of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
focused particularly on the potential impacts of pro-
posed climate engineering techniques on biological 
diversity. Other international treaties, in particular 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), would also be potentially applicable. 
In the context of the three broad approaches noted 
above, these three treaty bodies would primarily 
address the issue of climate engineering as follows:
 the UNFCCC from the standpoint of context;
 the LC/LP from the standpoint of activities;
 the CBD from the standpoint of effects. 
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entific uncertainty, in preparing environmental 
policy, as well as of the potential benefits and costs of 
action or lack of action. 
To date, no act of EU secondary law has sought to 
explicitly regulate climate engineering research and/
or deployment. That said, examples of EU secondary 
law, both procedural and substantive, can be identi-
fied that could potentially be triggered, subject to 
more detailed assessment, in the context of climate 
engineering research or the possible deployment of 
climate engineering techniques. In particular, the 
standard of protection and care mandated by EU pri-
mary law has been further developed through EU 
secondary law and can contribute to international 
understanding and consensus-building on how inter-
national law on a given topic can be interpreted and 
implemented by other parties. 
Finally, a key overall contribution of EU law is the 
high degree of importance it places on environmental 
protection and, most prominently, the central objec-
tive of improving the quality of the environment 
rather than merely maintaining it, which can help to 
provide more stringent scrutiny of potential climate 
engineering activities than the requirements of public 
international law. Ultimately, however, EU law will 
also not directly provide a clear mechanism for deve-
loping comprehensive regulation for climate enginee-
ring, suggesting that initiatives beyond formal legal 
approaches will be necessary to effectively govern 
climate engineering.
7.5 Research options
Over the past decades, there has been a substantial 
increase in the general interest in and research on the 
various proposed climate engineering techniques. 
For greenhouse gas removal techniques, this increase 
has generally been gradual over this period, while for 
albedo modification techniques, especially SAI, there 
was a very rapid increase in interest and research in 
the 2000s.  
The increase in research has been accompanied by 
extensive discussion on whether or not — and in 
what forms — such research should be conducted, on 
how to effectively govern research, and on possible 
steps between field tests and large-scale deployment 
neering”, without differentiating between albedo 
modification and greenhouse gas removal tech-
niques).  
Since each of the three approaches noted above (con-
text, activities, and effects) would miss out on impor-
tant aspects of regulation if applied as standalone 
approaches, in order to develop an effective regula-
tory structure for climate engineering, all three 
approaches would arguably have to be integrated. 
Such integration, although requiring extensive inter-
national effort, would at least be facilitated by the fact 
that all three relevant legal instruments are, to some 
extent, based on a common denominator (embodied, 
for example, in the precautionary principle). The 
development of a single, overarching, dedicated tre-
aty that would subsume a wide range of techniques 
under the general term “climate engineering”, and 
that would attempt to address the full range of 
aspects involved, would be a prohibitively large 
undertaking, if at all realisable or desirable. A more 
promising option would likely be to bring together 
the three aforementioned regulatory approaches and 
associated treaty bodies at the operational level (i.e., 
through parallel action, common assessment frame-
works, or Memoranda of Understanding).
Focusing on EU law: without a comprehensive inter-
national regulatory structure in place, EU law provi-
des a “bottom-up” source of limitation on climate 
engineering for member states and the EU itself. Alt-
hough present EU law cannot be interpreted as gene-
rally prohibiting or authorising climate engineering, 
it serves to structure the decision-making process 
and provide essential provisions for environmental 
protection. This applies through both primary and 
secondary EU law. 
In EU primary law, this manifests for instance in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), which requires that environmental policy 
— including the evaluation of climate engineering 
techniques — “shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action 
should be taken, that environmental damages should 
as a priority be rectified at source and that the pollu-
ter should pay”. A further provision of the TFEU is 
that the Union is also required to take account of 
available scientific and technical data, including sci-
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 ethical, political, and societal aspects; 
 governance and regulation. 
The list of research questions on climate engineering 
provided in the assessment is the first known compi-
lation of this breadth, and is intended to give an over-
view of the range of issues that would benefit from 
further investigation for various purposes, e.g., as an 
improved basis for policy making. 
7.6 Policy development for 
climate engineering
The complex socio-technical context within which 
discussions of climate engineering are emerging 
necessitates, as a basis for sound decision making, 
careful engagement with scientific, legal, political, 
economic, and ethical aspects of climate engineering, 
as well as with the overall context of climate change 
and climate change policy. Questions arise concer-
ning technological feasibility, global fairness, interna-
tional cooperation, distribution of costs and benefits, 
social acceptability, and possible effects on existing 
and potential strategies for mitigation and adapta-
tion. Decision makers will thus face complex choices 
and trade-offs. While many general principles that 
can guide policy development are likely to apply to 
most or all climate engineering techniques, the diffe-
ring stages of development and discourse about the 
various techniques need to be taken into account 
when assessing policy options and pathways. This is 
also reflected in the differences between the three 
example techniques considered in this assessment 
(BECCS, OIF, and SAI). 
Should the EU decide to act as a global leader on cli-
mate engineering research, it could draw on establis-
hed processes for ensuring comparatively high stan-
dards of environmental and social protection to 
develop farther-reaching propositions for the gover-
nance and regulation of both climate engineering 
research and deployment, with the goal of informing 
and guiding international discussions.
Discussions of climate engineering governance are 
not emerging in a legal void. Customary international 
law includes established principles such as the duty to 
inform and the duty to prevent transboundary harm. 
of individual techniques. These arguments broadly 
apply to both greenhouse gas removal and albedo 
modification, although often in different ways and 
frequently differentiated between individual tech-
niques. 
The main arguments made in favour of conducting 
research are:
 information requirements;
 knowledge provision;
 deployment readiness; 
 avoidance of premature implementation;
 elimination of specific proposals; 
 national preparedness;
 scientific freedom.
The main arguments made against conducting 
research are:
 the “moral hazard” argument;
 allocation of resources for research;
 the “slippery slope” argument;
 concerns about large-scale field tests;
 backlash against research.
To the extent that research is continued, there are 
many open research questions on climate enginee-
ring that could be investigated more deeply, ranging 
from natural science and technological aspects to 
social sciences, humanities, and legal issues. The 
results of this assessment were used to identify 
important knowledge gaps and to draw up lists of key 
research questions, grouped into the following topi-
cal areas:
 natural sciences and engineering;
 public awareness and perception; 
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 the principle of transparency;
 the principle of international cooperation;
 research as a public good. 
Based on these principles, different strategies have 
been proposed that could be applied across all cli-
mate engineering approaches, including:
 early public engagement;
 independent assessment;
 operationalising transparency through adoption of 
research disclosure mechanisms and targeted public 
communication platforms;
 coordinating international legal efforts through 
joint adoption of a code-of-conduct for research that 
draws upon existing legal texts and principles;
 applying frameworks of responsible innovation and 
anticipatory governance to natural sciences and engi-
neering research.
The realisation of some of these principles, demands, 
and instruments — especially in the governance of 
small-scale field tests of albedo modification tech-
niques, but also similarly for perturbative experi-
ments such as open-ocean OIF experiments — requi-
res adequate governance mechanisms and 
institutions at national and international levels that 
currently do not exist. 
7.6.2 Development of international 
governance
Taking into account the possible side effects and risks 
associated with different climate engineering tech-
niques, the question arises: who can legitimately 
decide on climate engineering deployment or even 
research, and through what processes? Agreements 
involving the global commons that are acceptable to 
all parties may be impossible to reach, due to signifi-
cantly divergent interests that are grounded in geo-
political, economic, and related issues. Furthermore, 
international decision-making structures often 
exclude or marginalise those who are especially vul-
National laws equally apply, for example the obliga-
tion to conduct environmental impact assessments, 
depending on the jurisdiction in question. 
7.6.1 Development of research policy
In forming a position on climate engineering 
research, several factors might be considered:  
 the urgency of such research;
 possible sequences in which the research might be 
conducted;
 the multiple applications for which climate enginee-
ring may create relevant knowledge. 
Based on the experiences in the interdisciplinary 
EuTRACE project, the consortium broadly advocates 
a parallel research approach that simultaneously 
addresses questions of natural scientific and social 
scientific interest, without prioritising one to be car-
ried out before the other, and emphasises that in 
doing so, it is valuable to place climate engineering 
research within the broader context of mitigation 
and adaptation.
Given the strong arguments that exist both for and 
against further research, there is a considerable 
debate about whether research into greenhouse gas 
removal and albedo modification should take place; 
great challenges remain for funding agencies and 
governing bodies, and also for research institutes and 
individual researchers, to weigh the arguments that 
speak in favour of and against research into climate 
engineering. In order to guide the scientific commu-
nity and policy makers in this debate, several princip-
les have been derived and applied in this assessment. 
These principles have been distilled from existing 
provisions in EU primary law, supplemented by inter-
national law and the development of climate enginee-
ring governance through the CBD and LC/LP, as well 
as principles from the academic literature
These principles are:
 the minimisation of harm;
 the precautionary principle;
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7.6.3 Development of technique-
specific policy
In addition to general policy considerations, specific 
policy considerations for individual techniques may 
be considered desirable. Below are considerations for 
the three example techniques that have been conside-
red in EuTRACE, on which policy development may 
draw, should the development of specific policies for 
individual techniques become a goal.
BECCS
EU policy attention to BECCS may be warranted for 
three reasons: 
 the suggested importance of BECCS to achieving 
decarbonisation, e.g., its extensive use in scenarios 
prepared for the IPCC assessment reports; 
 the experience that establishing deployment of 
technologies reliant on large resources and infra-
structures requires many decades;
 the opposition that is becoming evident in some 
European countries against proposals for developing 
BECCS. 
Should the EU envisage a substantial role for BECCS 
in its domestic emissions reduction strategy, steps 
toward this would include: 
 research and technology development;
 infrastructure provision;
 market development;
 societal engagement. 
OIF
The EU has very successfully taken the role of an 
“enforcement organ” of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) in the context of shipping. 
A central policy option for the EU would be for the 
European Commission to urge all LP member states 
to ratify the amendment, and for all LC members to 
nerable. Procedural norms provide guidance on how 
these difficulties and shortcomings can be overcome, 
and include:
 notification and consultation of those affected as 
well as the wider public and other nations;
 fostering public engagement early in the research 
phase; 
 open preparation and execution of environmental 
as well as societal impact assessments prior to con-
ducting activities that have the potential for signifi-
cant environmental or other impacts; 
 transparency and public disclosure of the rationales 
for policy decisions on climate engineering tech-
niques;
 providing a mechanism for appeal and revision, to 
ensure fairness.
The comparatively rapid development of internatio-
nal governance for climate engineering over the past 
couple of years at the CBD and the LC/LP suggest a 
willingness amongst states to cooperate on the issue 
of climate engineering. In the medium term, this 
might signal the emergence of a regime complex con-
sisting of regulatory provisions that include the CBD 
and the LC/LP, as well as potentially the UNFCCC 
(given the considerations noted above), supported by 
strategies designed to manage interplay between 
these institutions and by scientific assessments from 
the IPCC.
A possible way to prevent political and legal inter-
institutional conflict could be seen in the conclusion 
of memoranda of understanding negotiated by the 
institutions’ secretariats and then submitted to the 
respective COPs. Specifically for the CBD and the 
LC/LP this seems to be an achievable near-term goal, 
given the apparent similarities between the two con-
ventions’ views on climate engineering, as evidenced 
by their consistent approaches as well as mutual refe-
rences contained in their statements on the objecti-
ves and the future of climate engineering regulation. 
EuTRACE Report_137
7. Extended Summary 
tions of any climate engineering techniques that are 
being investigated, and that help to provide options 
for future actions.  If a sufficiently large need for 
knowledge exists at a future time, then these pro-
grams could potentially be modelled on flagship pro-
jects akin to that currently conducted on the human 
brain, or based on “Joint Programming Initiatives” or 
“Joint Technology Initiatives” co-funded between the 
EC and national research budgets. 
With regard to the emerging regime complex invol-
ving the LC/LP, CBD, and UNFCCC, the EU is 
arguably in a unique position: On the one hand, its 
member states are all parties to both the UNFCCC 
and the CBD. In addition, the EU itself, being a supra-
national organisation equipped with the competence 
to effectively enforce appropriate application of its 
laws vis-à-vis its member states, is a party to both 
conventions. Therefore, EU member states could, in 
principle, agree on a common position for proposal to 
both the UNFCCC and the CBD. So far, however, no 
specific EU perspective on climate engineering has 
been agreed upon. Taking into account its considera-
ble political influence, the EU might one day contem-
plate leveraging and advancing a common position 
on climate engineering within the different regula-
tory settings, thereby — following internal negotia-
tions — perhaps also contributing to the prevention 
of conflicts among its member states. 
Politically, the implementation of a European climate 
engineering research policy would influence the 
structure and content of the EU’s climate change res-
ponse portfolio as it stands today. For the past two 
decades, the EU has championed the internationally 
agreed target of limiting global warming to a 2°C 
increase in global mean surface temperature compa-
red to pre-industrial levels. Given that in the “vast 
majority” of scenarios considered by the IPCC,  stay-
ing within the 2°C target during the 21st century 
would necessitate some form of greenhouse gas 
removal, this commitment may have challenging 
implications for climate engineering policy in the EU. 
Seen from this perspective, research on greenhouse 
gas removal could become a significant component of 
developing and evaluating policy options for staying 
below the 2°C limit. Furthermore, given the currently 
slow progress on implementing climate change miti-
gation measures, combined with the limitations of 
become parties to the LP. Recent developments in the 
governance of OIF arguably place this technique at 
the most advanced stage of legal and norm develop-
ment among climate engineering techniques. As 
such, it might provide insights into overall develop-
ments in climate engineering governance and, accor-
dingly, guidance for developing governance for other 
techniques. 
SAI
Thus far, the CBD is the only instrument that has 
directly addressed the issue of SAI, although only by 
general reference to the umbrella term “climate-rela-
ted geoengineering”. It may therefore be valuable, at 
least in the near term, for the EU to maintain an 
exploratory stance on SAI. 
One of the key challenges for SAI, and generally for 
albedo modification, is the governance of near-term 
outdoor experimentation. One option for the EU is to 
consider thresholds for the impacts of outdoor 
experiments on radiative forcing. However, such 
thresholds only aim to address known environmental 
concerns associated with field tests of SAI, but not 
the wider concerns that should be taken into account 
in developing effective governance. 
7.6.4 Potential development of climate 
engineering policy in the EU 
With regard to the potential development of climate 
engineering policy in the EU, two perspectives need 
to be distinguished:  
 the positioning of the EU vis-à-vis climate enginee-
ring research; 
 where the EU as a whole fits into the wider emer-
ging regime complex on climate engineering. 
With regard to climate engineering research, the EU, 
through its seventh framework research programme 
(FP7), has already funded two projects that focus 
explicitly on climate engineering. Should the EU 
decide to support further research, it would be con-
sistent with the general principles outlined above to 
do so through programs that broadly investigate the 
environmental, political, legal, and societal implica-
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greenhouse gas removal techniques (in particular the 
technical uncertainties and the long timescales requi-
red to significantly influence global atmospheric CO2 
concentrations), a strict commitment to the 2°C limit 
could eventually lead to a very difficult decision over 
whether to deploy albedo modification techniques in 
order to stay within a given temperature threshold 
(e.g., the 2°C limit) or, while recognising the risks of 
such deployment, to allow the threshold to be 
crossed. 
Should the EU decide to develop climate engineering 
policy, then the conscientious application of princip-
les embodied in existing legal and regulatory structu-
res, and the development of strategies based on these, 
may help ensure coherence and consistency with the 
basic principles upon which broader European 
research and environmental policy are built. 
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